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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the inter-firm management of product development between a
vehicle manufacturer and six component suppliers actively participating in the design and
development process. It introduces the notion of design chain management, in a similar
way to the supply chain concept has been used to describe logistics and purchasing
relationships. This concept enables the product development process to be considered at
the inter-firm level between supplier and vehicle manufacturer.
Specifically, the research investigates: the nature of the inter-firm design process; the
changing requirements of the inter-firm relationship; and the mechanisms that promote
inter-firm design transactions. There is an extensive literature review, integrating related
themes in product development; coordination mechanisms; inter-firm relationships;
information processing; and supplier involvement. This review develops the key
components for managing design at the inter-firm level, which forms the basis for an
empirical examination of one UK vehicle manufacturer and six of its component
suppliers. The empirical part consists of in-depth analyses of the design management
process within each case study, and across the buyer-supplier relationship.
The research presents a classification of suppliers involved in product development based
on their relative responsibility for design, and the position each enters the product
development process. The thesis concludes that the core suppliers involved in early
exchanges of design information require more attention to long-term structural
mechanisms, such as supplier development initiatives, than to the use of CAD/CAM or
ED!. In particular, suppliers are investing in placing their own staff permanently within
their customer premises, in the form of guest (resident) engineers, and this is an area in
need of further research. In addition, there is a need for post-project reviews at both the
vehicle programme level and the individual system and component level. As project
management is devolved to the supply base, the ability to project manage both internally
and externally will determine those firms able to compete effectively in the market place.
xv
It's mid-August The temperature is a balmy 81°. An opeii road
tretchcs invitingly before you And you, lucky you, have just
eased yourself behind the wheel of a gleaming, open-topped,
Rover 200 Cabriolet.
You settle into the contoured sports seat
the elcgant burr walnut veneer dashboard
an airbag to protect you. (And a twin alarm system to protect the
car).
the award-winning 16 valve K-Series engine
The power operated triple layered hood glides over you
In the moment that takes, a reassuring thought comes to mind.
Rover put their Cabriolets through the same stringent water
pressure tests as their saloons and hatchbacks.
Thank you Mr Rover Designer1 you murmur to yourself Thongh
in the back of your mind you seem to recall that it was in fact
Signor Pinin Farina who designed the Rover 200 Cabnolet s
..	 elegant hood,
Source: Advertisement for the Rover 200 Cabriolet (July 1994)
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1	 DTRODUCTION
1.1	 Background
Sitting behind the steering wheel of a car, one would be correct in assuming that the
feeling and experience of the vehicle were a reflection of the marque: a Jaguar car, for
example, feels like a Jaguar car because that is what is important to the car's designers.
It is akin to a signature: a unique description of the product. However, one would be
wrong to assume the vehicle manufacturer has designed all the car. Vehicle design is a
subtle art of defining the product's specification and requirements (such as the feel or
aesthetic) and gathering the skills necessary to turn concept into commercial reality.
The design and development of a modern car require the coordination of many different
skills, and knowledge. A single company cannot acquire all of these in-house, as once
may have been done, but must look to the network of suppliers for inputs of design and
process expertise. 	 The ability to manage these suppliers within the vehicle
manufacturer's project management process will provide a key competitive advantage to
companies in the future. As Ivor Owen, Director-general of the Design Council in the
UK, recognises:
As the global marketplace becomes more competitive, the key to survival will be
to integrate internal functions, together with suppliers, into a concurrent
engineering operation. [1]
Over the past decade, competitive advantage has revolved around delivering products
quicker to the customer, ensuring quality throughout the production and delivery phases
and doing them cheaper. The result of these changes has been a concentration on
1
purchasing and supply management, and logistics management. As these downstream
operations become leaner (Lamming, 1993), focus will necessarily shift upstream to the
origins of the product (or service). Central to achieving this are the product
development relationships that a company will form with its outside suppliers. This
network of design contributions may be considered a design chain. Yet, very little
research work has been devoted to studying these relationships, in particular the division
of design responsibility. Much has been done to look at internal relationships, but few
studies have extended this work to include the early involvement of suppliers in product
development.
1.2	 Design chain management
The study of supply chain management (SCM) has in recent years received increasing
attention, not least from the acute awareness by firms that the satisfaction of the
customer (both immediate and final) requires a focus by all participants in the supply of
the product. SCM involves a complex supply network (of both manufacturing and
service operations) within the operating boundaries of a business or industry. In the
automotive industry, for example, this network is characterised by a variety of companies
involved in the manufacturing and distribution of vehicles and their component parts, as
well as the supply of raw materials. Hence, the key focuses of SCM are the manufacture
and distribution chains of a business or industry. Supply chain management has been
defined by Harrison and Jones (1990, p.283) as: "the management of all or some of the
businesses that add value to the goods or services ultimately received by the end
customer".
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Since SCM concerns those operations that add value to the goods and services, there is
often an assumption that development of the product, or services, is implicit to the
process of supply (for example Harrison and Jones, 1990). However, this does not
explicitly define product development as part of the supply chain, rather focusing on the
processes that add value. This view is certainly valid where no inter-firm design
relationship exists. For example, either where the focal organisation undertakes all
design engineering and process engineering tasks as intra-firm activities, or where those
external parts supplied in the design of a product are standard catalogue parts requiring
no alteration (for example, non-specialised fasteners). In these circumstances, the design
of the product requires no further external expertise (either product or process) other
than that found within the focal firm. Hence, there is no chain of activities between
firms. Nevertheless, the contribution of design and development activities within the
supply network has received recognition:
• Bessant (1991) argues that, whereas inter-firm relationships were once predominantly
based on materials procurement, a variety of other activities are now undertaken, inter
alia, design, purchasing, expertise/consultancy, distribution and marketing.
• Guy and Dale (1993, p. 30) reinforce the role of the supplier in design activities: "The
supplier base must be treated as an extension of the buying organization, especially
the buyer's design process ..."
• Macbeth and Ferguson (1994, p. 36) acknowledge the design process as a "...
particular supply chain ..."
• DeToni et a! (1994) view the design process as an element of the modern supply
transaction, within the service supply chain. Whereas the traditional supply chain has
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been based upon material supply transactions, a new approach to supply has emerged
based on material and service activities:
The supplier does not simply offer the buyer his production capacity, but rather
innovative, design and logistics capabilities. This complex of information and
technical collaboration consolidates a continuous and interactive dialogue
between the upper and lower ends of the productive chain. (DeToni et al, 1994,
p.5)
The design process can, therefore, be seen as part of the supply chain. A premise of this
thesis is that a design chain is embodied within the total supply network, but its
management should receive different, yet integrated, attention. Design and supply
transactions are different; there is, for example, in design: high task uncertainty; a need
for inter-firm organisational structures (teams); and the transfer primarily of information.
Due to these differences, it is useful to distinguish between those operations that are
design-related, and those that are finished goods related.
Design chains (also referred to here as encompassing development) can be viewed as a
specific form of supply chain that relates to the transfer of information between
organisations in the pursuit of product design and development. Whereas supply chain
management focuses on the manufacture and distribution relationships of a business,
design chain management is defined as the management of the participants, both internal
and external to a focal firm, that contribute the capabilities (knowledge and expertise)
necessary for the design and development of a product which, on completion, will
enable full-scale manufacture to commence.[2] This definition focuses the design chain
on the process of creating the product such that production may begin; hence, the chain
involves participants from concept, detail engineering, process engineering, prototype
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manufacturing, and after launch. The elements of design chains are elaborated further in
Chapter Five. Figure 1.1 illustrates the key components.
1.3	 Objective of the research
The main goal of the present research is to determine the changing nature of the inter-
organisational engineering design process between a vehicle manufacturer and its
suppliers. This process involves relationships where design expertise resides both
internal to the focal organisation (vehicle manufacturer) and external to it (through a
network of specialist suppliers). These suppliers are not merely parts' suppliers, but
contribute specific knowledge to designing the overall product, in the form of vehicle
components, systems and process knowledge.
1.4	 Rationale for a study of the automotive industry
The research has focused on a study of the product development process within the UK
automotive industry, for a number of reasons. First, a major finding of previous research
conducted on Rover Group Limited (Twigg, 1990) was the description of a fundamental
change in the design and development activities of automotive manufacturers, namely the
increasing contribution of external organisations to the product development process.
The increasing demand for new technologies and the acceptance that a single company
could no longer retain in-house all the necessary design and process capabilities was
witnessing a new set of relationships developing between motor vehicle manufacturers
and their suppliers (based on the exchange of engineering design information). In 1991,
5
Figure 1.1 The total supply network (design and supply chain)
End
Supply chain
	
element	 Main supply flow
(besign chain
	
Lelement	 - Design/engineering information flow
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there was no evidence of any studies following this phenomenon, despite evidence that
the Rover Group was one company actively seeking such relationships with component
suppliers. This observation was echoed by Cusumano and Nobeoka (1992, p. 283) in
their review of research performed on the automotive industry, by a need to analyse the
structure and process of inter-organisational coordination:
Although some studies exist on differences in supplier relationships by regions,
no study concentrates on the supplier coordination process in product
development, and there are even fewer studies on other forms of inter-
organizational coordination.
Second, in recent years there has been increased attention paid to the management of
supply chains, with one sector - the motor industry - being particularly noteworthy.
Since this study has proposed differentiating design chain management from supply chain
management, it seemed appropriate to investigate elements of the design chain in this
particular industry, thereby enabling a clear understanding of the similarities and
differences in parallel.
Third, since the late 1980s, the motor industry has witnessed significant changes to the
way product development is managed. Organisations have experienced the shortening of
product development lead times, the application of concurrent engineering practices, the
improved integration between functions (and the use of cross-functional teams), and the
flattening of organisational structures (Bertodo, 1988). Much of this work has focused
on the internal operations of the firm, and where there have been external operations,
these have largely been controlled through internal processes. However, since more
design and development effort is being directed externally, together with respective
levels of control, research was needed to understand better these new relationships. The
7
motor industry is, therefore, a suitable sector for study given the undoubted application
of these changes to it.
Fourth, the motor industry provides a rich data set of information on effective product
development and this present study complements previous work performed on it.
Despite attention being paid to the automotive product development at an international
scale (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Cusumano and Nobeoka, 1992), there is a deficiency of
detailed work on this in the UK. The UK industry operates differently to those of other
European countries, the USA and Japan. This research seeks to highlight this whilst, at
the same time, drawing attention to the topic of design chains.
Finally, since the topic of research concerns managing the product development of a
complex product, the motor industry is well suited for study. Both the product and
process of the industry are complex, as Fujimoto (1989, p.149) emphasises:
The car is a complex fabrication assembly product which involves numerous
functions, components, and production steps. Consequently, development of its
product and process requires a large project, involving hundreds or thousands of
specialised engineers and planners.
The organisation of this development process requires both the internal effort and,
increasingly, the contribution of external suppliers of material, components, and
engineering and production expertise. Thus, the industry provides an excellent
opportunity to investigate these organisational and inter-organisational issues.
8
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1.5	 Scope of the study
The thesis is centred on three main areas of literature: product development; inter-firm
relationships; and mechanisms for coordination. Figure 1.2 illustrates these three themes
and the areas of overlap between them that will be the focus of this study.
Figure 1.2	 Three themes in design chain management
Product
development
Management
of
interfaces
Coordination
mechanisms
Design
chain
management
Inter-firm
relations
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1.5.1 Product development
The research has used the information-processing perspective of product development,
based on Clark and Fujimoto (1991), as its main framework. This framework was
chosen given that various approaches to product development are used by firms. No
generic process is applicable and, therefore, a perspective following the information
flows was deemed appropriate.
Much of the literature on product development and innovation regards the process as
essentially internal to a firm. In the cases where inter-firm relations are indicated, these
have concentrated on technological collaborative agreements (such as joint ventures or
partnerships), often for policy or organisation behaviour study. The present research
examines the product development process at the operational level, to determine the
parameters in which management decisions are set, and the dynamics of inter-firm
relationships. It has adopted an approach that focuses on the information processing
perspective of inter-firm linkages. This has enabled the boundary of the firm to be
extended to the information system boundary, thereby including the contribution of
external design expertise.
1.5.2 Inter-firm relationships
This thesis has examined the literature on inter-firm relationships from the network
perspective of the Swedish School (such as Hâkansson et al, 1987) to the applied model
of lean supply developed by Lamming (1993). These provide understanding of the inter-
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firm development of both product and process technology. Where the network approach
has considered the contribution of suppliers of technical knowledge to the product
development process, this has generally been construed of as a complete process
innovation or basic/applied scientific research. A re-examination of the network
literature should indicate its applicability to acknowledging other forms of supplier
knowledge, such as technical process capabilities or engineering design input.
Lamming's (1993) work on automotive suppliers provides a rich description of the
evolution of the buyer-supplier relationship. These illustrate the emergence of suppliers
whose relationships require some degree of product development input. This research
will expand upon this theme.
1.5.3 Mechanisms for coordination
One objective of the research has been to examine the coordination mechanisms used in
inter-organisational relationships. The work of, inter alia, Galbraith (1973), and
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967b) on intra-firm integration mechanisms may find application
to the buyer-supplier relationship of the automotive industry. Research by the author
with Voss and Winch (for example Twigg, Voss and Winch, 1992) had observed
integration problems with suppliers involved in product development, whilst examining
CAD/CAM implementation. Consideration has therefore been given to the application of
intra-firm coordination mechanisms to the inter-firm relationship, in the absence of any
such study. This idea was further supported by Adler (1988) who had developed a
typology of coordination mechanisms, applied at the interdepartmental interface. Since
the start of the present research, there has been one application of integration
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mechanisms to inter-firm relationships in the automotive sector (Bensaou, 1992),
although not specifically to the product development process.
1.6	 Organisation of the thesis
The thesis is organised in nine chapters. The process of inter-firm product development
will be examined and discussed through a review of literature in Chapters Two to Five.
Different models of the product development process are presented and discussed in
Chapter Two, together with alternative organisational structures used for supporting
product development.
Chapter Three concentrates on the automotive industry, describing an information
systems generic model of automotive product development, and then examining and
discussing the changing role of buyer and supplier in inter-firm relationships. In
particular, it describes the emerging relationships affecting inter-firm product
development.
An information processing framework is developed in Chapter Four for meeting the
information requirements of inter-organisational product development. The coordination
of activities is discussed at both the intra and inter-organisational level, and a typology of
inter-organisational coordination mechanisms developed.
	 The components of
automotive design chains are examined and discussed in Chapter Five, where the design
capabilities of suppliers are constructed to form a typology of supplier involvement.
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The methodological procedures are explained in Chapter Six, where the appropriateness
of the case study methodological approach is presented. The project has focused on a
single host organisation (a vehicle manufacturer) to understand the nature of its product
development process, together with a selection of cases that represent a range of supply
inputs to this process. Chapters Seven and Eight present the design management
approaches of these cases, the key participants, and examine specific examples to
illustrate the differences and similarities that will enable a better understanding of the
buyer-supplier product development relationships.
Finally, in Chapter Nine, the main findings of the research are examined and the
implications of these are presented. Some directions for future research are proposed,
where areas of inter-organisational coordination or limitations of this project have been
found to warrant further investigation.
NOTES
1. 'Design tool that too many ignore', Ingenuity: The Financial Times Engineering Review, 14
September 1993, p. 5.
2. The term design chain management was first proposed by the author in April 1991 to shape
the design and development relationships witnessed in an earlier study (Twigg, 1990) within
the supply chain of Rover Group Ltd. This definition of design chain management has been
submitted for inclusion in Slack, N. (Ed) The Blackwell Dictionary of Operations
Management, Blackwell: Oxford (in press).
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2 PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
2.1	 Introduction
This chapter reviews the literature on product development, highlighting the range of
models available to firms and researchers to investigate the process, and discusses the
key elements of the process. It shows how the product development process has evolved
from being stage controlled, through cross-functional, overlapping phases towards an
integrated, iterative process.
Product development is the process of converting resources (knowledge and materials)
into a commercial product through several sub-activities (such as product planning,
engineering and production) (Twiss, 1986). Figure 2.1 illustrates this conversion
process. There are two elements to this process: the conversion of knowledge (technical
and market) into a product plan; and the use of materials and process knowledge to
convert the product plan into a final product.
An important element of figure 2.1 is the source of knowledge. This may be from basic
and advanced research, or market/customer needs: these are commonly referred to as
technology-push (Schumpeter, 1964) and demand-pull (Schmookler, 1966). Rothwell
and Zegveld (1985) incorporate these two models into an interactive model of technical
change (figure 2.2), which is not unlike the conversion process in figure 2.1. The benefit
of Rothweil and Zegveld's model is self-evident: product development is a combination
of both technological developments (push) and meeting market needs (pull). Despite
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Conversion	 Output
Figure 2.1 Product development as a conversion process
knowledge
Product planning
$
Product
engineering
input
Source: after Trygg (1991) and Clark and Fujimoto (1991)
being acknowledged for sometime, customer driven development has received renewed
attention as the voice of the customer is heard (Hauser and Clausing, 1988).
2.2 A definition of new product
To begin an examination of the new product development process, the term new product
requires definition, since newness is a relative term to a specific situation. Hayes,
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Figure 2.2 Interactive model of technical change
New
need Needs of society and the marketplace
Idea conception I Marketing
Development	 Manufacturing I	 I and sales
New
technological
	 State of the art in technology and production techniques
capability
Source: Rothwell and Zegveld (1985)
Wheelwright and Clark (1988) express new development projects in terms of changes
that range from incremental to radical, in both product and process technology. At
either extreme, a radical change could be the introduction of a new core product
(creating a new market), whereas an incremental change would be expressed by
component changes through a planned engineering change. Between these extremes
exist next generation products - changes that include the next generation of a core
product, an addition to the product family, or add-ons and enhancements. Henderson
and Clark (1990, p.9) distinguish new products by changes to their core concepts and
components, hence:
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1. incremental: where relatively minor changes occur to an existing product;
2. radical: where new technical and commercial skills result in a new product with new
markets and applications;
3. modular: where a core design concept (the basic underlying knowledge) is changed,
while the way the components of the product are linked together (the architecture) is
left unchanged;
4. architectural: where the overall architecture is changed, while leaving the components
and core design concepts they embody unchanged.
They argue that successful product development requires: component knowledge
(knowledge about the core design concepts and the way they are integrated into the
component); and architectural knowledge (knowledge about the way the components
are integrated into a coherent whole). This is a useful distinction between the knowledge
requirements for product development, and hence the location of responsibility for new
product development. In the automotive industry, for example, the architectural
knowledge of the product will be located clearly with the vehicle manufacturer (the
external integrity of the product as translated through the product strategy) whilst
component knowledge (internal integrity) may be more widely distributed between
vehicle manufacturer and suppliers of components, component systems, and design
houses; these are discussed later in Chapter Three. Hence, the process of development
will experience different levels of activity and structure in each phase, depending on the
relative type of newness. This process of development is now examined.
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2.3	 The activities within the product development process
A plethora of models can be found in the literature on product development, each
illustrating their approach to the total process and placing specific emphasis on particular
sub-activities. These differences are clearly visible from the two main perspectives to
product development represented in the literature: a marketing and consumer orientation
(for example, Crawford 1983; Urban, Hauser and Dholakia 1987), and a technology and
operations orientation (for example, Twiss 1986; Wheelwright and Clark 1992). Each
perspective outlines similar broad activities, only with vaiyin ,g degrees of concentration;
figure 2.3 illustrated the similarities among four examples of product development
model. The purpose for this comparison is to demonstrate the various emphases placed
by models and the essential similarity in the overall process. These models have been
extrapolated from their originals to highlight the stage process but figure 2.3 does not
represent the entire process. For example, figure 2.3 suggests that Hayes, Wheelwright
and Clark (1988) do not specif' the development of a new product • strategy plan,
whereas they do in fact view such a development plan as implicit to the process. The
features of each stage reflect the differentiation of functionally separate tasks, and their
elaboration into further sub-divisions. Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1986) choose to
distinguish 13 separate activities in their model of product development{ 1], but for the
purposes of this discussion, however, it is necessary only to be aware of the broad band
of activities.
A simplified model of the new product development process is presented in figure 2.4,
based on the work of Crawford (1983). Two points are noteworthy of this model: first,
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Figure 2.3 Various models of the product development process
NEDO (1979)	 Booz, Allen and	 Souder (1987)
	 Hayes,
Hamilton (1982)
	 Wheelwright and
Clark (1988)
New product	 (*)
strategic plan
Identify need or
	 Focused idea
	 Exploratory	 Knowledge
want	 generation	 acquisition
Specification
Concept	 Concept	 Concept
development	 development	 investigation
Conceptual design
	 Basic design
preparation
Preliminary cost
	 Business analysis
estimate
Evaluation
Detail design
	 Prototype	 Prototype	 Prototype building
development	 development	 and testing
Prototype
Testing
Manufacture	 Commercialisation
Product launch
Product review
Prototype testing
	 Pilot production run
Market
development
Manufacturing	 Manufacturing
start-up	 introduction and
ramp-up
Marketing start-up
Technical service
	 On-going
enhancement
Phase-out
Note: The divisions act as approximates to illustrate similar activities across the models.
These divisions should not be viewed as limitations on possible over-lapping
activities.
(*)	 A strategy formulation stage is assumed to have taken place in this model.
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the process develops out of a strategic planning stage; and, second, the development
stage emphasises the parallel roles of the technological and marketing development, and
the contribution of an evaluating function.
The importance of a product strategy to precede the product development process is also
emphasised by Booz, Allen & Hamilton (1982), Urban eta! (1987), and Freeman (1982).
In their model, Booz, Allen & Hamilton precede the idea generation stage with the
interaction of various strategy activities - business strategy, new products strategy and
new product strategic plan.
A spectrum of innovation/product strategies is available to an organisation, from
proactive to reactive strategies. The choice of strategy will largely depend on the
resource structures, type of business, and strategic orientation of the organisation (Urban
et a!, 1987). Proactive strategies reflect organisations that have an aggressive policy
towards growth, and commit resources in the pursuance of customer needs and
technological opportunities, design new products, and anticipate changes in market
behaviour. A proactive strategy will utilise every activity of the product development
process, whereas following a reactive strategy, such as responsive, imitative and
defensive strategies, will see fewer development activities being undertaken internally,
because these are carried out by competitors and outsiders (Urban et a!, 1987). A
reactive strategy may be chosen over a proactive initiative where, for example, markets
for new products are too small to recover development costs, the firm has insufficient
development resources, or little innovation protection is available to the firm. Since
firms generally have a portfolio of products, it is almost certain that a variety of proactive
20
Figure 2.4 The new product development process
Strategic planning
for new products
Concept generation
and development
Screening
(concept testing)
Technical
Original concept
Protocol
Basic/applied
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Prototype
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Pilot plant
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Screening
Prototype/concept
testing
Preliminary
financial evaluation
Product use-tests
Market testing
Marketing
Concept
Preliminary strategy
Final strategy
Preliminary tactical
planning
Control planning
(Physical product) (Evaluation) 	 (Marketing plan)
Launch of product
Source: Expanded from Crawford (1983)
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and reactive strategies will exist within the firm. This heightens the importance for any
new product strategy plan to be in line with both the business and existing product
strategies of the firm.
The strategy stage of the process begins by clearly stating the purpose of new product
development. This will involve establishing the overall direction of activities (such as
strategic orientation), the setting of specific objectives, and the general policies to
facilitate meeting these objectives. Crawford (1983) refers to this combined statement as
a product innovation charter.[2] Once the purpose of product development has been
defined, various concepts can be created and tested. These concepts may originate from
technological ideas, or customer needs, and represent product opportunities rather than
actual products. Any concepts will then receive a preliminaiy evaluation, after which
successful concepts will be developed or enhanced.[3] The developed concepts can then
be screened. Screening provides an opportunity to evaluate alternative product
concepts, whereupon more resources may be provided to a selection of concepts for
further review, prior to a final go/no go decision. The screening stage will also
determine whether a product development programme or project is to be established,
depending on the extent to which fundamental R&D is required.
The process of developing a product concept into a commercial reality, requires three
parallel activities: technical, evaluative, and market planning (Crawford, 1983). These
three activities transform rather generalised and vague concepts into specific products.
Beginning with a verbalised product concept, the technical activity focuses on the
available technologies to develop preliminaiy product configurations (such as product
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sketches or clay models). These are followed by prototypes and final specifications, and
the completion of manufacturing activities. Simultaneous to these activities is the
evolution of a marketing plan, through which the proposed marketing actions can be
formulated and tested prior to the completion of the technical product. To ensure that
the technical and marketing activities are consistent with each other, and that the
outcome and rate of development are fulfilling the requirements of product strategy, a
review procedure (evaluative activity) exists between these two operations (Crawford,
1983).
At some point within the development process a decision will be made to commercialise
the concept. This may be at the point of screening, or after further development work.
However, the launching of the product will only take place once the three phases of
development have been completed, although much of the preliminary work will have
taken place throughout this stage. The launch of a new product is not the end of the
process, since feedback may be provided to new projects or existing product
programmes, with line extensions and product improvements.
The discussion so far indicates that some development activities may not be used under
certain strategic situations. The degree to which particular activities are undertaken in
the development process is also a reflection of the type of product. Souder (1987)
compares the cost and duration of new product innovations across eight industrial
sectors, using the eight stages indicated in Table 2.1. [4] Although his findings provide
some support for the conventional pattern of cost distribution for innovations across
each stage, exceptions to conventional thought were found and can be explained by the
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Table 2.1	 Stages of the life-cycle model for means-generated innovations
Stage Label	 Description
1	 exploratory	 search and inquiry activities, often funded by
corporate monies, usually phenomenon oriented
2	 concept development	 concept elaboration, extension, and substantiation
activities aimed at the clarification or elaboration of
previously generated ideas or concepts
3	 prototype development differs from stage 2 in that a commercially relevant
prototype, first model, or product has been
identified and is targeted
4	 prototype testing
5	 market development
6	 manufacturing start-up
7	 marketing start-up
8	 technical service
laboratory, field, or production-scale evaluations
market generation, demand simulation, and market
analyses activities
initial production runs, scale-up, and preparation
for full-scale activities
preparation for full-scale market entry
follow-on market and technical activities that
accompany the introduction of the new product
Source: Sbuder (1987, table 4-1)
study's concentration on means-generated innovations. However, the aggregation of
certain stage costs provides a reasonable reflection of the different orientations of
industrial sectors, namely in those activities their efforts are concentrated. Table 2.2
provides a summary of the aggregation of total development and marketing costs. These
data show that the glass, machinery, plastics and transportation industries have the bulk
of their projects' expenditures in research, development, and engineering activities,
whereas the bulk of project expenditures for the chemicals, electronics, food and metals
industries appear to be in marketing and production activities.
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Table 2.2	 Aggregated stage costs for means-generated innovations (by percentage)
Industry	 Development costs	 Marketing costs
(Stages 2 and 3)	 (Stages 5 and 7)
Glass	 45	 15
Machinery	 45	 17
Plastics	 51	 22
Transportation	 40	 18
Chemicals	 16	 34
Electronics	 17	 20
Food	 31	 39
Metals	 25	 42
Note: Stage 2 is concept development; stage 3 is prototype development; stage 5 is market
development; and stage 7 is marketing start-up.
Source: Souder (1987, table 4-3)
2.4 Product development as a stage model
Product development consists of the movement of a product idea from concept through
to market availability. This process involves a variety of distinct phases that have been
traditionally viewed as individual, pre-determined steps, each of which required
completion before subsequent stages could begin. In its simplified form, a new product
is likely to have been transformed through the following stages: concept generation and
screening; product design; prototype development and testing; process development;
pilot production; and final production.
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Taken as discrete steps, this linear (or sequential) process requires the completion of
product design and prototype activities prior to the release of data to manufacture. This
step-by-step process has been likened to a relay race in which the baton is passed from
one runner to the next (Takeuchi and Nonaka 1986; Uttal 1987): the work of an
upstream stage (for example, product engineering) is only passed downstream (for
example, to process engineering) when the stage is complete. In extreme cases, this
approach is typified by reference to 'over the wall' engineering, where little-to-no
discussion takes place between upstream and downstream phases, and designs are
transferred unidirectionally (as a batch transmission of information), it is only when
senior management is ready to accept responsibility for the completed work of its area
that the project is signed-off for work by the next group. This sequential approach has
been a dominant form of product development in US and European companies since the
1960s (Uttal 1987).
Hence, a characteristic of the stage model is the use of control mechanisms, determining
go/stop decisions between each stage. Cooper (1990 and 1994) refers to this as the
stage-gate process. Typical of this approach is the NASA-type phased project planning
(PPP) system (also known as the Phased Review Process): "Under this system, a new
product development project moves through different phases ... in a logical, step-by-step
fashion. The project proceeds to the next phase only after all the requirements are
satisfied, thereby minimising risk" (Imai eta!, 1985, p.349).
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2.4.1 Examples of the stage model
Two examples serve to illustrate the process of development in a simplified, linear form
and the elements of project management used in the sequential stage approach. The first
is a composite case - Medical Electronics Incorporated - based on several companies'
experiences, whilst the second, is the Eastman Kodak Company (Wheelwright and Clark
1992).
2.4.1.1 Medical Electronics Incorporated
In 1991, Medical Electronics Incorporated (MET) introduced a portable, premature
infant heart monitoring machine, the MEl 2010, into the market (Wheelwright and Clark,
1992). The 2010 product had undergone five development phases on reaching the
market place: concept development; engineering prototyping; production prototyping;
market acceptance testing; and market introduction.
Concept development: The concept originated in 1984, from informal discussions
between an electrical design engineer and a marketing specialist. It was the electrical
design engineer who championed the idea, and engineering who focused attention on the
concept; it was only when marketing grasped the idea that the project made it into the
active list of the 15-20 company projects. Various features of the final product (such as
sensors and software) had there origins, however, from existing projects within MEl;
hence, the creation of the final concept - and allocation of a capital budget in late 1986 -
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was seen as a convergence of existing ideas, in the absence of any formal written
proposal until 1991! During the formal concept phase, Marketing took responsibility for
project leadership.
Engineering prololyping: On allocation of a formal capital budget, the project was
assigned to the project manager (the design engineering manager); hence, project
leadership was transferred to the engineering function. Despite managing three other
projects, he was able to devote 40% of his effort to the 2010. (Besides project
managing, he retained responsibility as functional head of the electrical engineering
subgroup - MET had five engineering subgroups, each with functional heads.) The
engineering project team consisted of three additional electrical engineers and a
mechanical engineer (who reported to the head of the mechanical engineering subgroup
for individual task assignments). This division in reporting procedures created working
and communication difficulties for the project manager. Similarly, management of the
project was further compounded by there being 38 staff across five subgroups,
undertaking nearly 20 projects between them. Moreover, as new staff were employed,
repetition of previous exploratory suggestions and tasks occurred as poor
communication inhibited transfer of current work and experience.
The first engineering prototype arrived in late 1987; this enabled marketing to get more
involved since they could now 'feel and touch' the concept. The second engineering
prototype, which arrived in the following spring, further enabled marketing to show a
visible item to customers. Customer feedback of the desired features was informally
communicated from marketing to engineering; engineering was still involved in
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undertaking numerous tasks before completion of the engineering phase. Finally, in late
1988, after a third or fourth prototype - the company was not certain as to the number -
engineering validated the engineering design and handed over the project to production.
Production prototyping: Manufacturing first became formally involved in late 1988.
Although some early observations to the project had been made in review meetings,
manufacturing had waited for the validated engineering design before proceeding with
outlining production tasks, creating material lists, preparing vendor plans, or establishing
factory test procedures (with engineering).
General responsibility for the 2010 was taken by the manufacturing vice-president,
although much of the day-to-day responsibility was given to a manufacturing engineer.
The original plan for a batch of 10 units was delayed due to changes in the vendor base,
requirements for tighter tolerances and improved vendor operations capabilities. Even
after a nine month delay, only 75% of the pilot batch was represented by the work of
production vendors; the remaining 25% had been custom built by job shops. Market
acceptance finally received the pilot units in late 1989.
Market acceptance testing: The objective of this phase was to validate the product and
ensure consistency of performance. The phase involved a wide range of testing and
approval processes: life testing; government approval testing; and testing early
prototypes with customers. The technical issues were handled by the quality assurance
group, whilst customer matters were overseen by marketing.
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Quality assurance developed a market acceptance test plan at the end of 1989; however,
since the project was already behind schedule, the normal six to nine months of testing
was reduced to four months. Customer testing showed a need to redesign the product in
three areas (two minor changes and one major change being required). The two minor
changes were acted upon immediately, but the major engineering change required formal
agreement. Finally, amended prototypes were ready by autumn 1990. By this time, the
original and amended launch dates had passed by. In an effort to release the product
from quality assurance, only mandatory government standards and functional
performance requirements were tested and met. The customer ease of use and
serviceability issues were cut back.
Market introduction: Even once the testing was complete, the launch date was delayed
two months as manufacturing found material faults amongst commodities sourced from
the 25% of vendors not involved in the pilot batch. Although engineering changes were
still in progress, manufacturing and marketing, under pressure from senior management,
finally approved the first release of the product in January 1991.
The success of the product led to over use by customers. One result of this was
frustration over how difficult it was to use, but also over the ease of breaking the wheels
(due to over-use). In addition, there were further technical and service problems.
Moreover, shortly after their launch, a major competitor introduced a premature infant
monitoring device, which appeared easier to use, although perhaps not offering as many
features.
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2.4.1.2Eastman Kodak Company
The Eastman Kodak Company has a similar, functionally oriented product development
process to MET, referred to internally as the Manufacturability Assurance Process
(Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). The process uses a series of phases, which are
functionally controlled in both focus and operation. Kodak uses a set of phases and
gales. Six distinct phases describe the development process: customer mission/vision;
technical demonstration; technical/operational feasibility; capability demonstration;
product/process design; and, acceptance and production.
After an initial customer mission/vision phase, the R&D group undertake a series of
technical demonstration and feasibility tasks; on completion of these, commercialisation
begins as the project passes from engineering, through production and quality assurance
to the market place. Although similar to the process at MET in terms of phases, Kodak
differs from MET in that it has a clear customer mission statement (rather than being
fuzzy) and controls the management of the process through gatekeepers and
stakeholders (there are clearer demarcations between phases). At the transition stage of
each phase, a gatekeeper (upstream) releases the project to a stakeholder (downstream)
in the next phase. In this way, conlrol is maintained over the project at a single point, or
'gate'. Although each stage is undertaken sequentially, there is some overlap of R&D
and engineering in phase four.
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2.4.2 Advantages and shortcomings of the stage approach
The sequential approach is held to have several advantages (Uttal, 1987; Shenas and
Derakhshan, 1994). First, the distinct stages make the process easy to manage and
control since each stage is pre-determined and each stage can be reviewed. Second,
uncertainty is reduced before the next phase begins, since the information received
downstream is assumed to be complete. In this way, risk can be better managed if the
appropriate control (review) mechanisms are in place. Third, the phased approach assists
in optimising functional expertise, since each manager can focus on a limited number of
tasks. Hence, if a primary performance driver is resource utiisation, for example,
advantages may accrue from clearly dividing the tasks in this way. Finally, engineers can
be kept active by participating on a variety of projects.
However, as the two cases show, many problems can arise from the linear approach. For
example, it may create products that are difficult to make, inappropriate for the
customer, and extremely slow to reach the market (Uttal 1987). Coddington (1987),
referring to the development of highway and construction industries' equipment, sees the
traditional 'blacksmith' approach (where cut-and-try methods of subsequent build
eventually lead to a durable although costly machine) as having three major
shortcomings: first, the increased length of time spent on new product development;
second, the increased cost of development resulting from the expensive need for
experimental build; and third, a resultant machine that has been over-designed, and which
is not cost competitive.
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One explanation for the delay to market can be attributed to the need for product
redesign, resulting from a failure to involve manufacturing early enough in the design
phase: "... traditionally, in the UK, products are first designed in isolation and then
designed for manufacture, resulting in long lead times because of production problems"
(Burman 1992, p.61). If the principles of design for manufacture, quality function
deployment and Taguchi methods were incorporated, much time, effort and money could
be minimised by the early interaction of product, process and customer need in the
design stage (Stoll 1986). Hence, there is a need for interdisciplinary inputs, including
customers and suppliers (Hart and Baker, 1994).
Shenas and Derakhshan (1994, p. 31) in supporting many of these disadvantages,
highlight many weaknesses with the sequential design process:
.there is little overlap between design and manufacturing decisions. The ultimate
goal ... is usually lowest cost, when the goal should include optimal product
performance, quality, robustness and conformance. Additionally, such issues as
manufacturability, quality control and ease of assembly are not considered until
the later production modules, when a design change may be very costly.
production planning, support analysis, maintenance and reliability are considered
separately from the design process. The designers by themselves must select the
particular aspects and parameters of the product with minimal input from
production engineers who are responsible for the implementation
consequently, information is lost as the design progresses through consecutive
production modules....Finally, designers usually do not set cost reduction as a
goal because they are not aware of cost information owing to poor
communication with the manufacturing experts.
Cooper (1994), whist accepting that the stage model can promote discipline and reduce
technical risks, sees the over-formality of the stage model as a major shortcoming. For
example, the process is laborious, requiring dozens of tasks to be checked-off at each
review point. One means of increasing the through-put time is to overlap activities
within the process.
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2.5 Overlapping product development
Imai ci a! (1985) consider the sequential approach to be inappropriate for development
that requires speed and flexibility, hence as the criteria for competing through product
development have advanced since the mid-1980s, so too have approaches to the process
itself: simultaneous engineering, concurrent engineering, forward engineering,
integrated problem solving, parallel engineering, team approach, and life-cycle
engineering are some of the terms that have been applied to the evolving piocess (hnai
et al, 1985; Stoll, 1986; Andreasen and Hem, 1987; Uttal, 1987; Coddington, 1987;
Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). The use of sporting metaphors has also developed with Imai
et al (1985) citing the rugby football approach to product development by Honda, where
an overlapping of activities provides an improved setting for product development. The
essential objectives of simultaneous engineering, for example, are captured well by Rolls-
Royce Aero Engines: "Simultaneous engineering attempts to optimise the design of the
product and manufacturing process to achieve lead times and improved quality and cost
by the integration of design and manufacturing activities and by maximising parallelism in
working practices" (Broughton, 1990, p.26).
The sequential approach is considered by Imai et a! (1985) as inappropriate for the
development of engineering projects that require speed and flexibility. In their study of
five Japanese engineering cases (Fuji-Xerox, Honda, Canon, NEC, and Epson), they
identify overlapping product development as a factor that assists firms, inter alia, to
reduce total development cycle time and enable competition through flexibility (the
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adaptation of the development process to changes in the external environment).[5]
Overlapping development is where downstream activities receive resources prior to the
completion, but after the start, of the upstream task. Figure 2.5 illustrates the sequential
process against the overlapping phases of development. Two types of overlapping
development model can be identified: those where successive tasks are undertaken in
parallel, as information (sometimes as technology) is transferred at each interface; and
those where a greater overlap extends across several phases and, thus, several tasks may
be undertaken simultaneously.
2.5.1 Example of a partial overlapping approach
Wheelwright and Clark (1992, pp. 156-59) illustrate a revised linear model with the case
of General Electric, where there was a partial overlap between the design/process and
manufacturing/planning phases, through the use of cross-functional phases and integrated
tasks through using a project team approach.
The tollgate process, as they term it, is based on seven stages (or themes) which have
superimposed onto it 10 programme phases, defined by a management review procedure.
Hence, the programme phases manage the process of development through the seven
themes (see figure 2.6). By using relatively short programmes, senior management is
able to maintain control over the process and to manage risks by having the opportunity
to change direction or emphasis at each review stage, before the risks become too great.
Hence, risk management is the primary performance driver, although the process does
enable the maximisation of resource utilisation.
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Figure 2.5 Alternative approaches to product development
(a)	 Sequential phases
Cnpt
.genera*oi
time
(b) Overlapping approach
Ptodut
+
time
Note: The duration of phases indicated is nominal and therefore should not to be representative
of actual development projects. In figure 2.5 (b) the product and process engineering
phases are deliberately longer to imply longer duration.
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Figure 2.6 Tollgate process at General Electric
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Programme Phase/Review Objective
1 Customer/consumer needs Quantification and articulation of the nature of the customer
need(s). Generation of product line management/marketing
concurrence on desired product specifications.
2	 Concept review	 Conceptualisation of product design alternatives in response
to definition of customer need. Authorisation to develop
product prototype(s).
Feasibility review	 Presentation of product design approaches.
Preliminary design review Agreement on product design and manufacturing approach.
-	 Authorisation to make pilot equipment.
Final design review	 Final product design. Final equipment design.
Critical producibility 	 Verification that in-plant production on prototype equipment
review	 replicates final process (in small scale) as it pertains to
product process, and equipment
Market/field test review	 Review of results of market and field tests conducted with
products made on prototype equipment.
Manufacturing feasibility Final equipment review in production mode.
review
Market readiness review	 Verification that all marketing steps have been completed
prior to product introduction.
Market introduction and	 Determination of what changes (if any) need to be made in
follow-up	 product, process, etc.
Source: Wheelwright and Clark (1992, exhibit 6-5)
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First, a specification of the customer needs is developed and reviewed, once marketing
and line management are in agreement over the detail of the desired product
specifications. Only after this review can the development of the concept design and
authorisation for prototyping begin. Alternative product designs are conceptualised, in
relation to the customer needs and development concludes with a feasibility review.
Some overlap between design and manufacturing occurs during the design/process and
manufacturing/planning phases. In order for a preliminary design review to be approved,
agreement between the product design and manufacturing approach is required. Only
then can authorisation be given for making pilot equipment. The final design review, at
which product and equipment designs are agreed, sees the beginning of the pre-
production phase. The manufacturing and planning phase is still operating concurrent to
these activities.
During the pre-production and final stages of manufacturing/planning, prototype
equipment verifies that the final process is representative of product, process and
equipment outputs - this is checked through the critical producibility review. Similarly,
the market/field test review establishes the results of prototype manufactured products.
Production begins once a manufacturing feasibility review has taken place. It is during
this stage that the preparation for the market place is verified (market readiness review).
The final review stage occurs after market introduction has taken place, in order to
determine any likely changes to product, process or equipment.
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Some of the essential features of General Electric's development programme is the
extensive use of integration mechanisms (a liaison team, programme manager, and cross-
functional phases), when compared with Kodak or MEl, and the more centralised, senior
management directed review process. The close control of the process by senior
management lends itself to a better assessment of risk; in this way, the more coordinated
and linked approach of General Electric may be more appropriate where time-to-market
and a coordinated technical/marketing strategy are important elements of the
development process.
Another example of this partial overlapping approach is provided by the development of
the Fuji-Xerox FX-3500, medium-sized photocopier (Imai et a!, 1985; Takeuchi and
Nonaka, 1986). Fuji-Xerox inherited a traditional PPP system from the parent company
which it revised in two ways: first, it reduced the number of development phases from six
to four (combining and redefining some) and, second, through changing the sequential
approach into, what Fuji-Xerox refers to as, the sashimi system (Sashimi is a Japanese
culinary dish where slices of raw fish are tilted on a plate, one slice overlapping the
other). Essential to this approach is extensive social interactions amongst the team
members, but also other parties involved, such as a cooperative network of suppliers.
The result of using this revised PPP system was a shortening of the total development
time from 38 months for a similar prior model to 29 months for the FX-3 500
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2.5.2 Example of an extensive overlapping approach
The second model of overlapping requires a greater overlap across stages. This
approach is typified by Honda's development of a city (1200cc engine) car in 1981, and
Canon's development of the Autoboy (Sureshot) lens shutter camera in 1979. Honda's
rugby football approach to product development involves all core project members
seeing through the development from start to finish, with the responsibility for combining
all phases. This continuous approach is intended to smooth out potential problems that
can arise at the adjoining phases, as projects are traditionally passed from one phase to
the next. Similarly, there was extensive overlapping in Canon's development process:
design engineers followed the project to ensure it was being produced as they had
envisaged, and manufacturing engineers advised on design aspects to ensure the design
met with their requirements.
2.5.3 Advantages and shortcomings of the overlapping approach
A disadvantage of the earlier stage model was its failure to incorporate related
development activities, as Hart and Baker (1994, p.&3, italics in original) suggest:
product development activity is not only iterative between stages but also within stages".
However, the overlapping approach has overcome this through encouraging
multifunctional discussion within each activity stage. This promotes a quicker process,
as problems are considered concurrently.
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Imai ci a! (1985) extol the benefit of the overlapping approach to the faster speed of
development and increased flexibility, as well as the sharing of information and a variety
of human resource management issues. For example, it can foster a generalist's strategic
view, enhance shared responsibility and cooperation, stimulate involvement and
commitment of the workforce, and orientate the organisation towards problem solving.
On the other hand, overlapping development increases the burden of managing the
process exponentially, increases ambiguity, tension and conflict with the group, and
increases the burden of coordinating the intake and dissemination of information (Imai ci
al, 1985, p. 351).
2.6	 Integrated product development
The integrated approach differs from the overlapping model insofar as a greater emphasis
is placed on cross-functional input throughout the development process and the early
release of information to downstream activities. For example, process engineering has
the opportunity to discuss implications for the design at concept stage, enabling faster
feedback of redesign requirements and consideration of phasing in new capital
equipment. Hart and Baker (1994) criticise the overlapping (parallel processing) model
for neglecting customer and supplier inputs, and for the lack of convergence on stages.
They propose a multiple convergent process that enables multifunctional decision-
making to take place between stages. Their argument for greater control to take place at
the gates (or points of convergence) is expressed as follows:
the [product development] process is a series of information gathering and
evaluating activities, and as the new product develops from idea to concept to
prototype and so on, the information gathered becomes more precise and reliable
and the decisions are made with greater certainty. Therefore as the development
project progresses, there are a number of natural points of evaluation and a
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number of types of evaluation (market, functional) which need to be carried out
in an integrated fashion. Hence there are multiple convergent points. (Hart and
Baker, 1994, p. 86)
Wheelwright and Clark (1992) provide a framework that accommodates these points
(figure 2.7). Three functional areas are indicated and their participation across the
product development process: engineering (focusing on product design); manufacturing
(including process development, manufacturing engineering and plant operations); and
marketing (responsible for market research and sales). This can be seen as an integrated
approach, and three points are noteworthy: first, other functional areas could be added to
figure 2.7, together with customers and suppliers; second, iteration of participants can
take place within stages; and third, integration mechanisms (such as review meetings) act
as convergence points - redressing the criticisms of Hart and Baker (1994).
The author has witnessed such a process in a clutch manufacturer in which 10 separate
groups (including customers) were identified as participants at review meetings, with
varying degrees of inputs throughout the process. An important key point to emphasise
is that although a group may not undertake a particular activity, the review procedure
enables them to have an early input. For example, manufacturing has the opportunity to
propose and investigate concepts early in the process, and similarly marketing does not
wait for full-engineering prototypes before interacting with the customer (Wheelwright
and Clark, 1992). The aim of the integrated approach is to improve integration and
promote the effective early involvement of all participants.
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The milestones in figure 2.7 indicate opportunities for each function to focus attention on
their respective activities and to see how these interface with other functions. Hence
each phase and milestone should have an element for all participants.
2.6.1 Integrating upstream and downstream operations
The overlapping and integrated approaches promote communication and transfer of
information by bringing together multifunctional teams at critical points in the product
development process. It may range from relatively simple early release of information to
intensive two-way communication. From a study of the world automotive industry, Clark
and Fujimoto (1989, 1991; Fujimoto, 1989) show that effective integration between
activities in product development requires the early release of information, intensive two-
way information flow, and mechanisms to facilitate these aims. These will be examined
in detail in later chapters, but a preliminary outline of the transmission of information
across activities assists in reviewing the various models of product development process,
thus emphasising the benefits of an integrated approach.
Figure 2.8 illustrates four situations of activity interaction. Figure 2.8(a) is characteristic
of the sequential, single batch transfer of information. In this, information is only
transferred when the upstream activity has been completed. Thus, no account is taken of
the downstream requirements. Figure 2.8(b) and (c) characterise overlapping problem-
solving. A partial overlap may occur as the downstream activity begins work on the
project without the availability of upstream information. The transfer of information is
similar, insofar as it is transmitted only on completion of the upstream activity. If
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Figure 2.8 Upstream-downstream interaction
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Source: Wheelwright and Clark (1992, exhibit 7-4)
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information is released earlier, downstream operations have the opportunity to begin
their work and recommend necessaiy changes to the product design. Finally, figure
2.8(d) shows the integrated approach: upstream and downstream activities are linked in
both time and communication. Information is shared from the start and feedback is
integral to the process: it is both rich in quality and intensive.
The discussion thus far has outlined alternative approaches to the process of product
development. It has been shown that the sequential approach, although reducing
technical risks, is time-consuming. The integrated approach is advocated where products
are complex and intensive iterations are required to deliver products speedily to market.
The process, however, is only part of a company's product development equation. The
organisation of the activities structures the process and through the resources available
to it, which now receives discussion.
2.7	 Organisation structures for product development
There are a variety of organisation forms under which product development can be
organised, since the choice of structure will be subject to, inter alia, the availability of
resources, the competitive environment (such as the speed of product introduction), and
the age and variety of the product base. For example, as the management of product
development has incorporated the need for cross-functional coordination, reductions in
lead times and so forth, there has been a movement away from the traditionally organised
functional structure, towards alternatives with tighter project management through which
tasks may be undertaken simultaneously.
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Larson and Gobeli (1987 and 1988) identif, five separate project management structures
along a continuum, based on the work of Galbraith (1971): a spectrum of alternative
structures can be considered from a pure functional organisation, with increasing
importance of tighter project management towards a pure project-based team. A pure,
functional based organisation aims to maintain functional (or discipline) strengths whilst
supporting many projects, whilst a pure, project based organisation specialises
development around a single product within a dedicated project team. Lying between
these extremes are structures based on the combination of these two pure forms: the
matrix organisation. Three hybrid forms can be identified within the matrix structure:
functional matrix, balanced matrix, and project matrix (Larson and Gobeli, 1987 and
1988; Harrison, 1992).
Similarly, the work of Clark (with Hayes and Wheelwright, 1988; 1991; with
Wheelwright, 1992) reflects both the pure and hybrid structures. Using work originating
from Fujimoto (1989), four dominant organisational structures for project activities can
be identified: the functional organisation; the lightweight project manager; the
heavyweight project manager; and the autonomous team. All of these organisational
forms are now examined in more detail, together with the balanced matrix; figure 2.9
provides a brief illustration of each organisational form.
2.7.1 Functional organisation
This is the traditional hierarchical organisation under which a project is sub-divided and
assigned to specialist groups operating within functional areas (such as engineering,
production, marketing and administration), and whereby authority for the development
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(c) Heaiyweight project manager
(b) Lightweight project managerProjectpersonnel
(d) Autonomous team
Figure 2.9 Organisational forms for product development
(a) Functional organisation
Notes:
FM functional manager
PM project manager
Source: Wheelwright and Clark (1992, exhibit 8-1)
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project cascades down through the organisation from senior management, through the
ranks of middle management and to the lower management levels. In this way, the
project is passed (as a completed task), like a baton in a relay race from one team
member to the next. The main responsibility for the project shifts from function to
function as it progresses, and is coordinated by the respective functional heads. Any
liaison will be conducted through the head of function; hence, it can become an
extremely bureaucratic system.
Projects based in this way have several advantages (Child 1977). First, the simple
structure makes economical use of managerial tasks and control. Second, it enables the
centralisation (or pooling together) of available experts and resources, especially
important in the innovation process where specialist technical expertise is critical, costly
and often scarce. Third, clearly defined career paths, and peer grouping, can assist the
hiring and retaining of specialist staff. Conversely, there are weaknesses with this form.
When there are a multitude of projects being undertaken simultaneously, competition for
resources can lead to conflicts over the relative priorities of individual projects.
Functional speciality can lead to an over-emphasis of the departmental goals, rather than
to achieving the goal of the project. Finally, there may be a lack of motivation or
enthusiasm when commitment of personnel is spread across projects (see Youker 1977).
2.7.2 Project team
Also referred to as venture team (Crawford, 1983), tiger team (Hayes et al, 1988),
slcunkworks (Quinn, 1985), taskforce (Slack, 1991) and permanent team or cell (Winch,
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Voss and Twigg, 1991), this organisational form consists of a project manager who is
given responsibility for a project team composed of a core group of personnel from
several functional areas, assigned on a full-time basis for the life of the project. This
team is separated from the functional structure and controlled by a manager responsible
for the completion of the project; hence, the functional managers have no formal
involvement. The project manager has responsibility for both internal coordination and
external integration, and has direct control of all personnel throughout the duration of
the project. In this way, responsibility is centred on one individual, who coordinates the
entire process, rather than the distributing of authority inherent in the functional
structure.
The advantages of this structure are the singleness of purpose and unity of command, the
clear focus of a single objective, the effectiveness of informal communication, and the
central authority of all the necessary resources (Youker 1977). In particular, the
development of teamwork, together with a single leader, enables conflict to be managed
efficiently. On the downside, this structure disrupts the regular organisation, since the
project is only a temporary event, facilities are inevitably duplicated and may be viewed
as being used inefficiently, and personnel may have problems re-entering the organisation
after project completion - a problem exists of personnel losing their 'home' in the
functional structure whilst away (Winch et a!, 1991).
An illustration of such a project team is provided by Winch et a! (1991). A UK
automotive manufacturer established a fully independent project team to develop an
entirely new vehicle model, whilst simultaneously using its existing matrix to maintain
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incremental development for improving and expanding the existing model ranges. The
project team, known as the Vehicle Concept Group, was established with two explicit
objectives: first, to centralise the early stages of concept and design of a vehicle into a
single group; and second, to develop a fully paperless design of a vehicle (through the
extensive use of a fully integrated CAD/CAM system).
The project team was headed by a project manager who reported directly to the board of
directors (by-passing the director of product engineering). The staff consisted of 19
permanent design engineers drawn from three sub-functional areas; 30 seconded staff
from other specialist engineering sub-functions; and five seconded manufacturing
engineers. The project manager was responsible for the vehicle development throughout
the development process, and had functional responsibility for the permanent members
of the project team; although responsible for the seconded staffs role on the project,
their career development remained under the direction of their sub-functional heads.
The experience of this organisational form was mixed. On the one hand, internally the
group had been perceived to be cohesive and effective. On the other hand there had
been considerable criticism of the group from outside. First, a number of people stated
that it had been criticised for being reluctant to bring in further expertise from outside
when needed. These comments would seem to have been a natural consequence of
developing a tightly knit group. Second, there was considerable uncertainty inside and
outside the group about its longer term role. It had been set up with the task of
developing the concept for a new vehicle. As this task progressed questions were raised
whether the group should continue to have responsibility for developing the vehicle
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through the later stages of its life cycle. In this case should the group have been enlarged
to involve a wider range of functions, or should it have evolved into a matrix approach?
There was considerable resistance to the former from the functions who saw the group
as eroding functional strength and power.
2.7.3 Matrix organisation
The third basic form of product development structure lies between these extremes and
combines elements of these two pure forms by integrating the vertical functional
structure with a horizontal project structure. Support towards a hybrid of these two
structures can be found first in the findings of an early study to investigate differences in
organisational structure and the effectiveness of such organisations, by Burns and Stalker
(1961). This study is one of the contingency theory school, which includes inter alia the
work of Woodwood (1965), Galbraith (1973), and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a and
1 967b). -
Burns and Stalker examined 20 British firms in the electronics industry, and sought to
explain how technological and market changes affected the way finns manage
innovation. They observed two opposing management styles: first, an organic style,
characterised by a highly flexible and informal organisation, based on teams that could
adapt to the problems being undertaken; and second, a mechanistic style, which was
more formal, hierarchical, bureaucratic and rigid in form.
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Burns and Stalker concluded that both forms of structure were effective as organisational
forms, but under differing situations: the organic form in rapidly changing markets and
technologies, and the mechanistic under stable conditions. These two management types
were applied by Burns and Stalker to variations in structure between organisations.
However, such differences can be identified within the operations of the firm. Hall
(1962) used these in a similar conceptual polar categorisation to examine intra-
organisational structures. He concluded that research and development departments
tended to be organised around the organic form and production departments under the
mechanistic form (see Winch el a! (1991) for further discussion on this distinction).
Similarly, Oakley (1984) discusses the appropriateness of these structures to the
organisation of product design units.
Firms are unlikely to adopt either of the pure forms of organic or mechanistic, but a
balance between the two - depending on the nature of the firm, the industiy, and the
projects being undertaken. Hence, firms may consider adopting a structure combining
the characteristics of both the functional and project organisation.
Matrix management is a 'mixed' organizational form in which hierarchy is
'overlaid' by some form of lateral authority, influence, or communication. In a
matrix, there are usually two chains of command, one along functional lines and
the other along project lines. (Larson and Gobeli, 1987, p.126).
Indeed, the matrix organisation tries to maximise the strengths, and minimise the
weaknesses, of both the project and functional structures (Youker 1977). The functional
organisation is organised around technical inputs, such as engineering, and is generally
efficient in the utilisation of resources and skills, but is less effective in achieving project
objectives, whereas the project organisation is more effective in achieving project
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outputs - the product but is less efficient in the use of resources (I{arrison 1992). Both
of these structures are unidimensional, whilst existing in a multidimensional environment;
hence, the matrix organisation aims to balance the objectives of the long-term technical
expertise of the functional structure with the short-term objectives of the project
(Youker 1977).
The matrix organisation developed primarily out of the USA aerospace industry during
the 1960s, as firms realised the need to lead by both technical performance and
coordination of project management (Galbraith 1971). The matrix structure offered the
opportunity to balance these objectives and to assist in the coordination of a project
across formal organisational boundaries. Unfortunately, despite these advantages, a
number of human relations problems arise from the matrix structure. Despite their
interdependence, conflicts may develop between the project manager and the functional
departments, due to differences in cultures and objectives.[6] Individuals may have
divided loyalties, resulting from the dual subordination, and this in turn can lead to
project and functional managers realising diminished authority over their respective
domains. The matrix organisation can be complex, ambiguous and is often uncertain!
These complexities and ambiguities are an inherent reason for adopting the matrix
structure, and is not a consequence of its use (Harrison 1992).
2.7.4 Choice of organisational structure
Table 2.3 provides examples of factors likely to influence the choice of organisational
structure for a specific project (see also Lock, 1992). From these characteristics, it is
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clear that for products such as farm equipment, where the technology is standardised and
the product is small, product development may be organised functionally. In contrast,
the significantly complex nature of a nuclear submarine would probably suit a matrix
structure. Similarly, a project organisation would be suitable for companies of complex,
time critical products.
The identification of these organisational alternatives does not limit firms to just one
structure. It is possible that a firm could utilise all three basic structures, selecting an
organisational form, as appropriate, for a specific project. Similarly, a firm could be
generally based around a matrix structure, but be project organised within the
engineering function.
So, what characteristics dictate a company's choice of structure? In 1971, Galbraith
established that the choice of organisational structure will be related to the degree of
authority between function and project (figure 2.10), as well as the use of integrating
mechanisms (such as task forces, teams and liaison roles) and the formal information
system (such as procedures, plans, and review meetings).
Galbraith's model has been used by Vasconcellos (1979) to differentiate the matrix
structures of 17 research institutes in Brazil. Using ten factors (for example, project
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Table 2.3	 Comparison of the three major organisational forms (by design
characteristic)
Characteristic	 Functional	 Matrix	 Project
Uncertainty	 Low	 High	 High
Technology	 Standard	 Complicated	 New
Complexity	 Low	 Medium	 High
Duration	 Short	 Medium	 Long
Size	 Small	 Medium	 Large
Importance	 Low	 Medium	 High
Customer	 Diverse	 Medium	 One
Interdependency (within) 	 Low	 Medium	 High
Interdependency (between) High
	 Medium	 Low
Time criticality	 Low	 Medium	 High
Resource criticality	 Depends	 Depends	 Depends
Differentiation	 Low	 High	 Medium
Source: adapted from Yo'uker (1977, figure 5)
deadlines, quality, purchasing, and human resource allocation) to measure the authority
of project managers, Vasconcellos's findings suggested four organisations as being
project oriented, thirteen organisations as having some form of matrix, and no
organisation with a functional orientation. These results were inconsistent with the
author's longitudinal experience of the field sites that suggested some organisations of a
matrix structure with a high emphasis on functional organisation, and others with a
strong project structure. Considering this observation, Vasconcellos argues that
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Figure 2.10 Range of alternative organisation designs
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Source: Gaibraith (1971, figure 3)
authority cannot solely be used to differentiate matrix structures, and two additional
variables should be included to improve GalbraitWs model: the communication pattern,
and the additional roles of project managers. Two organisations may have similar
distributions of authority between a project and functional manager, but communications
between each respective manager and the project team will lead to significant differences
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between the resulting structures. Second, differences may be highlighted when the
project manager is given additional duties, most importantly where the project manager
is, at the same time, also a functional manager.
An adapted version of Galbraith's model is presented in figure 2.11, in which a
continuum is presented from functional to project organisation, separated by a
combination of matrix structures from a weak matrix near functional to a strong matrix
near project. The distribution of staff is based on the percentage of staff working in their
own functional departments versus full-time staff on the project team. It is evident that
under the functional organisation there are no staff on a project team. However, the
boundary between functional organisation and matrix occurs when an individual is given
part-time responsibility for coordination across functional boundaries (the position of the
weak matrix). As the role of integrator gives way to that of decision maker, the matrix
organisation assumes a stronger matrix with a full-time project manager.
2.7.5 Differences in matrix organisation
This revisiting of Gaibraith's model highlights the need to categorise further the matrix
structure. Larson and Gobeli (1987) use the relative influence of functional and project
managers to define three forms of matrix: functional matrix; balanced matrix; and project
matrix. Harrison (1992) adds a further category, that of contract matrix, which can exist
in multi-company (often global) projects. In this case, each 'function' may be carried out
by a separate organisation, linked by weak lines of authority and often based merely on
contractual and purchase order agreements. Each company will endeavour to maximise
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Figure 2.11 Organisational continuum
Staff m functional departments
Staff on project team
Source:Youker (1977, figure 6)
its own best interests, thus if the project is to be managed effectively, the companies
must be integrated and considered as a global entity: the matrix organisation offers the
best structure to enable this.
2.7.5.1 Functional matrix
This lightweight (or weak) form of matrix maintains personnel in their functional groups,
but designates a project manager with limited authority to coordinate the project across
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the different functional areas; the project manager may be a junior manager, such as a
design engineer. The project is entirely under the control of the project manager, who
coordinates, liaises and monitors its progress. Each functional area is represented
through a liaison representative who coordinates related issues to the project manager.
However, the functional managers retain responsibility and authority for the design and
completion of technical requirements within their discipline (specific to elements of the
project), and hence to the allocation of resources.
Clark (1991) sees the project manager as lightweight in three 'ways. ?irst, there is no
direct influence over engineers at the working level, and the product manager has little
leverage over the activities outside of engineering (such as manufacturing and
marketing), despite having liaison representatives. Second, the project manager has little
status or power within the organisation, since he has a middle-management or junior
position to command such respect. Third, the project manager is a coordinator, using
concepts developed by others to coordinate and manage potential conflicts.
2.7.5.2 Balanced matrix
Trygg (1991) has likened the balanced matrix to a form of middleweight project
manager. Larson and Gobeli (1988) see the project manager in this structure as being
assigned to oversee the project and share the responsibility and authority for competing
the project with the functional managers. Project and functional managers jointly direct
many work-flow elements and jointly approve many decisions. More specifically, project
managers schedule, control, and monitor the timing and activities of the project, and
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integrates the contributions of the various disciplines, whilst functional managers assign
personnel and execute their part of the project according to the plans of the project
manager (Larson and Gobeli, i987).
2.7.5.3 Proj ect matrix
This form of matrix requires a stronger project manager than under the previous
structures. A project manager is assigned to oversee the project and has primary
responsibility and authority for completing the project. Staff working on the project will
be under the control of the project manager, although they are likely still to reside in their
specific functions. Similarly, functional managers will assign personnel, as needed,
provide technical expertise, and oversee the long-term career development of their
personnel. It is essential that the project manager is able to command authority over the
functional heads, hence it is likely that they be relatively senior, or at least equal to them.
Hence, Clark (1991) sees the heavyweight project managers as follows. First, the
project manager will have direct influence over the personnel working in the various
functions - engineering, marketing and manufacturing. Second, since the project
manager will be of senior management level (head of function, or chief engineer of a
division), he will wield considerable status and power within the organisation. Third, he
plays an active role in directing and evolving the product, thus performing more than
mere coordination of activities. In this respect, the project manager extends his influence
beyond the organisation, into the market place, to integrate external activities, besides
the internal coordination already expected from him.
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Larson and Gobeli (1987) have compared these three matrix hybrids across a variety of
factors. Table 2.4 summarises these findings. First, they consider the advantages of each
matrix: efficient use of resources, project integration, flexibility, information flow,
discipline retention, motivation and commitment. The disadvantages include: power
struggles, heightened conflict, reaction time, monitoring and control, excessive overhead,
and experienced stress.
Table 2.4 Comparative advantages and disadvantages of the three matrix hybrids
Advantages	 Functional
matrix
Resource efficiency 	 High
Project integration	 Weak
Discipline retention	 High
Flexibility	 Moderate
Improved information flow Moderate
Improved motivation and
commitment	 Uncertain
Disadvantages
Power struggles	 Moderate
Heightened conflict	 Low
Reaction time	 Moderate
Difficulty in monitoring
and controlling	 Moderate
Excessive overload	 Moderate
Experienced stress	 Moderate
Balanced
matrix
High
Moderate
Moderate
High
High
Uncertain
High
Moderate
Slow
High
High
High
Project
matrix
High
Strong
Low
Moderate
Moderate
Uncertain
Moderate
Moderate
Fast
Low
High
Moderate
Source: Larson and Gobeli (1987, table 2B)
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2.7.6 Effectiveness of the five organisational structures
Five alternative organisational structures for project management have been examined,
and a brief summary is provided in table 2.5. Of these five project structures, wide
support can be found in favour of the project team and project matrix being the more
effective for product development projects. Based on research results, Clark (1991)
argues that the heavyweight project manager and the project team are the most efficient
forms of organisation for product competitiveness, shorter lead time and engineering
efficiency.
This finding is generally supported by the research of Larson and Gobeli (1988). Their
study compared the performance of 540 development projects in terms of cost, schedule
and technical performance of all five project structures. When comparing the success
outcome, there was no single best way to organise projects; nevertheless, project team,
project matrix and balanced matrix shared equal success rates. Furthermore, when
project complexity was analysed, only the project team structures showed considerable
suitability for very complex projects. However, project matrix (heavyweight project
manager) was satisfactory for both complex and less complex projects. Clark (1991),
cites the example of Nissan in Japan, which, having moved from a middleweight to a
heavyweight project management orientation, was very successful in product.
development in the early 1980s.
These results emphasise a strong preference towards strong project leadership. This is
supported when the actual and recommended structures are compared. Figure 2.12
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Table 2.5	 Project management structures
Functional organisation:	 The project is divided into segments and assigned to
relevant functional areas and/or groups within
functional areas. The project is coordinated by
functional and senior management.
Functional matrix (or
lightweight project manager): A person is formally designated to oversee the project
across different functional areas. This person has
limited authority over functional people involved and
serves primarily to plan and coordinate the project.
The functional managers retain primary responsibility
for their specific segments of the project.
Balanced matrix:	 A person is assigned to oversee the project and
interacts on an equal basis with functional managers.
This person and the functional managers jointly direct
work flow segments and approve technical and
operational decisions.
Project matrix (or
heaiyweight project manager) A manager is assigned to oversee the project and is
responsible for the completion of the project.
Functional managers' involvement is limited to
assigning personnel as needed and providing advisoiy
expertise.
Project team (or tiger team):	 A manager is given responsibility of a project team
composed of a core group of personnel from several
functional areas and/or groups, assigned in a full-time
basis. The functional managers have no formal
involvement.
Source: based on Larson and Gobei (1987, table 1)
illustrates the distribution of structures actually used and those recommended by the
same sample. The difference in the distribution illustrates that although a particular
structure may not be used by a firm, it may have been favoured (circumstances
permitting). When the distribution of those recommending their structure is viewed,
again the project matrix (75%) and project teams (72%) are favourable. Similar results
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were found when unsuccessful projects were examined - 64% and 54% respectively;
although a project had been considered a failure, the project matrix and project team
maintained strong support for future projects. (Although the majority of their
respondents were project managers, Larson and Gobeli found no significant differences
in their results when the responses from top management and functional managers were
compared.) Noteworthy is a general word of caution by Larson and Gobeli (1988) made
against the use of either functional organisation or functional matrix for innovation
projects.
Figure 2.12 Recommended vs. Actual Project Structure
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Drawing on research in the pharmaceutical industry, Henderson (1994) highlights the
fluidity of organising product development (innovation), suggesting that either
organising by function or product can only be a temporary solution. Companies need to
respond to changing conditions, and to prevent any dominance of either function or
product; thus continuous adaptation is required, perhaps moving along the continuum on
a regular basis, or changing the type of project manager used. For some companies she
studied, "it meant the active cultivation of a culture in which every individual was
continually reminded to wear 'two hats': a functional, or disciplinary, hat and a product-
orientated, or therapeutic, hat" (Henderson, 1994, p. 105).
2.7.7 Formation of project teams
These various organisational forms illustrate the combination of resources available to a
firm, and the respective weighting they give to project management methods. Other than
the pure functional structure, where the control and completion of the project rest solely
with each functional head in turn, successful project management requires the
appointment of a project manager and a specifically selected team.
A project manager may be a representative of any function. However, an individual will
be selected largely on his/her competence to coordinate the required activities to bring
about the successful completion of the project. Therefore, the project manager requires
skills in leadership (acting as both politician and diplomat, when necessary), decision-
making, and being able to assume responsibility. The range of responsibilities for a
project manager is clearly different from those of a functional manager. In summary, a
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project manager should have responsibility for: what is to be done; when the task will be
undertaken; why the task will be undertaken; how much money will be available; and how
well the total project will have been completed. Whereas a functional manager should be
concerned with: how the task will be done; where the task will be undertaken; who will
undertake the task; and how well the functional task will have been integrated (Harrison,
1992).
There are four elements that promote an effective project team: multifunctionality;
responsibility; commitment, and experience and proficiency (Bower and Hout, 1988).
First, project teams comprise representative members of the departments that provide an
essential service to the project. The availability of staff; required level of contribution,
number of projects and so forth will determine both the number and definition of
personnel assigned to the project on a full-time or part-time basis. Functions represented
will normally include: marketing; sales/purchasing; engineering/development;
manufacturing/production; quality; logistics; finance; and sometimes the customer,
and/or suppliers of parts, materials and equipment. Second, the team must be given
responsibility and the authority to undertake the project. Each member will have both
individual and collective responsibilities: they are both specialist of their home
department and ambassador of the project, responsible for balancing the needs and
objectives of both groups. In the majority of companies, however, the project, rather
than functional requirements, will take precedence should resource availability need to be
considered. Third, there must be commitment throughout the team, and senior
management, towards team-working and the project itself. Fourth, each team member
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should be able to contribute both experience and proficiency to perform the necessary
tasks required of them.
Since each development project is unique, the team should be based on personnel whose
collective competencies provide the means to tackle each task. Teamwork is therefore
essential. Some companies promote teamwork through identifring the characteristics of
individual team members, thereby developing a team spirit as the capabilities of the
whole team become apparent. One means used by companies is a Belbin exercise;
individual team members complete a self-perception assessment, the results of which
emphasise particular traits useful in teamwork. Eight roles in teamwork can be identified;
chairperson; company worker; shaper; plant; monitor-evaluator; resource investigator;
team worker; and completer-finisher (Belbin. 1976). The identification of these roles
does not create the team, but it does provide a benchmark for the project manager to
allocate tasks. The success of the team still requires the leadership skills of the project
manager to coordinate and motivate the team towards achieving the project goal.
2.8 Summary
The chapter has illustrated the evolution of product development in both the process
(sequential to integrated) and its organisation (functional to project-based). The
evolution of the organisational forms can be clearly seen in figure 2.13. The
multifunctional team illustrated in the diagram is an advanced form, as suggested in the
review of integrated product development. This form extends the team beyond the
company boundary to incorporate both customers and suppliers, and has been
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Figure 2.13 Trends in engineering management styles
Focus	 I	 Task	 People
Function and company
Product and customer
Conventional	 Matrix
hierarchical	 organisation
(pre- 1 960s)	 (1 960s- 1 970s)
Project	 Multi-functional
management	 team
(1970s-1980s) 	 (1980s onwards)
Source: Bertodo (1989b, figure 1)
recommended as the appropriate type of organisation for managing complex projects,
such as automotive products (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991).
Similarly, for complex products, an integrated development process is recommended that
allows overlapping between phases with a multifunctional team. Thamhain (1994)
proposes ten criteria for implementing an effective integrated product development
process, based on best-in-class management practices. First, detailed planning is
required of all activities and participants (including support groups, suppliers and
subcontractors) to help identify and establish effective communication linkages and
critical information transfer points. Second, the project should be sub-divided by natural
groupings to reduce complexity. Third, a clear business mission should be
communicated by senior management, enabling a strategic vision of the goals to be
shared. Fourth, interface management is essential between disciplines and activities.
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Fifth, the collective skills of the team should accommodate technical and other skills
(such as cost management) necessary to solve problems and produce the agreed-on
results. Sixth, fostering a professionally stimulating work environment is important for
maintaining the interest and commitment of personnel, and for minimising conflict.
Seventh, cross-functional communication requires the implementation of coordination
mechanisms (this will be reviewed in chapter four). Eighth, key networking individuals
(such as gatekeepers) require identiI'ing to communicate effectively both internally and
externally, and to assist technology transfer. Ninth, rewards and motivation are
important signals for reinforcing cross-functional team performance. Finally, good
leadership influences all of these through their actions.
In their review of successful users of overlapping phases, Wheelwright and Clark (1992)
have shown that effective simultaneous engineering requires a combination of
• early release of information;
• intensive, two-way flows of information;
• effective computer and organisational integration;
• analytical methods and tools; and
• multifunctional teams.
First, the early and frequent release of preliminary (often only partial) information from
the upstream phase enables the downstream phase to initiate problem solving prior to the
information being finalised. Hence, product design and process can be undertaken
simultaneously. By doing so, the design engineer, for example, is able to realise the effect
of the design on manufacturing, and implement changes at the design phase where the
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majority of cost and time savings are possible. Second, since there is an element of
uncertainty in this information, and as it is subject to revision, there will be a requirement
for frequent communication from downstream back upstream. The net result is that
effective overlapping requires frequent and intensive two-way communication. Third,
frequent two-way information exchange requires effective integration, both through
information systems that can provide shared product and process models and databases
(such as CAD/CAM), and organisational mechanisms (such as at the
engineering/design/manufacturing interface). Fourth, the use of information integration
can be enhanced through use of analytical methods to optimise a product design for
manufacturing and customer requirements (such as design for manufacture, Taguchi
methods, quality function deployment). Fifth, multifunctional teams ensure each activity
necessary for the project is represented, this includes external contributors such as
equipment vendors and parts suppliers.
These criteria illustrate the changing nature of product development, from a focus on
functional specialism - referred to as functional silos at the farming equipment
manufacturer John Deere (Anderson, 1992) - to a focus on a strategic direction
supported by cross-functional and inter-firm networks (Bertodo, 1988). These
observations will be discussed further, in the forthcoming chapters, as the elements of an
integrated development process are examined in the form of design chain management.
NOTES
1. Dwyer and Mellor (1989) have used this model to survey product development activities in
Australian manufacturing firms, and provide detailed analysis of the activities involved.
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2. A detailed examination of the formulation and characteristics of the product innovation
charter can be found in Crawford (1983, Chapter 3).
3. Crawford (1983, p. xii) notes that the pre-R&D stages had gained in importance during the
1970s. Whereas a typical new product in the late 1960s was derived from almost 60 ideas, a
product in the early 1980s would originate from only seven. This reduction Crawford
suggests was due in part to strategy, early market analysis, and a serious system of concept
testing.
4. Souder (1987) examined the projects of innovations that had been means-generated, that is to
say that they had originated from the development of ideas from within the firm, and had not
been in response to other firms, a documented customer need, or an explicit customer request.
This distinction should be recognised when interpreting Soude?s findings.
5. The other five intraflrm factors are: the contribution of senior management in a catalyst role;
self organising project teams; a multilearning environment; subtle control; and, orgamsational
transfer of learning (Imai eta!, 1985, pp. 342-62).
6. Katz and Allen (1985) provide a thorough discussion of the performance relationship between
project and functional managers in upstream (R&D) activities.
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3 AUTOMOTWE PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
3.1	 Introduction
This chapter examines the process of product development within the automotive
industiy. A generic model is presented based on the work of Clark and Fujimoto (1991),
from which consideration is then given to the contribution of suppliers within this
process. A review of the changing supply base will follow, highlighting the conditions
under which suppliers contribute to the design and development process. (Further
detailed examination of types of supplier is presented in Chapter Five.) Finally, the role
of purchasing is examined since this is a critical link between the internal development
process and outsourcing to the supply base.
The UK automotive industry is a hybrid of long established industries, the products of
which are an amalgamation of many different types of material, crafts and expertise.
Where once a single company could design, develop and build a vehicle alone, the
numerous material technologies and related design and development costs require the
involvement of a plethora of companies across the manufacturing industries. The UK
domestic car industry is dominated by eight companies: Rover Group (a subsidiary of
BMW), Ford, and its subsidiary Jaguar, Vauxhall (a subsidiary of General Motors),
Peugeot, Honda, Toyota, and Nissan. The remaining participants are specialist
producers, such as Rolls-Royce, Morgan and TVR
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Supporting these vehicle manufacturers is a multiplicity of companies differing in both
size and operation, from international system manufacturers, to fabrication outfits - the
components sector. In 1993, it was estimated that the turnover of this sector was £14.7
billion (The Financial Times, 16 February 1994). The diversity of components supplied
to car manufacturers is vast, with the major production inputs consisting of: engine and
chassis; electrical; drive, transmission and steering components; suspension and brake
systems; body components; and a variety of other components, systems, and raw
materials - such as climatisation systems, audio systems, batteries, paint (coating), and
tyres (Sleigh, 1993). Appendix A details an extended product list based on these
component divisions to illustrate this diversity and complexity of supply.
This variety of products brings with it a vast array of skills, knowledge and expertise, in
research, design, development and manufacturing. No single vehicle manufacturer can
retain all of these skills - although Fiat was, until the early 1 990s, able to retain most
production requirements in-house (Sleigh, 1993) - so outsourcing of necessary design,
development and manufacturing is made to the supply base. These issues will be
returned to later in this chapter and in Chapter Five.
3.2	 Automotive product development
Clark and Fujimoto (1991) present a simplified model of the product development
process, which is a generic model for fabricated and assembled products (such as
automotive products). Their model expresses the various stages of the process as key
assets of information, broadly based around common activities: concept generation,
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product planning, product engineering, process engineering, and production. Figure 3.1
illustrates these stages based on the model presented in figure 2.1. This thesis is mainly
concerned with the activities indicated by the product development shaded area, but
before reviewing these, the concept development stage is discussed. The following
review of the process is largely based on the comprehensive work of Fujimoto (1989,
appendix 2; with Clark, 1991).
3.2.1 Concept generation
This activity is characterised by the creation of a product concept. This will reflect a
balance of what is technically possible, economically feasible and wanted by the market.
It consists of a product description of what will satisfj the customer's needs. Vehicle
manufacturers use three principal sources of information for generating the vehicle
concept: market information, strategic plans, and advanced engineering (Clark and
Fujimoto, 1991). First, finns utilise product clinics, focus groups and detailed statistical
analysis of market research to gather the thoughts and preferences of existing, and
would-be, customers. Second, strategic plans enable firms to take a long-term view of
their product range, developing family platforms with which to introduce model year
changes, or major face-lifts in response to changing customer preferences or to
incrementally introduce new technological improvements. Where firms have a wide
range of vehicle platforms, strategic plans can assist in focusing available engineering and
manufacturing resources, and the timing of new product introductions. They may
include product specifications such as engine choice, image, price range and so forth.
The availability of an award-winning engine, for example, may encourage extending the
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Figure 3.1	 Product development as an information system
Source: Similar to Trygg (1991, figure 1.4) and Clark and Fujimoto (1991, figure 10.1)
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product-life of a design. Third, advanced engineering develops solutions for eventual
integration into future models. Miller (1994) identifies three contributing activities:
outlining and proving innovative technical designs; managing joint research programmes
with external groups; and creating and testing experimental prototypes. Typical
examples include new diesel engines and electric powered vehicles.
Clark and Fujimoto (1991) found that three types of manager are given leadership
responsibility for concept generation: functional specialists (typically from either
marketing or advanced engineering), product planners (usually from marketing), and
product managers. Of these, they found that the product managers tend to maintain the
best links with downstream activities. However, of importance in managing the concept
stage is a balance between leadership, creativity, and cross-functional involvement.
Clark and Fujimoto (1991, p. 110) conclude that: "Especially during the first few months
of a project, clear concept leadership, together with wide involvement of other functions,
appears to be an important aspect of effective concept creation".
The output of this stage is a set of broad product specifications that embody the
product's description in terms of the customer's requirements; for example, 'a family
tourer that is environment friendly, with a feeling of security'.
3.2.2 Product planning
This activity translates the product concept into spec?Jications for detailed product
design - a product plan. In the automotive industry, this product plan includes
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specifications for styling, layout, major components, cost performance targets, and
technical choices, and is a process of negotiation and trade-offs between each (Clark and
Fujimoto, 1991). For example, if a new engine is planned for an existing model, changes
in the engine compartment may mean repositioning of component systems (such as air-
conditioning units). This may have knock-on effects with the cooling system or wiring-
harness; thus, each group will compete for space, dimensions and their individual
component/system integrity. At this stage, most information assets will still be
intangible, but physical models and early-stage prototypes may be used for, inter alia,
styling and layout evaluations, and advanced component testing. It is at the end of this
stage that top management will approve, or not, the commitment to full-scale activities in
product engineering. Clark and Fujimoto see styling, layout and component choice as
critical elements of this stage.
3.2.2.1 Styling
Styling is a bridge between concept and detailed engineering. It requires intensive two-
way communication as the abstract, verbal and two-dimensional descriptions of the
concept are translated into a three-dimensional form (clay and plastic models, and CAD
generated product data for later use on body development) whilst maintaining the
product integrity of the total vehicle concept. Face-to-face communication between the
concept originators and the stylists is paramount, since subtle-nuances cannot be defined
in written form. The body and interior styling are typically separate design departments
consisting of industrial designers, modellers, technicians and aerodynamic and
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ergonomics engineers (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Many vehicle companies use
specialist styling studios such as Ital Design or Karmann.
3.2.2.2 Layout
Layout (or packaging) determines the available space requirements for mechanical
components, body frames, luggage and passengers (as in the example given above). This
activity begins with determining the key dimensions and key component configurations
of the basic package; Clark and Fujimoto (1991) found that in most companies they
studied this activity preceded detailed styling. It is a key activity and responsibility for
layout may be located with the concept creator - facilitating concept-layout coordination,
the product manager - common practice in Japan, or with a specialist engineering unit,
within advanced engineering or body engineering.
3.2.2.3 Major component selection
In Chapter Two, the definition of new product illustrated the range of choices a firm
makes on balancing the integrity of the product vis-à-vis the number of carry-over parts,
available external engineering capabilities, and selection of basic components over new
technologies and materials. Using existing parts reduces cost for re-tooling and design,
reduces reliability risks, but can affect the design quality in terms of customers'
perspectives of the newness of the total vehicle. Similarly, outsourcing engineering can
reduce the long-term technical capability of the firm, or reduce the negotiating power
with suppliers (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). (The issue of technical outsourcing will be
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revisited in Chapter Five.) The configuration of the product may raise conflicts between
component and test engineers, as each compete for particular component choices.
Therefore, the ability of product managers and other interfunctional staff to resolve
conflicts play an important role in this activity.
The completion of product planning is a critical stage in the overall process. It is here
that approval is given by senior management to proceed with the project. The product
architecture and interior mock-ups should be complete, the clay model approved, the
cost and performance targets specified, and the overall packaging and basic component
selections complete (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991).
3.2.3 Product engineering
This activity transforms the product planning specifications into detailed product
designs, and signifies the full-scale commitment to engineering resources. Product
engineering is a series of design-prototype-build-test cycles, until a detailed product
design is officially approved. It consists of three major activities: detailed design
drawings (from targets and constraints); trial prototype components (from the drawings);
and engineering prototypes that are tested using prototype tooling at both component
and total vehicle levels, checking against the original target and concept. One frequently
cited issue of prototype testing is the authenticity of the tooling to reflect production.
Prototype parts are frequently produced using prototype part specialists; hence, the
prototype parts do not reflect production fit and finish of the ultimate parts' suppliers.
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Product engineers have to realise the concept in terms of real parts/components, but also
meet the business requirements, such as cost and perfonnance. Negotiations and trade-
offs are again prevalent as the product design is realised. Design engineers typically
convert the specifications into CAD generated data, which can be shared with adjoining
parts and process engineering.
Increasingly, the use of computer-based technologies is having an impact on these
activities. For example, rapid prototyping is a technique that allows product designers to
produce a resin prototype from CAD stored data. The Rover Group uses this technique
and found that for one redesigned part, rapid prototyping reduced the delivery time from
nine weeks to only three days (The Engineer, 30 April 1992). This enabled testing of
flow characteristics sooner than normal, which meant that the test results could be shared
earlier with other component groups.
Each engineering project is divided into manageable parts, based on process step and
component, and reflects the organisation of the company (compare Clark and Fujimoto,
1991, figure 5.1). Typical product divisions for a European volume producer would
include body, chassis, interior, electrical, and power-train (engine and transmission). A
vehicle producer also divides responsibility for components or processes to external
agents (such as suppliers, sub-contractors, and specialist agencies). Hence, management
of product engineering for complex products requires the use of computer-based product
databases to track and inform changes that may occur from both internal and external
design groups. (This issue of integration is again raised in Chapter Four.)
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3.2.4 Process engineering
This activity is sometimes referred to as industrial or manufacturing engineering, and
involves translating detailed product designs into process design requirements. The
output of this activity are the final shop-floor production processes, hence the following
activities are undertaken: plant design (for example, material flows and plant layout);
hardware design (for example, tools, jigs, dies and equipment); software design (for
example, NC part-programming); and work design (for example, standard operating
procedures) (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Process engineering is normally the concern of
production, hence, staff may be located in any number of production sites. Some
companies have begun locating staff within product engineering to facilitate
product/process coordination. It is this simultaneity of activities that will be returned to
in Chapter Four, as coordination mechanisms are discussed.
Reviewing the overall product development process, and referring to the findings of
Chapter Two, several themes appear important for effective delivery of the product..
Product development in its integrated form requires intensive two-way communication,
and where possible downstream operations should have the opportunity to use
information more quickly, for an early start - particularly between product and process
engineering. One of the key characteristics of product development is problem-solving;.
in some cases, this takes the form of test-build cycles. An important aspect for
participants is negotiation for individual parts or processes, whilst aware of the need for
total vehicle integrity; hence, there will be a need for trade-offs to be made. Across these
82
different themes there will be a need for effective mechanisms, such as strong leadership,
to augment conflict resolution should this be necessary.
3.3	 Project strategy
A new vehicle is part of a company's strategy to attract fresh, or retain existing,
customers. A firm may choose any number of characteristics as part of its design policy.
Miller (1994) observes typical policies as including: world-wide under-body concepts;
basic upper-body concepts; variations and face-lifts; technical features (such as engines
and power-train); and differentiating factors such as quality, safety, innovation and
product life.
In developing a project strategy, Clark and Fujimoto (1991) suggest that a firm will
consider the level of trim required, engine-body combinations, degree of innovation, the
role of supplier, and the number of carry-over parts from previous models. The
cumulative effect of these choices, they argue, will be the level of project complexity and
thus will affect productivity, lead-time and total product quality - all elements of
company performance. Figure 3.2 outlines the main features of product development
performance, and the role of suppliers in determining project performance. Once
product variety and level of innovation have been determined for a project, attention
focuses on the location of engineering work. The scope of a project is the volume of in-
house engineering work performed by a vehicle manufacturer: this can be influenced by
the degree to which engineering capability is outsourced to suppliers and the level of
parts carried over from previous models.
83
Figure 3.2	 Major influences on product development performance
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3.3.1 Supplier participation
Since Chapter Five discusses in detail the degree of supplier involvement, a summary of
Clark and Fujimoto's work illustrates the importance of suppliers to the product
development process. Their study of 20 vehicle manufacturers - three US, nine Western
European, and eight Japanese - found large regional differences in the participation of
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suppliers in vehicle design and development. They defined and examined the
contribution of external resources to the internal organisation in the following terms:
supplier proprietary parts - parts developed entirely by parts suppliers; black box parts -
parts whose basic engineering (functional specification) is performed by car makers and
whose detail engineering is done by parts suppliers; and detail-controlled parts - parts
developed entirely by the car maker, although subcontracting of production may occur.
The activities of these suppliers are shown in figure 3.3, based on the generic model
already outlined.
Clark and Fujimoto calculated the share of suppliers' costs in engineering parts to be
52% for Japan volume producers, 14% for US volume producers, 36% for European
volume producers, and 31% for European high-end specialists. Thus, Japanese finns
were more dependent on suppliers for design input than the US or European
manufacturers. In particular, Japanese firms relied on suppliers to perform detailed
engineering for components whose functional specifications they developed in-house
(figure 3.4).
When these differences were correlated with unadjusted productivity measures, in terms
of engineering hours and lead time, the greater use of suppliers was found to reduce
project scope (the percentage of unique parts developed in-house by the car maker) and
thus the engineering hours and lead time. In general, they also found that greater
supplier involvement by Japanese firms accounted for their advantages in engineering
hours and lead-times.
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Figure 3.3	 Typical information flows with parts suppliers
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However, it should be remembered that the data on which Clark and Fujimoto based
their conclusions are for projects for the period 1982-87, since when US and European
vehicle manufacturers would appear to have been placing more engineering work in the
hands of suppliers. There has been a conscious development toward early supplier
involvement by many industries and it would be surprising to find no shift in supplier
involvement as a result. Figure 3.4 acts as a reminder that there are structural differences
between US, European and Japanese supply relationships and engineering traditions,
which will be discussed later.
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There is a caveat to Clark and Fujimoto's study, however, in their contribution to
understanding inter-organisational coordination, since they only concentrated on the
internal operations of new projects, and Cusumano and Nobeoka (1992, Pp. 283-84)
have reservations on the underlying assumptions used. First, their analysis of supplier
parts assumes uniformity of design contribution across all regions, and only identifies
two categories of design contribution: supplier proprietaiy, and black box parts. For
simplicity, they assumed all suppliers worldwide contributed 30% of uJesi work £r
black box parts. This is a surprising assumption given the vast regional differences in
supply relationships. Cusumano and Nobeoka note that independent engineering firms
are also excluded that may play an important role in US product development.
Second, their study neglects the internal mechanisms for managing projects, such as
partitioning design-tasks and sequencing, which von Hippel (1990) sees as critical to
efficient and innovative product development. Cusumano and Nobeoka's remarks could
go flirther and apply the concept of task partitioning to inter-organisational management,
thereby looking at project boundaries rather than firm boundaries. Third, their study
does not explore multiple project coordination, but only a sample of one project per
manufacturer. This limits the findings to the commonality of particular projects, whilst
neglecting how parts are shared, designs modified, and other knowledge acquired for
product development. Finally, consideration should be given to how firms plan and
support multiple product development activities, particularly since there are many
different activities, options and decisions both within the firm and with suppliers.
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Nevertheless, the evidence of Clark and Fujimoto's study suggests that car companies are
outsourcing to suppliers important tasks and components, and suppliers are equally as
fast as car makers at component development, without any loss of lead-time to the car
maker. These are important findings since they support the idea that suppliers not only
have a role to play in development, but there is certainly no negative affect for project
performance (measured by lead times).
3.4	 Supply relationships
Vehicle manufacturers have been increasingly moving towards closer relationships with
their suppliers. Much of this has been due to the adoption of just-in-time (JIT) and Total
Quality Management (TQM) techniques, where the benefits of these processes become
apparent through an integrated and responsive supply base. Similarly, effective
simultaneous engineering requires integrating suppliers into an extended knowledge base.
Synchronous to these are other supplier development policies, such as the rationalisation
of the supply base, and promotion of preferred suppliers (primary, direct suppliers) who
are able to assume greater responsibility for particular operations. However, supplier
development is much more than an elaborate operation of buying parts from a smaller
number of leading suppliers: it is a commitment by both parties to integrate and
coordinate their operations together.
For this to be achieved, it is necessary for both buyer and supplier to move away from
the adversarial relationships and short-term views that characterised relationships
throughout the 1970s and 1980s in the European automotive industry. It requires a
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shared vision of their joint operations, based on a long-term view of the relationship,
multiple contacts maintained at several organisational levels, and mutual trust and
respect. In this way, information can be shared freely and integrated problem solving
undertaken on product design and production operations. An important basis for these
demands is a true understanding of each other's operation. Hence, the open-book
accounting practice has emerged reinforcing the necessary mutual trust and can allow
true costs to be measured.
These changes are characteristic of an evolution of the customer-supplier relationship
spanning more than 20 years. Lamming (1993)[fl classifies a four-phase model of
supply relationships that traverses this period: Traditional (pre-1975); Stress (1972-85);
Resolved (1982 onwards); and Partnership/Japanese (1990 onwards). Each phase
emphasises aspects of vehicle manufacture thinking and market changes from which
suppliers have responded to buyers. The general trend affecting the UK automotive
industry is illustrated in figure 3.5 that shows the falling total UK production in cars from
the early 1970s to the mid-1980s. Emerging out of the partnership model, Lamming
(1993) identifies Lean supply, as characteristic of global operations in partnership. Table
3.1 summarises the evolution of these models, which is discussed below. It may be that
Lean supply is representative of the conditions under which design chain management
can operate within the total supply network.
The Traditional buyer-supplier relationship existed up to the early 1970s, and was
characteristic of the period of expansion experienced until that time. This relationship
was based upon design originating either from the vehicle builder or the component
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manufacturer, with research and development only being discussed where a specialist
supplier input was required. Information restriction was prevalent, with suppliers' cost
structuring and buyers' requirement levels being unknown to the other party.
Competition was essentially closed, with new orders for one supplier resulting in the loss
of business for another, only when the existing supplier was unable to satisf' the
changing demands of the buyer's Purchasing Departments. This situation was accepted
by suppliers, since there was reasonable capacity in the market and it was not difficult to
remain competitive. However, with the receding market of the mid-to-late 1 970s, severe
pressures created fissures in both the personal and commercial relationships that had
existed in the traditional situation.
Figure 3.5	 UK passenger car production
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1.	 I;t
In their attempts to reduce unit costs, vehicle manufacturers focused on reducing
suppliers' prices and exploiting their buyer's market. The result of this marginal costing
was suicidal supplier costing and increased dual sourcing policies, as the suppliers'
position was further weakened through buyer's insistence on open costing information
policies. Paradoxically, the need for cost reductions led to improved design liaison,
although secrecy of design excellence remained prevalent.
The need for a strong supply base was resolved in the early 1 980s, as vehicle
manufacturers attempted to resolve the stress phase which had developed, not least
through relaxing the tactical buying philosophy and in developing the concept of
collaborative research and development and improving the advancing of information on
planned model and production programmes. Improvements to the buyer-supplier
relationship were further essential due to the interest being shown in the concept ofjust-
in-time manufacture and supply (a requirement of which is a trust between buyer and
supplier, - which the dual sourcing and rationalisation of the previous years had sorely
damaged).
The resolving of conflicts from the 1970s can be observed as a check for the possible
development of Japanese style relationships. Although the success of the Japanese
buyer-supplier relationship owes much to its cultural setting - a collective vision of
working towards the economic success of Japan, rather than an individual company - and
to the arrangement of trading groups, with few suppliers, long-term partnerships,
common strategies and equity exchanges (Twigg, 1990), elements of this model have
entered UK supply relationships. Japanese vehicle manufacturers entrust their suppliers
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with design responsibilities (without manufacturer interference), and this closer
cooperation is reflected by quality throughout the company and supply base; the mutual
confidence in each other, helps support a smooth supply network necessary for low
inventory, regular delivery (just-in-time) operations.
Recognising the differences in environment and structure Lamming proposes a further
evolutionary stage, beyond partnership: lean supply. In short, this model entrusts greater
design responsibility on the supplier (black box and grey box developments), as
operating uncertainties are resolved through joint discussions, reciprocal dialogue of
information, and long-term cost knowledge (based on open-book accounting practices).
Furthermore, the in-depth understanding of supplier operations resident in the
partnership model extends confidence through coordinated capacity management to the
provision of long-term sourcing contracts, with annual price discussions. Lamming
views the lean supply model as comprising of:
• fewer, larger and more talented companies who are the central provider of complete
component systems;
• a tiered supply base, differentiated by the nature of the services each supplies. There
will be a small group of preferred supplier in close partnership with the vehicle
manufacturer, who will be responsible for their own supply base; hence, there will be
a cascading of responsibility for coordination and control of the network, around
principal nodes;
• collaboration on design and R&D between the vehicle manufacturer and preferred
suppliers, with early supplier involvement;
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• stronger vertical and horizontal relationships to share expertise (higher
interdependence);
• global sourcing and operations, and multi-market presence;
• competitive advantage based on best practice, continual improvement and ability to
collaborate.
3.4.1 Emerging relationships affecting product development
There is growing evidence (Imrie and Morris, 1992; Turnbull et a!, 1992; Sleigh, 1993)
that vehicle manufacturers are developing towards the lean supply relationships identified
by Lamming (1993). A perusal of Sleigh's examination of vehicle-supplier relationships
indicates very similar policies across all the vehicle manufacturers examined. Some of the
characteristics sought in the emerging suppliers directly impact upon the design
relationships being examined in this research.
3.4.1.1 System suppliers
First, retaining fewer, more talented and larger suppliers suggests a movement towards
system suppliers, where design and development expertise will be sought from a network
of suppliers, but coordinated through only one primary supplier - responsible for that
part number! module. The first requirement along this route is for a reduction in the
number of direct suppliers to the vehicle manufacturer. Vehicle manufacturers have
substantially reduced the number of suppliers (for a vehicle) during the 1980s, as figure
3.6 indicates. This has been happening since the 1970s, when Ford introduced supplier
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Figure 3.6	 Reduction of Component Suppliers (by selected company)
Company	 Year
1981	 1982	 1983	 1984	 1985	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989
Peugeot	 >2000	 P 1229	 9008
Renault
	
1415	 r 9ØØ8
Rover	 1200	 P 700
Ford:
Europe	 2500	 P 900
UK	 P600
a	 anticipated figures (company estimates)
Source: data from House of Commons (1987; p. xvi)
quality assurance programmes (Lamming 1993). All vehicle manufacturers have supplier
rating systems that assist in determining those that are suitable, capable and willing to
undergo changes to maintain best practice supply and improve performance.
Some examples from Sleigh (1993) indicate that the modular supplier, as coordinator of
other tiers of supply, is receiving wide recognition within the international automotive
industry. Volkswagen is selecting suppliers who can progress from being parts suppliers
to taking responsibility for the development and supply of modules/systems. Their
intention is that all functional parts of new models will, in future, be entirely based on
pre-developed components; thus, suppliers will be integrated early - into pre-
development - to provide pre-developed modules for storage in a Goal Catalogue.
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Perhaps less extreme, Fiat subdivides each new model into 440 system and major
component areas (such as seats, bumper, fascia assembly, heating and ventilation
system), each of which they ultimately see as being the responsibility of a single supplier.
The potential supplier for each of the 440 modules/systems is rated by product and by
capability, and then on a project management classification of A, B, Cl or C2. Category
A suppliers will have product development ability in its own specialised area, and as a
result will be assured of bidding for design and development, as well as supply contracts.
Price is a qualifier in being a category A supplier, but of importance too are the product
development lead-time, delivery schedule time, delivery quality and reliability,
component weight control and reduction, and where possible the standardisation of
small, high volume parts from a Fiat-issued catalogue of approved parts. Category B
suppliers are potential A-grade suppliers, to whom Fiat second personnel for 6-12
months to improve their operating methods. Category C suppliers may be able to attain
A/B grade after improvements, otherwise they are likely to become the subcontractors to
the others.
Nissan's approach in design management is to promote reciprocal understanding in
design and development. Comments made by the purchasing director of Nissan in 1992
(cited in Sleigh, 1993, p.36) bears testimony to this:
To match the ever shortening model-change cycles a supplier has to have the
necessary development facilities and engineers to support our new model
programmes. A key element of this is also project control - basically
understanding what you are doing and by when it has to be done - and then
meeting commitments. By following a single sourcing policy we can commit
more time to each supplier to help ensure our design and development needs are
clearly understood.
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In its strive for supplier continual improvement, Nissan sends Supplier Development
Teams to supplier sites to advise on problems relating to both their products and other
customers. Nissan considers management attitude, technical capability, quality and
delivery reliability as the most important criteria for supplier selection; price
competitiveness is important, but is not an order-winning criterion (Carr and Truesdale,
1992).
It is interesting to note the different perspective of Japanese firms to supplier
relationships. Carr and Truesdale (1992), in a study of Nissan's UK suppliers, comment
on the different approaches to supplier-selection by vehicle manufacturers. They cite
Ford and Rover as seeking best-in-class through buying a component, whereas Japanese
customers would develop a relationship to assist the supplier become 'best in class'.
3.4.1.2 Tiering of the supply base
The second effect is on the tiering of component supply. In 1993, it was estimated that
there were over 200 first tier component system makers in the UK (such as GKN and
Lucas), with probably 10,000 second and third tier small component makers (The
Financial Times, 16 February 1994). In their efforts to incorporate fewer, more talented
primary suppliers in partnership, the traditional number of direct suppliers to the vehicle
manufacturers will decrease further.
Lamming (1993, p186) cautions against referring to tiering in describing the various lean
supply relationships, preferring instead to use direct and indirect suppliers, in order not
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to suggest similarities between Japanese style (keiretsu) relationships and the
materialising non-Japanese forms.[2] Figure 3.7 illustrates the main participants in the
supply relationship with vehicle manufacturers. Supplier A is a direct supplier to the
vehicle manufacturer. It integrates components and process knowledge from other
suppliers (B, C, D, E, and X) into a component system that is supplied directly to the
vehicle manufacturer, as a pre-assembled unit - a system integrator (Macbeth and
Ferguson, 1994). Since B, C, D, and E supply A, they are indirect suppiers to te
vehicle manufacturer.
Figure 3.7 Direct and indirect supply
' Supply
' Know-how
B
Indirect!
direct
supplier
Vehicle
manufacturer
Direct supplier
Indirect!
supplier
influential
C
	
D
Indirect suppliers
Source: Lamming (1993, figure 7.4)
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Supplier B, however, is a special case. It also supplies directly to the vehicle
manufacturer so has a dual role. It may even be a system integrator for some component
systems, whereas for others it supplies indirectly through supplier A. Macbeth and
Ferguson (1994, p. 130) illustrate this scenario with the case of anti-skid braking (ABS).
Lucas Braking Systems and Bosch Electronics were previously equivalent suppliers of
ABS, until Bosch became a system integrator; it now purchases parts from Lucas for
pre-assembly in a Bosch ABS system which it supplies to vehicle manufacturers.
Supplier X plays another special role. It is an indirect supplier, but has an
role in the supply relationship. A similar emphasis was placed on indirect/influential
suppliers by Twigg (1990) who, in investigating CAD/CAM adoption by component
suppliers, recognised the toolmaking supplier as having a specific role in the design
relationship: it straddles the supplier-vehicle manufacturer divide, in some cases working
directly with the vehicle manufacturer, and in others with the supplier (with manufacturer
approval).
Blenkhorn and Banting (1990), in a study of Canadian first tier automotive suppliers,
reported close relationships between these and second tier suppliers based on, inter alia,
continuous communication and the sharing of technical knowledge.
One first tier supplier has chosen the top three or four second tier suppliers in
major product categories and invited them to participate in a long-term
relationship, similar to the type of relationship that the first tier supplier would
like to have with OEMs. Other evidence of closer relationships include daily
interfacing with suppliers, supplier/plant joint action problem-solving committees,
participation in the other firm's business with suggestions for cost reduction, and
more involvement in parts design. (Blenkhorn and Banting, 1990, pp. 8-9)
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In summary, one can see the emergence of specific direct suppliers who will, in future,
command greater responsibility from the vehicle manufacturer for the design and making
of components, assembly of component systems, quality assurance and delivery
scheduling for the vehicle manufacturer (Macbeth and Ferguson, 1994). In addition,
many of these suppliers will undertake R&D, management of subcontractors, and use
ED! in support of JIT supply (Lamming, 1993, p. 189). Where product development is
concerned, these system integrators will have major responsibility to control/manage the
project management process with indirect suppliers. It is this transfer of project
management responsibility that will probably be a key focus for effective design chain
management, if vehicle manufacturers are willing to devolve these duties.
3.4.2 Role of purchasing
Although Clark and Fujimoto (1991) refer to external inputs to the development process,
they do not examine the role of purchasing in this transaction. It is nevertheless a crucial
partner in inter-organisational coordination, not least because many of the failures of the
stress model are directly attributable to the adversarial policies of the purchasing
functions at that time. Figure 3.8 illustrates two forms of buyer-supplier relationship and
the role purchasing has to play in each. The first is typical of the serial model of product
development in which the buyer's purchasing department transacts with the
sales/commercial department of the supplier, in which most information transactions
occur between them. Carter and Ellram (1994) see three advantages with this
configuration. First, by concentrating the transfer of information in one location,
purchasing acts as a valve able to prevent an overload of information elsewhere in the
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purchasing
Design
• Engineenng
sales	
• Quality control
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Planning
• Others
• Design
• Engineering
• Receiving
• Quality control
• Planning
• Others
Figure 3.8	 Role of purchasing in buyer-supplier relationships
(a)	 Serial relationship
Customer	
Primary information flows
	 Supplier
(b)	 Parallel relationship
Customer	 Supplier
• Design	 Primary information flows	 • Design
• Engineering	 • Engineering
• Receiving	 • Receiving
• Quality control
	 • Quality control
• Planning	 • Planning
• Others	 • Others
Buyer	 I Supplier
purchasing	 -] sales
Source: Carter and Eliram (1994, figures 1 and 2)
firm. Second, this centralised role wields considerable power, which enables purchasing
to respond quickly to changing market conditions.	 Third, centralisation of
communication channels through one point reduces the possibility of incorrect data being
transferred. An effective centralised database would, of course, negate this argument.
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Figure 3.8(b) illustrates a parallel form of purchasing in which the integrated team
approach is advocated. In this arrangement, the buyer's purchasing department and the
sale's department of the supplier assume liaison roles, facilitating and coordinating the
transactions through functional and supplier integration (Carter and Eliram, 1994). A
major disadvantage that they see with this form is the amount of effort required to
manage the exchange of information. Guy and Dale (1993) disagree with this central
role for the purchasing department in product development, seeing it as the converse
polarised role of design in this relationship. Two firms in the defence industry they
studied advocated the involvement of the purchasing team in a cross-functional interface.
Hence, the focus of coordination should perhaps be on the team integration, rather than
individual functions.
Guy and Dale (1993) do, however, admit that in the absence of a truly cross-functional
team approach, the purchasing department is well equipped to manage inter-
organisational design transactions. First, purchasing staff have the ability to manage the
multiplicity of relationships that will occur. Second, if allowed to develop the technical
expertise, it could be a valuable source of advice on alternative materials and suppliers.
Table 3.2 summarises the main criteria that they view facilitate an effective
purchasing/design interface.
Figure 3.9 illustrates a simplified diagram of the two major sequences in buyer-supplier
product development transactions. During contract negotiations, purchasing and sales
play key roles in coordinating the commercial transactions; however, during the design,
development and production stages, the key transactions are between design and
manufacturing engineers in both organisations.
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Table 3.2	 Criteria for an effective purchasing/design inter-organisational interface
Relationship focus Criteria
Purchasing	 • well defined goals about the interface;
• identifr areas of cost reduction;
• develop supplier relationships;
• staff with engineering qualifications;
• knowledgeable about DFM and concurrent engineering
philosophies;
• staff set and control the pace of change in the interface.
Design	 • design engineers should see themselves as part of the
manufacturing process;
staff rotation with purchasing enables a commercial orientation to
the design process (attention to cost reduction).
Supplier	 • the supply base is an extension of the buying organisation,
especially the buyer's design process, and must understand the
buyer's goals and strategies;
• long-term commitment, demonstrated through resource
commitment;
• viewed as part of the buyer's concurrent design team.
Organisation	 • culture ready to welcome change;
• acceptance for constant reappraisal;
• close team proximity.
Source: compiled from Guy and Dale (1993)
3.5 Summary
The criticisms raised by Cusumano and Nobeoka (1992) would indicate a need to better
strati& supplier participation in inter-organisational product development, and the need
to investigate appropriate mechanisms for effective coordination. The coordination
issues are now raised in Chapter Four and the supplier involvement in Chapter Five.
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Figure 3.9	 Role of purchasing in design transactions
Source:	 based on Lenau et al (1991, figure 2)
The emergence of a more stratified supply base, based on direct and indirect suppliers,
where project management responsibilities are devolved to the direct supplier, reinforces
the need to examine design relationships in more detail. The examination of the
literature of this emerging trend suggests that only those suppliers able to command
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project responsibility and capability in R&D will enter the major direct supplier role.
Therefore, the management of design relationships is, and will, determine specific
patterns of component supply.
NOTES
1. These models originate from Lamming (1986) in which four models of buyer-supplier
relationship were observed between Austin Rover (now Rover Group) and its supply base.
2. Discussion over the subdivision (or tiering) of the automotive supply base may be found in
Bessant et al (1984), Watanabe et a! (1987), Twigg (1990), Imrie and Moms (1992), and
Turnbull eta! (1992; 1993).
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4 COORDINATING INTER-FmM COMMUNICATION
4.1	 Introduction
In Chapter Two, the various demands on new product development were discussed and
an integrated, information processing system approach to product development was
developed. Effective product management requires the development of a project
management process, and organisational and information transfer mechanisms to
facilitate this. Using the information system model already espoused, the information
requirements of the process are now considered to construct a framework for analysing
those components necessary for coordinating product development activities in a design
chain environment. As the design chain increases in importance, there will be an
increased need for effective coordination mechanisms, as higher levels of
interdependence are required between a focal firm and their suppliers of design and
development information. This framework will be developed from examining, first, the
intra-firrn perspective, and then extending this understanding to the inter-firm situation.
4.2	 An information processing model
A starting point in considering coordination mechanisms is to consider briefly the
information processing requirements of the buyer-supplier relationship. For this, an
information processing framework, derived from the work of Tushman and Nadler
(1978) and the later adaptation by Daft and Lengel (1986), is presented in figure 4.1.
This model has an intra-organisation perspective, and recognises two requirements in
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Figure 4.1	 Information processing model
Sub-unit task
	
Inter-unit
	
Sub-unit task
characteristics 	 interdependence	 environment
Sub-unit uncertainties
I
I
Source:	 Composite of Tushman and Nadler (1978, figure 4) and Daft and Lengel (1986,
figure 6)
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information processing: the needs of the organisation, and the capabilities to meet these.
The effectiveness of any information processing provision is therefore the match (or fit)
between these two elements.
Tushman and Nadler (1978) argue that an organisation's tasks vary according to the
degree of uncertainty. They identify three sources of uncertainty derived from
contingency theory: task characteristics (Gaibraith, 1973); task environment (Thompson,
1967); and task interdependence (Lawrence and Lorsch, 196Th). They see the
information processing capabilities as being met by the design of the sub-units (such as in
the organic or mechanistic fashion discussed in Chapter Two), and the implementation of
coordination and control mechanisms that link the various sub-units. The alternative
coordination and control mechanisms will be discussed later in this chapter.
Recognising the absence of the application of the basic model to inter-organisational
coordination, Bensaou (1992; and Venkatraman, 1993) developed an adapted version of
this model, applying it to inter-organisational coordination between US and Japanese
vehicle manufacturers. The operational constructs of Bensaou's framework are listed in
table 4.1. Bensaou again specifies three types of uncertainty as determining information
processing needs: environmental; task; and partnership. A significant departure from the
previous models is the combining of task characteristics and interdependence (task
uncertainty), and the introduction of partnership uncertainty. Partnership uncertainty, in
this context, is defined as "the uncertainty a focal firm perceives about its relationship
with a business partner" (Bensaou and Venkatraman, 1993, p. 8).
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Table 4.1 The operational constructs of Bensaou's inter-organisational coordination
framework
Information processing needs 	 Information processing capabilities
Environmental uncertainty	 Structural mechanisms
• dynamism (changes in product) 	 • multiplicity (number of communication
• product complexity	 channels)
• market capacity	 • frequency (of mutual visits)
• formalisation (control/coordination)
Partnership uncertainty	 Process mechanisms
• mutual trust	 • conflict resolution
• manufacturer's asset specificity	 • commitment
• supplier's asset specificity 	 • joint action
Task uncertainty	 Technological mechanisms
• analysability	 • scope of the use of information
• variety	 technology
• interdependence	 • intensity of electronic data interchange
(EDI)
• EDI use for engineering
• EDI use for purchasing
Source:	 Bensaou and Venkatraman (1993)
The framework presented in this thesis, whilst recognising the contribution of Bensaou's
model, adopts a different emphasis of coordination that approaches a more operational,
rather than organisational design, perspective. Bensaou's framework, for example,
mutually excludes the cross-categorisation of mechanism dimensions. It is the contention
of this thesis, however, that this may incorrectly identifj the type and range of
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mechanisms used in product development coordination. Bensaou's study concerned
coordination per se and, hence, specialisation on product development of this present
study may reveal unique relationships not adequately covered by his constructs.
Investigation of the dynamics of coordination requires consideration of the information
exchange relationships themselves. For example, whilst frequency of mutual visits
(structural mechanism) and intensity of EDT use (technological mechanism) are factors to
consider, they may not describe the capability of information processing, whilst use of
telephone or facsimile machine may be as effective. Similarly, mutual visits may reflect
the number of task forces empowered to rectiQj engineering changes or prototype build
issues. It is not the number that is of importance in determining effective capabilities,
rather it is the appropriateness to fulfil a task - having considered all other options.
A revised framework is presented in figure 4.2 that considers the information processing
capabilities available to vehicle manufacturers, and their information needs for product
development. This marries the information processing needs of Bensaou, with the
information processing capabilities in figure 4.1. The information processing needs of a
vehicle manufacturer for product development are determined by the uncertainty of tasks
to be undertaken, the uncertainty of environment, and the perceived uncertainties in
relationships it establishes with external organisations for engineering resources. These
challenges are similar to those confronting intra-organisational coordination. However,
two antecedents play a crucial part in determining these needs: the supplier strategy, and
the product strategy (Chapter 3). Supplier strategy influences both the task uncertainty
and inter-organisational relationships. Finns are increasingly seeking closer links to
suppliers for inputs to product development and production. The nature of these
relationships and certainty over completion of specific tasks will determine the level of
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Figure 4.2	 Information processing framework for the coordination of inter-
organisational product development
1
I
I
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information processing needs. Similarly, the product strategy will influence both of these
factors, as well as the environment in which the organisations operate. Hence it seems
appropriate to utilise the information processing needs determinants proposed by
Bensaou. However, one departure seems necessary: whereas Bensaou uses the term
partnership uncertainty to consider an asymmetric perception of the relationship, this
thesis will adopt Relationship uncertainty and consider this to reflect the perceptions of
both supplier and focal organisation. One important reason for this is that partnership
assumes an open relationship, which may not have yet been reached.
Figure 4.1 shows that intra-organisational information processing capabilities can be
provided by organisation design and utilisation of coordination and control mechanisms.
At the inter-organisational perspective, the framework in figure 4.2 considers these as
coordination (organisational and technological mechanisms) issues, and product
development process (internal and external) issues. In the second case, this refers to the
organisation and management for product development of both the vehicle manufacturer
(internal) and the supplier (external). This is a departure from Bensaou's model, in order
to overcome the considerations given above, and to present a model in which alternative
mechanisms, as opposed to their determinants, can be examined.
The marriage of these needs and capabilities will result in effective coordination.
However, whilst it is hoped to offer new understanding to this coordination relationship,
it is not within the remit of this study to offer a measure of effectiveness of mechanisms.
As will be explained later, a portfolio of mechanisms is available for any one project, and
effectiveness of mechanisms necessarily reflects the perceived effectiveness of project (by
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both parties of that relationship). In examining these coordination mechanisms, it is
hoped to understand better the dynamics and interactions under specific conditions.
Hence, the capabilities to meet the vehicle manufacturer's needs will be based upon: (1)
the vehicle manufacturer's ability to organise and manage internally its product
development process (internal organisation); (2) the supplier's ability to organise and
manage internally its product development operations (external organisation); and (3)
the availability of appropriate coordination mechanisms to facilitate information transfer
between (1) and (2). These elements are now discussed in detail, culminatiri in a
typology for inter-organisational coordination.
4.3	 Coordination of product development capabilities
In figure 4.2, the information processing capabilities of a firm were identified as requiring
a combination of organisational and technological coordination mechanisms to meet the
information processing needs of its product development process. Trygg (1991)
proposes a systems-based model for coordinating development and production activities.
He identifies two critical influences on the coordination of these activities: technological
factors - material tools, tools and advanced manufacturing technologies - and
organisational factors - culture, structure, and people.
Organisational structures consist of two elements: the division of activities and the
coordination of tasks (integration). Fujimoto (1989; with Clark, 1991) proposes three
dimensions to examining organisational design of product development: functional
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specialisation; internal integration; and external integration. He observes that previous
literature on organisational design has concentrated on aspects of functional
specialisation and internal integration, but an examination of today's car industry also
requires consideration of external integration (Fujimoto, 1989, p. 115).
In Fujimoto's study, internal integration corresponds to those internally developed
activities which assist in higher internal integrity in terms of information assets, and for
simplicity, he includes suppliers' contributions to product development as part of this
process thus not specifically differentiating their activities: he notes that their separation
would not change the basic nature of his research argument (Fujimoto 1989, footnote 39,
p. 101). Thus, his external integration dimension does not refer to suppliers' information
assets, but to those of the market (customer).
This is an important distinction between Fujimoto's use of the information processing
system and the one developed in this thesis. Since the focus of this research is the
contribution of suppliers' information assets to vehicle design and development, the
market (customer) relationship has been assumed as implicit in the concept and
specifications developed from the product strategy of the vehicle manufacturer. This
external integration is assumed as part of the marketing/R&D and marketing/customer
interfaces. The contribution of market (customer) inputs to component/sub-system
design will be coordinated through the vehicle manufacturer, as part of the product
strategy process. Hence, this thesis will distinguish between internal and external
integration, where external integration refers to coordinating supplier (and other service)
inputs to product development.
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A general • consensus in the literature is that the effectiveness of new product
development (in terms of cost, quality and timing) is greatly determined by the quality of
its project management approach, the technology being used, and the organisational
characteristics (Adler and Helleloid, 1987 [1]; Bertodo, 1989b).
	 Adler (1988),
continuing his work with Helleloid, investigates these organisational features through
five key organisational variables: skills, procedures, structure, strategy and culture. It is
argued by Adler that these represent a continuum along which the focus for
organisational learning changes from task orientation to the wider organisation, and
hence gains in magnitude. The procedures and structure issues will be discussed in detail
later, but first, skills, strategy and culture warrant a mention.
Traditionally, skills were seen as a person's accumulated capabilities through their long
working experience, but the participant in product development today requires more
subtle skills, such as problem-solving, teamwork, leadership and negotiation. Many of
today's product engineers need to be able to design, draft and understand the cost
management of his work. Not all the necessaly skills will lie within one function, or in-
house. For example, design and drafting may be undertaken by the same, multi-skilled
individual in one firm, whereas in another, the drafting responsibility may reside
elsewhere. If two people are employed, then immediately there is a need for
communication and coordination.
Whatever the choice of integration mechanism, there should be a strategic view of their
purpose both internally and externally. Is supplier development important for the
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company, and should early supplier involvement be encouraged? If so, how? Does the
firm have access to all operations in-house? If not, how best can existing capabilities be
coordinated with those external to the operations?
Differences in, inter alia, core values, norms, attitudes and sometimes language can pose
cultural challenges to product development (Harrison, 1992). Product engineers, for
example, have often been at logger-heads with purchasing over the best supplier with
whom to outsource. Purchasing might argue for an alternative supplier based on cost,
whereas the tacit requirements of previously successful work would seem strong
arguments by the design engineer for an alternative. Effective cost management by
engineers may assist reduce such tensions, as responsibility shifts to component
designer's for their budgets.
Based on the discussion of this section, figure 4.3 illustrates some of the important
determinants of coordinating development projects. Whilst limited as an overview, the
diagram provides an integrated perspective of the issues of coordination.
4.4	 Internal integration
Issues surrounding organisational structures for product development were discussed
earlier in Chapter Two, and alternative forms presented that assist in the over-arching
structure in which product development activities exist. Central to this discussion is the
contribution of contingency theory to the integration of functional units (Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967; Galbraith, 1973) and the coordination of tasks therein. The terms
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Figure 4.3	 Coordination determinants for a development programme
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integration and coordination are often used synchronously in examining these issues, as
illustrated by Van de Ven et a! (1976, p. 322): "Coordination means integrating or
linking together different parts of an organization to accomplish a collective set of tasks."
This demonstrates the concentration of examining coordination from an intra-firm
perspective. However, as the following definitions illustrate, they are equally
applicability to inter-firm coordination, later discussed.
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Integration is defined as the process of achieving unity of effort among the
various subsystems in the accomplishment of the organization's task. Task is
defined as a complete input-transformation-output cycle involving at least the
design, production, and distribution of some goods or services. By these
definitions, the boundaries of organizations will not always coincide with their
legal boundaries. (Lawrence and Lorsch, 196Th, p.4, italics in the original)
Figure 4.1, earlier, showed that information processing needs are characterised by
interdependency of tasks, task uncertainty and environment uncertainty. internal
integration can thus be seen as a requirement for improving or maintaining the internal
integrity of the information assets for product development (Fujimoto, 1989).
There is a wealth of research concerning the effective coordination of the functional
interfaces relevant to design activities. Typical amongst these are: marketing/R&D
interface (for example, Crawford, 1983; Souder, 1987; Urban et a!, 1987), and
engineering/production interface (for example, Adler, 1988 and 1995; Carisson, 1990;
Dean and Susman, 1989; Ettlie, 1988; Trygg, 1991). Each examination considers
various mechanisms appropriate for improving coordination between sub-units across the
respective interface. In a study of nine companies, Ettlie (1988) found six methods being
used to promote design/manufacturing integration: design/manufacturing teams;
compatible CAD systems; common reporting positions; design for manufacturing;
engineering generalists; and R&D lead time reduction. Ettlie suggests this final method
indicates the strategic importance given to improved integration for competitiveness.
Dean and Susman (1989) propose four approaches to improving design/manufacturing
coordination: the use of manufacturing sign-ofl an integrator role to act as liaison; cross-
functional teams; and a combined product/process design department. Soderberg
(1989), referring specifically to improving product and process engineering integration,
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identifies three steps that companies should consider: co-locating the two functions;
rotating staff between functions; and reducing the disparity between career paths,
incentives, pay and job specifications.
Earlier work by March and Simon (1958) suggests two ways of coordinating the tasks
within organisations: by programming, and by feedback (mutual adjustment).
Considering this work, Van de Ven et a! (1976) propose three predominant modes of
coordination: impersonal mode (coordination by programming); personal (vertical or
horizontal) channels; and group (scheduled or unscheduled) meetings - both forms of
mutual adjustment. Galbraith (1973) classifies integration mechanisms further, as: rules,
programmes or procedures; computer communication networks; hierarchical sub-unit
control; goal setting; lateral linkage; and product sub-units. However, all of these
integrating mechanisms may be defined by organisation or technology type (figure 4.4),
and are now discussed, before proposing a detailed integration typology.
4.4.1 Integration through organisational structures
A number of organisational mechanisms have been suggested to improve integration. A
useful starting point is the work on lateral relations proposed by Gaibraith (1977),
namely: direct contact; liaison roles; task forces; teams; integrator roles; and matrix
organisation. Mintzberg (1983, p.91) views these liaison devices as being used "...
where tasks are, at the same time, (1) horizontally specialized, (2) complex, and (3)
highly interdependent." These are widely used as intra-firm mechanisms (see for example
Fujimoto, 1989).
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Technology mechanisms
• Decision rules in software
• Electronic mail
• Video-conferencing
• CAD/CAM
• Product database system
Figure 4.4	 Organisation and technology integration mechanisms
Organisation mechanisms
• Direct contact / physical proximity
• Liaison role
• Secondment
• Task force
• Project team
• Role combination
• Permanent team (or cell)
• Integrator function
• Combined department
• Matrix organisation
Source: based on Winch, Voss and Twigg (1991)
In their study of CAD/CAM implementation, Winch, Voss and Twigg (1991), consider
additional organisational mechanisms that can assist in integrating product development
activities; namely: secondinent of staff from one function to another; role convergence,
where previously separate jobs are merged (Voss, 1985); and cells, where previously
separate specialisms, such as tool design and process engineering, are combined (Lee,
1988).[2J Each mechanism is now discussed in turn.
Direct contact:	 This is the simplest, quickest and easiest form of
engineering/manufacturing liaison, and may involve setting up meetings, design reviews,
encouraging ad hoc meetings, encouraging informal contact in coffee lounges, and so
forth. Factors such as the existing company culture, and the location of engineering and
manufacturing influence the success of this mechanism. The continuity of employment of
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personnel within the organisation is also likely to be a factor here as longer serving
employees build up personal networks.
A mechanism that promotes direct contact is physical proximity. This can be simple and
inexpensive; moving groups or departments together in the same building, office or even
across the same desk is a very effective way of promoting communication. Winch et a!
(1991) found three cases where informal contact had been facilitated by physically
locating manufacturing engineers in the same area as design engineers. On a larger scale,
BMW and Chrysler both see the advantage of e,dcing the psttai istnces ol
information flows as achieving reduced product development cycles (Shenas and
Derakhshan, 1994).
BMW has created perhaps the largest single research engineering centre in the
European [automotive] industry in pursuit of simultaneous engineering principles.
Its Fiz centre in Munich ... houses nearly 6,000 engineers, none of whom has to
walk more than 150 metres to talk to a colleague. It allows a first-concept
designer to discuss easily with a production-line engineer (the building houses
prototype production lines) the manufacturing practicalities of even an outline
design idea. ... The design of the building is based on the concept that, if physical
distances between two designer engineers are greater than 150 metres, the easy
interchange of ideas or discussion of problems is discouraged. (Shenas and
Derakhshan, 1994, p.35)
Liaison role: These promote two-way communication, and two types were found by
Winch eta! (1991). The first type is the pairs form, where the manufacturing person has
an identified opposite number in engineering. The second type is where a particular
group within one function also reports to another function (for example, engineering may
have staff located within manufacturing).
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Secondment. This involves transferring (seconding) a representative for a period of time
in another activity area (for example, a manufacturing engineer to the product
development team in engineering). The benefit can be two-way: to bring into one
function the considerations of another function; and, at the end of a secondment, to bring
the project through to the home function.
Task force: This is a widely used technique for solving particular finite problems. They
can be distinguished from committees in the sense that they are usually responsible for
the implementation of policies rather than policy fcrmatio. T'o tt titt ky Wrn e
a! used task forces on a temporary basis to review the working procedures and protocols
of the CAD/CAM system, to meet the requirements of downstream operations.
Project learn: This is cross-functional and can be distinguished from task forces by the
full-time and, usually, longer term nature; most notable is the product development team.
(This was discussed more fully earlier.)
Role combination: This is where tasks, previously performed by a number of separate
people with different skills, are brought together to be done by one category of
personnel. Ettlie (1988) considers the engineering generalist in this capacity. Within
the engineering function there appears to be a general move towards a role convergence
between engineers and drawing staff on contract, or product, design work. Within
manufacturing, convergence is occurring between the roles of tool designer, NC
programmer, and process planner. With role combination, other forms of integration
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become less necessary as a variety of skills are possessed by one individual, but the depth
of skill needed is a limiting factor in its widespread use (Winch eta!, 1991).
Permanent team (or cell): Cells are permanent cross-functional project teams providing
a veiy high level of integration, configured around a common database in CIM. Such
teams can work closely together on a major project, or a series of projects of similar
characteristics. Key to the team's success would seem to be size: it must be large enough
to contain the necessary functions for the design and manufacturing tasks, but not too
large so that it becomes fragmented.
Winch et al found two examples. The first case, defined around surface modelling, was a
permanent team of four people (NC programmers and design engineers), sitting together
in the design office. Both groups needed the surface model for their work and the NC
programmers downstream had a vital interest in the way in which the original model was
generated. The second case, a cell set up around a single, new vehicle project, was
composed of twenty designers, analysts and engineers from four functions. This group
worked as a single team in an open plan office, seconding other members as required.
They were responsible for the majority of the final stage of design and development of a
vehicle, and all work using a unified CAD/CAE data base.
Integrator function: This fulfils the same need as the liaison role, but on a larger scale
(Tushman, 1977). Two distinct types of integrator function that bridge the
engineering/manufacturing interface exist. First, the true integrator role (as described by
Gaibraith, 1970) which is product oriented, typically reporting direct to executive level
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management, rather than within an individual function. Second, the specialist, associated
with the development of information systems or quality assurance (QA). This role is
quite distinct from that of the systems manager responsible for the daily running of the
system. The emphasis of the specialist integrator is not so much on initiating system
innovations, but supporting and coordinating local initiatives from operational managers.
Combined Department: Sometimes the presence of a common data base with CIM
raises the question as to the need for separate functions or organisations. Where the
sources of differentiation can be minimised, it is feasible to establish combined
departments. A reorganisation in line with the system configuration may, for example,
facilitate a more effective design process. John Deere & Company, for example, formed
a combined, production engineering/product engineering department with the co-located
production engineers switching reporting to the product engineering manager (Anderson,
1992). This co-location differs from the physical proximity form due to the change in
reporting arrangements. Winch et al (1991) found one case that combined the
manufacturing engineering and design engineering functions into a single engineering
organisation, whilst another case, on a smaller scale, combined the design and analysis
departments into a single department after installing CAE and CAD.
Matrix Organisation: This mechanism is the most sophisticated lateral linkage
mechanism in Galbraith's hierarchy, and was earlier described in detail.
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4.4.2 Integration through technology
Technology can be used to assist integration through its accurate, complete and timely
transfer of data. There are two principal ways in which technological integration can be
accommodated: through information technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence, expert
systems, electronic mail and video-conferencing; or, through functional databases, such
as CAD/CAM (Trygg, 1991; Winch el a!, 1991). Shenas and Derakhshan (1994) note
that although electronic interfaces are critical for efficient transfer of routine information,
they cannot substitute the necessary physical interaction of people. A number of key
technologies are now discussed.
Expert systems: Winch et a! (1991) found a number of companies beginning to
experiment with expert systems to support coordination. In particular, one company was
using in-house developed software (an artificial intelligence type shell) of structural
features of components that had been defined in manufacturing terms. In another case, a
company had developed a tool library of preferred tools with manufacturing, held within
the CAD system, from which design engineers were expected to design components that
could be made from these tools.
Electronic mail: The need to ensure a variety of people, in different world time zones,
receive information speedily is promoting the use of electronic mail (e-mail), and oice-
mail. Not only can messages be delivered directly to individuals, but some companies
are adopting groupware to enable centralised sharing of information. British Aerospace,
for example, has implemented a groupware system called DUCK (Designers as Users of
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Cooperative Knowledge) to enable their distributed engineering teams to share their
experience. DUCK provides simultaneous, multiple computer access to a project log
(The Financial Times, 26 April 1994).
Video-conferencing: Video-conferencing (or teleconferencing) has received increasing
interest in industries, particularly in aerospace, where project development teams have
been dispersed internationally. Ford Motor Company used this mechanism extensively in
the development of the Mondeo global car. The responsibility for development was
given to teams in different countries: Ford of Europe had primary responsibility for the
basic engineering and integration of the components and sub-systems; Ford (in the USA)
engineered the V6 engine and automatic transmission, and provided air conditioning
expertise; and four design centres in Italy, Germany and two in the USA undertook body
design work. The coordination of this process relied heavily on complex video-
conferencing, supported by processing from a Cray super-computer, thus enabling
engineers in all locations to work simultaneously on drawings (The Financial Times, 29
March 1994).
Muliimedia. This is a relatively new, but increasingly powerft.zl, communications tool.
Within one system, a variety of packages can be combined into an interactive medium.
For example, designers can communicate using video-conferencing, send information by
e-mail, access decision support software and a product library, or interact simultaneously
with another designer on a shared document or CAD model, able to discuss it in real-
time. The limitation of this technology, at present, would appear to be the method of
transmission. Transferring CAD-related information, and simultaneously sharing it, will
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require the widespread use of ATM high speed networks, enabling a broadband
communication, and enabling data transmission in seconds rather than tens-of-minutes.
At present, these are few, due to the cost of installation.
CAD/CAM: CAD/CAM is frequently espoused as an integrating technology, but this can
only be achieved if its integration with organisational needs is implemented properly
(Adler and Helleloid, 1987; Ettlie, 1988; Twigg, 1990; Twigg and Voss, 1992).
Nevertheless, CAD can provide a mechanism for integrating cross-functional activities,
and can assist in consolidating upstream and downstream operations into a cohesive
product development process. There is an opportunity with CAD/CAM to provide a
focal point for product development information, which can be accessed by all parties
(see product database below). For example, if held digitally, part-programming data for
NC machines can be extracted from the CAD system and delivered to tooling and
manufacturing operations. However, as Twigg et al (1992) note, procedures and
standards may need to be reviewed to ensure drawing conventions and data positioning
interface correctly between the different parties. CAD/CAM can assist in prototyping and
pre-assembly work. The Boeing Company, in its development of the Boeing 777
aircraft, for example, adopted two important changes to its product development
coordination. First, it working closely with its major customers (Condit, 1994), and
second, it utilised an extensive CAD system:
The 777 was pre-assembled digitally, with computer-aided design which allowed
Boeing's design engineers, production experts and tooling specialists to work
together. In the past, tooling problems and manufacturing glitches surfaced only
when the final aircraft was about to be assembled, resulting in lots of expensive
reworking: this time, the glitches were spotted by Boeing's computers so the
777's body and wings fitted together straight away. (The Economist, 12 March
1994)
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Product database system: A significant benefit of integrated CAD/CAM is the provision
of a centralised database containing design and manufacturing related information on
each product. This can be accessed by various functional groups - engineering,
marketing, purchasing, finance, manufacturing, and servicing - and provides all necessary
data on each product. One cause of error in the product development process is the
misinterpretation of information, so centralising it in digital form ensures that current
data is only used, and errors due to conversion from paper to stand-alone systems are
avoided.
4.4.3 Patterns of communication
The previous two sections have illustrated a variety of organisational and technological
integration mechanisms. Before presenting a typology of mechanisms, it is worthwhile
considering the types of communication pattern these mechanisms aim to serve. Figure
4.5 illustrates the dimensions along which communication of' upstream and downstream
activities can be integrated. Four dimensions can be identified that determine the quality
and effectiveness of communication: timing, richness, frequency, and direction of
information (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). Figure 4.5
typifies the extremes of product development process discussed in Chapter Two. Where
the process is sequential, information tends to be seldom exchanged, except as a single
one-shot batch late in the particular stage. Conversely, an integrated approach to
product development is facilitated through richer exchanges of information (such as face-
to-face contact and the use of product models), more intensively and frequent. This
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situation encourages the early release of preliminary information, such as sketches and
models, thereby providing a mechanism for discussion.
4.4.4 A typology of coordination mechanisms
A variety of mechanisms are thus available to companies to improve the internal
coordination of their product development activities, for example, through joint
Figure 4.5 Dimensions of communication between upstream and downstream activities
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Source: Clark and Fujimoto (1991, figure 8.2) & Wheelwright and Clark (1992, exhibit 7-3)
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product/process design teams, design for manufacture, and the early release of design
information to manufacturing. The use of effective procedures and structures are
imperative if; inter alia, up-to-date drawings are to be issued, and technology (for
example CAD/CAM) is to be realistically employed - such that engineers do not strive
towards over-complexity where optirnisation is more appropriate (Adler, 1988).
Adler (1995) proposes a typology of design/manufacturing coordination mechanisms that
distinguishes five modes of interaction: non-coordination, standards (or rules),
schedules and plans, and mutual adaptation (Thompson, 1967), and teams (Van de Ven,
Delbecq and Koenig, 1976).[3] His critique of the literature on coordination
mechanisms led him to consider these five modes at three stages of the product
development process: pre-project phase; design-phase; and manufacturing-phase. [4]
Figure 4.6 illustrates this typology.
In an earlier version of this typology, Adler (1988) considers the quality of information
flow of each coordination mechanism as: one-way, stilted two-way, or two-way. These
quality dimensions can be considered to be comparable to the independent (pooled),
sequential, and reciprocal information flows defined by Thompson (1967). Van de Ven
et al (1976) add the team arrangement to Thompson categories. Although Adler (1995)
does not use these information flows in his adapted typology, it is useful to refer to them,
in the light of Van de Ven el a!. Three categories of information flow can be identified
which characterise these groups: sequential (one-way flow), combining Thompson's first
two groups; reciprocal (stilted two-way flow); and iterative (two-way flow), based on
the team arrangement.[5] This dimension has been added to figure 4.6 to highlight the
varying degrees of information flow characteristic in each mechanism.
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Figure 4.6	 A typology of design/manufacturing coordination mechanisms
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Source: Adaptation and expansion of Adler (1988, Exhibit 11; and 1995, Figure 2)
Figure 4.6 indicates the variety of integration options available to firms. It may be
obvious to conclude that the earlier measures are taken to improve coordination
upstream, the better the process of development. However, there may be occasions that
firms will require flexible manufacturing operations or engineering changes later in the
process. These mechanisms should be seen, therefore, as complementary to each other:
the key issue is to have effective mechanisms in place, and not mechanisms per se!
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Adler's (1995) primary objective is to develop understanding of how established design
and manufacturing departments coordinate their activities, and how these departments
should coordinate to manage efficiently their interdependence.[6] Adler (1995, p.148)
notes:
As the phases of work unfold within a time-bound project, departments typically
experience different degrees and types of interdependence, and they interact with
varying intensities and via different coordination mechanisms. And as a result, in
the course of a product development project, neither interdepartmental
interdependencies nor coordination mechanisms are constant over time.
Since this thesis is concerned with the coordination of effective design management
(post-concept), focus on these phases of product development is appropriate. Each
mechanism is now discussed under the typology presented in figure 4.6. As a precursor,
the non-coordination of phases warrants separate attention. In Chapter Two, the
traditional approach to product development was characterised as separated activities,
where communication only took place between phases. The non-coordination modes in
figure 4.6 are typical of this process. However, non-coordination may also include the
absence of a CAD or CAM strategy (Adler, 1995), or a failure to integrate properly
technology and organisation (Ettlie, 1988; Twigg and Voss, 1992).
4.4.4.1 Pre-project phase coordination
In the context of this thesis, pre-project coordination corresponds to those activities that
will impact on the design and manufacturing activities, yet precede the initiation of a
given project. The output at this phase will be a set of design and manufacturing
capabilities.
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A number of activities may take place during the pre-project phase, and may include: the
setting of standards to be used throughout the project (both product and process
related); the schedules and project timing plans (including any review meetings and build-
test dates); the coordination of functional strategies; or the building of a cross-functional
team.
Compatibility standards (sequential): By establishing standards early in a project, or as
corporate policy, the need of reciprocal discussion may be reduced. Standardising the
number of variants in commonly used components early in the project can assist greatly
the process of downstream operations. For example, where there are complex assembly
operations, prior discussion with product designers to limit the variety of fastener size
used will have positive effects on purchasing, logistics and manufacturing in terms of
cost, time and quality. Such standards may be either firm or project specific but require
detailed discussion by all relevant parties at an early stage. Other types of standard may
include: setting producibility standards; creating approved parts' databases; or
centralising a product definition database in which CAD/CAM facilities in all
departments and divisions must be compatible.
Capabilities' development schedules (iterative): Coordination can be greatly enhanced if
all capabilities are working uniformly to a prescribed set of objectives and schedules.
The effective implementation of CAD/CAM, for example, requires cross-functional
development and integration in formulating a cohesive strategy (Adler, 1995; Twigg and
Voss, 1992). The coordination of strategies enables planning in the knowledge of the
activities of other functions, which can lead to a reduction in inappropriate design
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specifications, or process expectations. Of course, this requires an effective two-way
exchange of information. Whilst Marketing and Manufacturing have increasingly moved
towards explicit strategy formulation (aided by the work of, inter alia, Platts and
Gregory, 1988; Hill, 1993), the author's personal experience of interviewing Engineering
personnel leads to the impression that their strategy is far more implicit, and that
coordination of strategy is not always widespread. The dysfunctional result of this was
acknowledged by Twigg (1989) in a specialist UK vehicle manufacturer in the late
1980s: a middle manager in Engineering with a key integrating role between
engineering/manufacturing interpreted differently the manufacturing strategy of the
company. In the context of one programme of work, this misinterpretation created
tensions at this interface.
Coordination committee (iterative): An example of a coordination committee is the
Product Policy Committee at Rover Group Limited, cited in Bertodo (1989b). This
committee represents all functions of the company and has vehicle programme directors
reporting to it. New product development plans are assessed vis-à-vis the operations of
individual functions; any conflicts can be resolved prior to the commitment of resources
to downstream operations.
Joint development (iterative): Bertodo (1989b, p. 20) cites a pre-concept joint
development event involving a core, cross-functional team, and vehicle programme
director. This event enables the project to incorporate: the maximum carry-over of
components, processes and technologies; shelf-engineered components; an assessment of
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available powertrain units for the new models; and, the existing manufacturing
constraints.
4.4.4.2 Design-phase (project) coordination
The aim of this phase is to convert the design capabilities into a product specification.
Increasingly, firms are identifying the needs of manufacturing in the design engineering
phase through such techniques as design for manufacture (DFM) and design for assembly
(DFA). Many of the mechanisms discussed now contribute to these techniques.
Design engineers' tacit knowledge (sequential): Design engineers may be able to
accumulate tacit knowledge of manufacturing practices over time from previous projects
or experience, thereby ensuring designs are producible. This may be achieved through
job rotation or internship schemes. Saeed et a! (1993) argue for design engineers to
develop focused manufacturing knowledge, gained through working in a specific
manufacturing environment; in this way, many manufacturing-related engineering
changes can be avoided. A draw back of relying on this type of coordination is the time-
related knowledge of the designer. Twigg (1989) cites an example of design engineers
assuming their tacit knowledge of manufacturing's practice was correct, when in fact
circumstances had changed. They were physically distanced from the manufacturing site,
and whereas assumptions had been made about the available space for new process
equipment, the assembly line layout had dramatically changed since last the design
engineers had visited, resulting is substantial engineering changes being made late in the
process from manufacturing.
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Design rules (reczprocal). It is possible to codif,', either manually or through software
(for example in CAD/CAM systems), formal procedures in the form of decision rules and
design rules that reflect the considerations of downstream functions. Wheelwright and
Clark (1992, Chapter 9) refer to the rules of thumb used for a fabricated, assembly
product. These included focusing on minimising the number of parts and part numbers in
a design, and eliminating adjustments, fasteners, and jigs and fixtures. In addition to the
rules, there were identifiable impacts on performance. Twigg et a! (1992) cite an
example of one company using in-built software (an artificial intelligence type shell) of
structural features of components spec/Ied in manufacturing terms. Another case had
moved to imposing design rules through its CAD system because design staff were
defining radii geometrically as straight lines (whilst labelling them as radii), the result of
which was corrupted geometric data feeding into CNC part-programs. Adler (1995)
cites a case where producible printed-circuit board fabrication specifications increased
from 40% to 95% over two years, due to the implementation of software based design
rules: CAD/CAM enabled the designer to verify automatically the design conformance to
producibility rules. The main advantages that Adler (1988) sees with design rules are,
inter alia, the learning across projects that can occur to the whole organisation as new
knowledge about manufacturing capabilities is progressively accumulated and, the tighter
control and definition by manufacturing of procedures necessary for the development of
these rules.
Manufacturing sign-off (reciprocal): This procedure enables manufacturing to accept or
refuse responsibility for making the product to design specification. There is often a
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proviso that manufacturing is able to veto the specification if unfeasible, or refuse it if
associated documentation is insufficient.
Producibility design reviews (reciprocal): According to Carter and Eliram (1994, p.
16): "Product design review is a detailed reassessment of the configuration and
tolerances of parts manufactured by a process. The objective ... is to optimize a
product's design, given an understanding of its intended use." They advocate design
reviews as a mechanism for improved product quality. In an exploratory study in one
buyer-supplier relationship, they compared the effectiveness of product design review
with process capability analysis, and found that 95.8% of the quality improvement in the
product was attributable to the functioning product review committee. Design reviews
are common within the design process: as end-of-design-cycle reviews, as reviews of
completed designs (such as Stage Gates), or as specialist reviews addressing the issue of
producibility, thus incorporating manufacturing (producibility) engineers. A balance is
required as to when this review occurs: if at the end of the design cycle, the design tnay
be performance-optimised, but not producible in manufacturing's view! In addition,
Adler (1995) found that one company in his study resisted producibiity improvements at
this stage, since the knock-on affect to related components meant time-consuming
revisions to already accomplished design work. Adler (1988, p.38) argues that
manufacturing (producibility) engineers who review design in-progress need to be
located within the design function to maximise frequency of informal consultation.[7]
Joint product/process design teams (iterative): Joint design teams enable manufacturing
engineers to begin developing process designs at an early stage, and offer informal advice
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to product designers on producibility aspects of emerging designs (Adler, 1995). These
become necessary when manufacturing's needs cannot be suitably captured by tacit
knowledge of designers, design rules, manufacturing sign-offs, or design reviews. Whilst
preliminary definition may have been discussed at pre-project stage, it is joint teams that
manage the finer detail at the project phase. As Adler (1988, p.33) remarks: "Truly joint
teams are rare; a more common procedure allowing two-way information flow - albeit
stilted - between manufacturing and design is the design review."
4.4.4.3 Manufacturing-phase (post-design) coordination
This phase requires coordination after the release of design data to manufacturing or a
more refined characterisation of the product design has been specified. The result of this
phase is a product that customers will accept.
Manufacturing flexibility (sequential): Manufacturing has long been the domain of
individuals expected to turn drawings into reality. This often meant working around
drawings (so-called tweaking) to make sense of them - that is, from a manufacturing
(producibility) perspective! One improvement to this non-coordination perspective has
been to build flexibility into manufacturing operations (see Slack, 1991, Chapter 5) and
Corrêa (1994) for a detailed discussion of manufacturing flexibility). Adler (1988)
suggests this is the second most popular form of post-design coordination, behind
engineering changes.
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Early release of design data (sequential): The early release of design data provides
manufacturing with the opportunity to begin preliminary work on verif'ing producibility
problems of the design, as well as instruct the parallel development of process design.
Production prototypes (reciprocal): A schedule-based form of coordination is the use of
prototypes. There are various occasions when prototypes may be used (Wheelwright
and Clark, 1992, Chapter 10): mock-up prototypes are used for addressing product
design issues at concept and engineering stages; and, design-build-test cycles address
product/process fit issues at pilot production stage. Complete system prototypes tend to
be constructed at concept and pilot production stages, whereas subsystem and
component levels are more generally used to address specific integration queries.
Engineering changes (reciprocal): Engineering changes enable manufacturing,
marketing, and even customers to propose changes to the product design, and is a
commonly used form of mutual adaptation:
In a frequently-encountered scenario, design 'throws the drawings over the wall'
to manufacturing, and in subsequent months manufacturing sends back a list of
changes required to ensure design producibility. (Adler, 1995, p. 156)
An important issue for companies is how to manage effectively the timing and
communication of engineering changes. One technological solution is the use of product
data management (PDM) systems, which can ensure downstream changes return swiftly
and accurately to upstream activities. However, as Twigg (1989) found, many systems
track design changes, but do not necessarily keep all relevant parties informed. Clark
and Fujimoto (1991, p. 121) suggest learning from the Japanese experience, where only
changes that add value to the product take place after final release of drawings, but the
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necessity of any such changes are minimised through early, meaningful and fast
implementation, rather than the bureaucratic checks and balances epitomised in Europe
and the USA.
Transition teams (iterative): An improvement to the engineering change procedure may
be made by co-locating design engineers in manufacturing, after design sign-off to
manufacturing, thus forming a transition team. Design engineers are seconded on a
temporary assignment, but in a full-time capacity, thus enabling problems encountered in
the early stages of manufacture to be resolved quickly - fast feedback of engineering
changes. However, whereas the previous mechanism distances the two functions, co-
location helps alleviate the common problem of design personnel moving to a new
project on release to manufacturing and thus being reluctant to revise now old designs.
An advantage of this form of coordination is that it enables design engineers to have
first-hand experience of the design/process fit issues, for input to future projects (see
designer's tacit knowledge of manufacturing).
An additional mechanism that may be used after the entire project has reached volume
levels of production is the post-project appraisal (referred to earlier in figure 4.3). This
would appear from the literature to be practised rarely, but where it is, inter-functional
dialogue is encouraged. One tool used in these appraisals is the project data (in terms of
tracking costs, time and quality performance) held in management information systems;
such reviews are only beneficial if lessons are learned and appropriate action taken in
future projects.
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4.5	 External integration
A typology of internal integration mechanisms has been considered largely based on
existing work of functional interface studies. These mechanisms can also be used at the
inter-firm perspective. For example, in the automotive industry, component suppliers
may be selected largely on their ability to respond quickly to late engineering changes
through flexible manufacturing processes; similarly, supplier manufacturing engineers
may be invited to the vehicle manufacturer to comment on prototypes at the production
build phase. Hence, the mechanisms presented in figure 4.6 have application across
firms. However, as suppliers of external engineering resource are increasingly requested
to contribute earlier to product development, additional mechanisms must be considered.
Figure 4.7 presents a revised typology of coordination mechanisms for inter-
organisational communication. Important additions to the typology are the use of
electronic data interchange, supplier development teams and committees, and
technological gatekeeper at pre-project phase, the producibility/manufacturing engineer
and guest engineer at design phase, and the site engineer at manufacturing phase. These
additional mechanisms are now discussed in detail, and specific examples of the previous
mechanisms are highlighted where references to particular inter-firm situations provide
benefit to the previous discussion.
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Guest engineer (R)
Supplier	 Joint product/process Transition team (I)
development team (I) design team (I)
Figure 4.7	 A typology of inter-organisational coordination mechanisms
Pre-project phase 	 Design phase	 Manufacturing
phase
Standards
Schedules and
plans
Mutual
adj ustment
Teams
Compatibility
standards (S)
Electronic data
interchange (S)
CAD/CAM data
exchange (S)
Cost management (I)
Capabilities
development
schedules (I)
Relationship
assessment (R)
Supplier
development
committee(I)
Gatekeeper (R)
Joint development (I)
Designers!
 tacit
knowledge of
manufacturing (S)
Design rules (R)
Sign-off (R)
Producibility/
manufacturing
engineer (R)
Early manufacturing
start with early
design data (S)
Manufacturing
flexibility (5)
Production
prototypes
I. engineering fit
II. build-test cycles
R)
Site engineer (R)
Producibility design Engineering changes
reviews (R)
	 (R)
Notes: t
	
Three types of information flow: S - sequential; R - reciprocal; I - iterative
An additional mechanism is available, that of post-project appraisal (I)
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4.5.1 Pre-project phase coordination
Electronic data interchange (sequential): Electronic data interchange (EDT) enables the
electronic transfer of information (both intra and inter-firm) through computers.
Increasingly, this is being done by EDT service suppliers, through a value-added network
(VAN). Originally, EDT was used for routine transactions, such as purchase orders and
invoicing, but it is now receiving wider application, such as integrating electronic mail
systems, and exchanging engineering graphics and NC programming data. EDT has two
major benefits in supply coordination: the elimination of re-keying the same information
into different computer systems; and the reduction of errors (Bessant, 1991). However,
much of the benefit of EDT accrues where systems are directly compatible, and it will be
several more years until an EDT standard is widely adopted. One estimate is that the
Tnternational Standards Organisation's EDIFACT will be responsible for 90 per cent of
European EDT transfers by 1997 (The Financial Times, 23 October 1993).
It is likely, therefore, that the role of EDT service suppliers will continue as they compete
on guaranteeing successful data exchange between systems, particularly if customers
continue to use different EDT systems. However, for EDT to be effective, there must be
trust within the supply relationship. Lamming (1993, p. 198) adds a cautionary note to
the effectiveness of EDT, citing problems, in the 1980s, of mistrust and ownership of
drawings. He sees the full use of EDT developing where the partnership model is
established.
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CAD/CAM data exchange (sequential): One means of coordinating design activities is
through the transfer of design information. Traditionally this has been through the
medium of blueprint drawings. However, since the early 1980s, the widespread use of
CAD/CAM has witessed the experimentation of CAD/CAM data exchange. CAD/CAM
data exchange is a particular form of EDI warranting separate discussion because it plays
a significant role within inter-firm design relationships. Three basic types of exchange
can be identified: (1) identical system, requiring no changes; (2) direct translation, where
a specific conversion is made between two different systems; and (3) neutral format (for
example, SET, IGES, and VDA-FS).
In the automotive industry, the transfer of design data electronically with suppliers has
been encouraged since the mid-1980s. To this end, Ford, Rover and Jaguar were
amongst the first UK companies to use neutral formats in 1983-84 (Barley, 1989). The
importance of a compatible CAD/CAM system, or a reliable exchange system, was
recognised by Twigg (1990): in a study of CAD/CAM adoption by Rover suppliers in
1987/8, many firms had selected systems capable of successfully exchanging CAD/CAM
data with their customers (not solely Rover). These suppliers tended to require
significant iteration with their customer in design work, especially in aesthetic and safety
critical work. This phenomenon was mirrored by the non-adopters interviewed, who
expressed a need to purchase directly compatible systems where iterative design
relationships existed. This situation was eased with the provision of dedicated bureau
services (such as Deltacam, Birmingham) and the position of Prime-Computervision as a
significant vendor to Rover, Jaguar and Ford in the UK.
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Cost management (iterative): Understanding the cost of design, development and
production of a new product helps focus attention on the total design. By implementing
a cost management system as part of all new projects, suppliers and customers can work
together on delivering an optimised product, given available resource. For example, as
part of Rover's RG2000 programme, suppliers are expected to provide detailed operating
costs, and for all new projects Rover design engineers are given responsibility for
component costs (Management Today, 1 May 1992). In a similar mode, Ford
established 200 teams comprising Ford and supplier personnel to apply cost reduction
analysis to selected components. They analysed the entire supply chain from design to
finished vehicle, with the aim of eliminating waste throughout the supply chain (The
Financial Times, 12 July 1994).
Relationship assessment (reciprocal): The establishment of a relationship assessment -
as opposed to an asymmetric supplier assessment - programme may act as a catalyst for
coordination through highlighting deficiencies in existing mechanisms and processes.
Lamming (1994), in a report on supply relationships, indicates only 28 per cent of
suppliers conduct formal appraisals of their customers. Since integration of design
activities requires iterative (or reciprocal) communication, a relationship assessment
would seem an appropriate mechanism to focus effectiveness.
Supplier development committee (iterative): In the same way that coordination
committees act on intra-firm development, supplier development committees provide a
forum for selected suppliers to assist in improving supplier development programmes.
These committees are highly selective, based in part on openness between the parties.
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Lamming (1993, P. 215), for example, sees supplier development as: "the natural
companion for cost transparency ." Hence, supply relationships that are based on the
disclosure of information will enable customers to provide insight to the suppliers
operations, and conversely, for suppliers to comment on customer's operations
(Lamming, 1993; Macbeth and Ferguson, 1994).
Gatekeeper (reciprocal). The literature also identifies individuals, gatekeepers (Allen,
1977) or boundary-spanning roles (Tushman, 1977 and 1979), who are gatherers of
information, and advisors on technological matters.
	
In his study of scientific
laboratories, Allen (1977) observed a number of key personnel to whom others sought
technical advice. He characterised these technological gatekeepers as high technical
performers, who were generally first-line supervisors, and who had exposure to external
technical sources (including refereed journals). However, Allen cautions that the use of
gatekeepers should remain informal.
Despite this caution of Allen's, a formalised form of gatekeeper is emerging. This is
generally a person who resides in the organisation and maintains a constant awareness of
the available skills in the supply and knowledge bases external to the company, which
may be used for new product programmes when required. Hayes el al (1988, p.113)
refer to this emergent form of gatekeeper: staff of long-standing experience in their
industries, whose network of acquaintances in suppliers, customers and competitors
place them at the forefront of learning about new technological developments.
Macdonald and Williams (1992), in a study of 125 gatekeepers, found an equal split
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between those who formally or informally gathered technological information as part of
their job responsibility.
Supplier development teams (iterative): Many customers have established supplier
development teams who assist suppliers in improving their operations performance;
typical applications are in quality, and in eliminating design and manufacturing problems.
The aim is for these teams to be a temporary measure, to raise supplier competence to
the requisite level, and for the supplier to self-sustain the required performance (Macbeth
and Ferguson, 1994).
Joint development (iterative): Joint development at the inter-organisational level
includes the involvement of suppliers at pre-concept stage. This will be elaborated on in
Chapter Five, but suffice it to mention that early supplier input to product development is
becoming more widespread (Birou and Fawcett, 1994). However, the occasions when
concept designers and suppliers meet to iterate potential assembly issues are rare indeed.
In a meeting at a vehicle manufacturer in April 1995, a number of suppliers were invited
to discuss supply issues for a power-assisted steering pump with product and concept
designers, manufacturing engineers, and purchasing representatives from the vehicle
manufacturer. It was noted by all parties that this was the first occasion that all
participants in the design, development and manufacture of this component system had
met in one place! One finding of the meeting was the high variation in standard fasteners
being used across the product range: this caused assembly and inventory difficulties.
There was no objection from the design engineers towards the standardisation of fewer
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fastener variants, and carrying these over in future projects. Hence, early joint
development can enable manufacturing issues to be resolved upstream in the process.
4.5.2 Design-phase coordination
Producibi lily/manufacturing engineer (reciprocal): 	 An example of a supplier
manufacturing engineer is provided in Appleby and Twigg (1988). In 1987, a prototype
inlet manifold for the award-winning Rover K-series engine was being developed.
Design responsibility lay with Rover's product designers, but the tacit knowledge of
process (aluminium sand casting), tool design, and so forth, lay outside Rover's
expertise, and required external input from the supplier and toolmaker.{8] Suppliers may
act more directly to promote their process knowledge to the vehicle manufacturer.
Around Detroit (USA) many plastics' suppliers maintain technical application centres to
assist in plastic componentry design and analysis. Along with computer analysis
facilities, plastics' engineers are providing advice to vehicle designers on plastic's material
technology (Machine Design, 8 August 1994).
Guest engineer (reciprocal): Guest engineers are technical specialists who are
employees of a supplier of technology or design expertise, but who reside on a
permanent or semi-permanent basis at a customer organisation.[9J Their purpose is to
ensure the effective integration of a supplier's technological expertise with the customer's
needs. They may only maintain contact with their home company on a weekly basis,
whilst working full-time with the design team of their host customer. This form of
coordination was introduced into Honda's simultaneous engineering teams in the late
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1970s (Hartley and Mortimer, 1990) and is frequently used in Japan.[10] It is now
finding widespread use within the world's automotive industry, but reference to it in the
literature is a little sporadic, and its meaning often assumed (see for example Clark,
1989, p.1261). Although referring to the exchange of customer experts into suppliers
(so-called resident experts), Macbeth and Ferguson (1994, p. 85) highlight a major
concern of relevance to guest engineers: "The mandating of such [resident] experts is a
big issue so that there is no doubt in anyone's minds about the acceptable range of
decisions such people are empowered to make."
Joint product/process design learn (iterative): An example of an inter-organisational
design team is provided by the re-design of the console fascia for the Rover 200/400.[1 1]
The original console had been designed by Honda in three sections, using 12 fasteners
and anti-squeak tape. Rover wanted a one-piece component, and formed a project team
comprising of material supplier, finished component supplier, a toolmaker and two
modelmakers. The result was an improved and quicker fitting fascia, a significant
reduction in the amount of anti-squeak tape used, and parts no longer required painting.
Overall there was a saving of one million pounds Sterling for Rover.
4.5.3 Manufacturing-phase coordination
Site engineer (reciprocal): Site engineers are an extension to the supplier development
team, discussed earlier. They are customer employees who provide specific input at the
supplier firm to tackle on-going difficulties at the prototype or manufacturing stage.
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4.6	 Interdependency and coordination
Coordination mechanisms are used to assist meeting information processing needs,
where there is uncertainty and interdependence between tasks and environment. At the
design/manufacturing interface, for example, these mechanisms can help ensure
product/process fit at both intra and inter-firm levels. If the use of mechanisms is
extended to other interfaces, at both levels, then product, process and customer fit can be
examined. Customer fit in this context is similar to the external integration considered by
Fujimoto (1989).
Depending on the uncertainty of this fit between information processing needs and
capabilities (see figure 4.1), different coordination mechanisms are needed. This
uncertainty has two dimensions: the degree of interdependence, and the degree of
analysability (Adler 1995). Various studies have examined these dimensions, vis-à-vis
alternative coordination mechanisms (for example, Adler 1995; Tushman and Nadler,
1978; Van de Yen et a!, 1976). It is generally accepted, since March and Simon (1958),
that as tasks increase their need for greater intensity of information transfer, due to
greater interdependency, there is a tendency to move towards higher level mechanisms.
The use of teams and integrating technological systems gain in necessity, for example, as
additions to standards and plans. Van de Ven et a! found the least costly mechanisms
(impersonal rules and plans) were used the most for intra-organisational coordination,
whilst lateral relations and group meetings were used the least, due largely to their
perception as being inefficient and costly.[12] Hence, an ordering of mechanisms can be
established based on, inter alia, complexity, cost and information processing capacity
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(Tushman and Nadler, 1978). In general, firms will attempt to reduce uncertainty
through the lower order mechanisms. Figure 4.8 illustrates this effect.
It should be noted, however, that the ranking in figure 4.8 does not infer increasing
effectiveness. There are no ideal forms of coordination, since effective use of integration
mechanisms is context specific. For any development project, there may be more than
one product/process fit problem, for example, each requiring different levels of
interdependence. Similarly, the degree of interpretability reduces as a product moves
from concept to market (Adler 1995). In the early stages of concept, the project is
abstract in nature, becomes less abstract as design specifications are detailed, and realises
Figure 4.8	 Mechanisms for coordination and control
Mechanism	 Complexity	 Cost	 Information
processing
capacity
	Simple	 Cheap	 Low
	
Complex	 Costly	 High
1. Rules and programs
2. Hierarchy
3. Joint planning
4. Either or both
/
Formal	 Lateral
information	 relations
systems	 (e.g. teams)
(e.g. MIS)
Note: t see footnote 12 for a counter argument on costs
Source: Tushman and Nadler (1978, figure 2)
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concrete character as production ramp-up begins. Similarly, each mechanism is only as
good as its ability to resolve a problem. Adler (1995) refers to a case where a joint
product/process design team appeared to have an impossible task to solve: there were
thousands of constraints to which an aircraft's tubing route had to satisf'; the
manufacturing engineers were unable to solve these at design stage, and it was only after
a CAD system provided a representation of the aircraft that the tubing fit couLd be
analysed against the constraints.
Hence, "the optimal coordination approach for the project will involve a portfolio of
mechanisms, the mix being determined by the relative importance of the different types of
fit problems" (Adler, 1995; p.1 59). For example, a firm may use manufacturing staff
early in the design phase to set general standards, but then rely upon sign-offs to check
their compliance; others may designate liaison staff to conduct occasional in-progress
design reviews, whilst others may implement fully integrated design teams.
Hence, one might predict that the choice of integration mechanism will be a function of
the character of the development required, whereby the level of carry-over parts being
used, or the newness of project (minor refinements versus major changes) will determine
the required level of fit.
4.7 Summary
This chapter began by presenting an inter-organisational framework for considering
coordination of product development. Its purpose was to link the previous chapters on
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product development and the information systems perspective to the mechanisms
available to coordinate the inter-organisational process. This differs from the work of
Bensaou (1992) due to the concentration on following the product development process
and on examining a range of alternative mechanisms, rather than analysing their
dimensions. The examination of coordination mechanisms began with consideration of
those used in organisational design, and their application to the organisational-
technology integration issue in previous work by the author (see for example Winch et
a!, 1991). An alternative typology by Adler (1988 and 1995) was examined and
extended as an appropriate typology of inter-organisational coordination.
NOTES
1. Adler (1988) also considers industry characteristics a further factor.
2. The original list of Winch et al (1991) included technological integration mechanisms suitable
for CAD/CAM implementation: these are dealt with elsewhere in this chapter.
3. A sixth option exists, namely, ignoring any coordination: thus during the pre-project phase one
might flnd a situation of anarchy, with design proceeding to throw their designs over the
proverbial wall, and manufacturing working around any problems to deliver a product
(emphasis intended).
4. Adler (1988; 1995) uses these phases in a notional form to help clarify the range of
coordination possibilities, whilst acknowledging that there is overlap between the stages.
5. This revised categorisation of information flows was used in a survey of CAD/CAM
implementation by Winch et al (1991). The work demonstrates the variety and distribution of
mechanisms used by firms for engineering/manufacturing coordination.
6. Adler (1995) recognises the possibility to sub-divide further - distinguishing conceptual design
from detail design, and pilot production from mature production - particularly since
coordination takes different forms within each.
7. However, in his later report, Adler (1995, p.155) notes that most manufacturing engineers
who reported to design management progressively lost the acuity of their manufacturing point
of view. Similar arguments are given in Twigg (1989), where the design and manufacturing
operations of a vehicle manufacturer are separated by site, and the traditional input of
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manufacturing 'over a drink in the social club' had been lost to the design engineers. To
counter this loss, manufacturing engineers were seconded to Engineering, under the project
manager's authority. However, after several years in this role, they were beginning to lose
identity from their manufacturing peers, whilst maintaining an outsider label from the
surrogate engineering group.
8. At the time of interview, the supplier saw no need for acquiring CAD, assured that their
expert knowledge would secure the production contract. Some years later the author met the
design engineer for this project who confirmed the essential input of that particular supplier
and toolmaker. His footnote to this recollection was that after the prototype work, the
production contract was given to a rival supplier, whose design expertise was not necessarily
on a par with the other. This is an example of the adversarial relationships that existed at that
time.
9. This definition of guest engineers differs from that of Lamming (1994) who sees them as: (1)
employees of the customer who are located at the supplier, working on process and product
improvements; or (2) employees of the supplier working at the customer. This first definition
is similar to that of site engineer in the presented typology.
10.Womack et a! (1990, pp. 146-7) cite several examples of resident design engineers assigned
by Japanese first tier suppliers to work in customers development teams up to two to three
years prior to production.
11.'One-piece console breakthrough', Engineering, Vol. 233, No. 1, 1993, p. 12
12 .As higher levels of interactions are involved, a natural assumption is that the overall cost of
implementing these mechanisms will increase. Adler (1995, pp. 160-1), however,
hypothesises that differences will occur dependent on the complexity of product. Where, for
example, complexity of product/process fit is high, then the overall cost may be lower: lower
levels of interaction may require frequent iterations (hence, become time-consuming), and it
may be impossible to formulate standards; in contrast, the team approach may be more cost
effective since this provides a forum for dealing specifically with complexity!
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5	 INTER-FIRM ROLES	 AUTOMOTIVE DESIGN AND
DEVELOPMENT
5.1	 Introduction
In Chapter One, the main components of design chains were outlined, and subsequent
chapters have sought to demonstrate issues relating to their management. In this chapter
this theme will be explored further by examining the inter-firm design and development
process.
The previous chapters have emphasised the importance of upstream stages of the
product development process to the cost, timing and quality of manufactured product;
this is the embryo of design chain management. In the same way that the manufacture of
a product requires inputs, the design and development of a product require the
accumulation and codifying of information, such as customer requirements, advances in
technology, manufacturing process knowledge and so forth. These inputs may be
internalised by the firm as vertical integration, which has been the traditional form of
design work, or external resources may be utilised, as Clark and Starkey (1988, p.80)
indicate:
Previously design had been conceived as an activity always undertaken within the
vertically integrated enterprise as in the case of Ford ... However, design may be
subcontracted and bought in, or designers may subcontract supply and assembly
whilst retaining control over aspects of distribution.
A good illustration of such an approach is found in the retail and textile industry. Since
the mid-i 920s, the retail company Marks and Spencer has taken over the control of
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design throughout an entire fihiere or chain. (Similarly, in Italy, the specialist textiles
firm, Benetton, has developed a strong control over design with its suppliers.) Marks
and Spencer now plays a dominant role as the focal enterprise shaping the directions of
design for its suppliers, insofar as it has established networks of knowledge and
competencies that involve over 800 suppliers of raw materials, equipment suppliers and
finished goods (Clark and Starkey, 1988). In these relationships, Marks and Spencer
acts as coordinator of design activities, and buyer of finished goods.
KB. Clark (1989), in his study of supplier involvement in automotive product
development, recommends a re-thinking of the traditional concepts of vertically
integrated supply:
There is evidence ... that integration of capability between upstream and
downstream firms without financial ownership (i.e. an integrated supplier
network) may be more effective in developing new technology and new products
than an enterprise where the upstream firm is a wholly owned subsidiaiy of the
downstream firm. At least in the development process, the implication is that the
vertically integrated firm actually is less integrated than the network of
independent suppliers. (p. 1261)
As P.A. Clark notes, in earlier work on the Rover SD1 project with Whipp:
Since [the 1960s and 1970s], many corporations have reassessed their in-house
specialists and have concluded that external agencies are a superior source of
[design, innovation, and R&D] advice. This conclusion is largely based on the
simple fact that external agencies specialize in new problems which require the
learning of new analytical skills. The external agency experiences the new
problems in a variety of settings and therefore has the best opportunity to shape
the problems and to design novel, appropriate solutions. (Whipp and Clark, 1986,
p. 203, italics in original)
One benefit the notion of design chain management may have is in helping focus
attention on the inter-firm development process. The field of economics refers to this
process as inter-firm innovation; however, the use of this term lacks appreciation of the
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dynamic interaction of participants throughout the development of the product or the
managerial decisions required to coordinate and synchronise the various operations.
Innovation is seen as the commercialisation of the R&D activity, often internal to the
firm, or as an inter-firm activity where design contributions are received as licences or
joint ventures. It assumes a black box that transforms R&D inputs into a commercial
product, with little exploration of the operations activities therein. As Whipp and Clark
(1986, p.128) also acknowledge, the contribution of certain parties (notably component
suppliers and production workers) to design in the automotive industry were not
commonly recognised in the innovation literature at that time; however since, attention
has been drawn towards the concept of networks - in particular, technological networks.
5.2	 Technological networks
One of the earliest references to the network is the concept of organisation-set proposed
by Evan (1966), in which the firm operates in a set of relationships with other
organisations delivering and receiving inputs and outputs, and regulating their activities.
It was not until the mid-i 980s, however, that the concept of networks received renewed
interest, mainly for investigating inter-firm relationships, and for understanding the
strategies, structure and management processes therein. This has been particularly
strong in the fields of marketing and purchasing, industrial economics, and strategic
management. DeBresson and Amesse (1991), in their review of the literature, deduce
that three conditions are likely to induce firms to enter this form of inter-organisational
design: strong technological and market uncertainties; the need for multiple sets of
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complementary technical developments, which even the largest firms cannot acquire;
and, the possibility of super-additive gains.
The concept of network has found wide acceptance in the inter-firm exchange of
design/development information (Hâkansson et a!, 1987; Clark and Staunton, 1989; a
special issue of Research Policy: see DeBresson and Amesse, 1991 and Freeman, 1991).
When supplier inputs of technological knowledge have been examined as part of a
network, they have largely been seen in terms of process innovations (suppliers of
equipment), or the supply of basic/applied research, such as scientific laboratories
(H5.kansson et a!, 1987; Häusler et a!, 1994). Westney (1988) sees this as a firm's
external knowledge network, consisting of both suppliers for developing new knowledge,
but also others from whom to draw upon for existing knowledge. Whilst the term
network has been widely used, many different forms of relationship are regarded within
the concept, for example,filiere, milieu or chain (Clark and Staunton, 1989, p. 159).
5.2.1 Characteristics of networks
Hâkansson (1987) defines a network on three dimensions: actors, activities and
resources. In every network, there are actors and a focal firm: in this thesis, the focal
firm is the Rover Group, and the other actors are their suppliers. Each performs or
controls operations, and controls particular resources and knowledge. Two types of
activity are present within the network: transformation, and transaction. Transformation
activities centre on the operations of the actor, whereas transaction activities link these
transformation operations, perhaps across many linkages. Hence, a key feature of the
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network is the development of long chains and clustering of activities around particular
operations; these may remain within specific sectors, but may also cross them. In the
hydraulics sector, for example, Hâkansson (1989, p. 141) found that:
Some actors try to operate in various network combinations connected with the
hydraulics field, something which is also reflected in their identity, as well as their
resource base and structure of their activities. Other companies instead combine
a network in hydraulics with a network in some other technological area such as
electronics or rubber.
This is an important observation since firms determine which networks they belong to on
the complementarity of their assets (Teece, 1986) vis-à-vis those assets of others with
whom they seek to collaborate. If these complementary assets are balanced, the
interdependence between actors and activities will lead to more efficient forms of
transaction as each actor learns to perform these activities better. The most common
types of dependencies affecting product development networks are technical, knowledge,
social and logistic (or administrative) dependencies (Hâkansson, 1987). As these
transactions become more established and stable, routines and informal rules will be
created (Häkansson, 1987, p. 16). It is this informal nature of networks, sometimes
referred to as milieu relationships, that plays a significant role in the success of
collaboration (Czepiel, 1979; Häusler eta!, 1994).[1]
Four further dimensions help characterise a network: first, the functional
interdependency across transactions; second, the power actors exert through the control
of the activities; third, the current and previous knowledge and experience of the actors
define the activities within the network; and, fourth, the network develops and changes
over time, bringing in (and discarding) new actors and operations, and resources
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(Hâkansson, 1987). An example of this from the 1980s was General Motors' purchase
of the Hughes aircraft company to exploit electronic design capabilities in car design.
Lawrence and Dwyer (1983) suggest three types of coordinating relationship can be
identified within an inter-firm network: markets, hierarchies, and clans. The first two
derive from the work of Williamson (1975), who argues that inter-firm transactions will
be organised around either a price mechanism (the market) or hierarchy (the firm) 42J
The clan relationship, on the other hand, is based on long-standing transactions, often of
an informal tacit nature. Williamson (1975) idtnt s tci ceermrnans ol iTansacion
costs: asset specificity; uncertainty; and frequency. It is argued that if the asset
specificity of a particular transaction is high, firms will tend towards internalising these
costs through vertical integration.[3] If one considers technological asset specificity,
however, this argument may not run true. In circumstances of short product
development times, and increasing sophistication of technology, one benefit of a
specialist supplier will be the ability to appropriate learning from the customers with
whom it collaborates. Over time, a positive-sum gain may appreciate to all customers by
the intimate relationship the supplier shares with each one of them, if this supplier was
subsumed into the corporate giant, this technological learning may be severely reduced.
Therefore, consideration must be given to the opportunity cost of the transaction.
Some authors have emphasised the organisational learning aspects of partnerships.
Westney (1988, p. 344) indicates two dimensions of their learning curves: how to
manage the relationship between partners and, how to transfer learning effectively
throughout the firm, and then how to add value to it for improving products, services, or
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processes. Doz (1988) reinforces this need of managing the interface. In his
examination of technology partnerships, he concludes that managerial, rather than
technical, reasons are strong causes of collaborative failures, and suggests three areas to
consider. First, whilst initial collaboration is based on strategic complementarity, long-
term partnerships require management of cultural differences, uncertainties, and
misunderstandings, as well as the elimination of hidden agendas. Second, a joint
coordinated approach is required from both partners, especially from senior management.
Third, consideration should be given to managing the operating interfaces, rather than
allowing ad hoc adjustments to develop.
5.2.2 Types of technical collaboration
Finns may choose to collaborate for many different reasons; table 5.1 lists those reasons
identified by Contractor and Lorange (1988), with two additions from Dodgson (1991,
cited in Lamming, 1993). Alongside each entry, examples have been extrapolated from
Lamming's review to indicate some of the joint ventures within the automotive industry.
It is noteworthy that within this thesis, the reasons of complementary technologies and
vertical quasi-integration are strong reasons for closer collaboration with suppliers
within the design chain paradigm. The increasing use of component systems in vehicle
design is making necessary collaborative links between previously unconnected suppliers.
Not only is the sharing of design responsibility becoming increasingly necessary between
assembler and supplier (vertical quasi-integration), but the modular and system design
discussed in Chapter Three is requiring suppliers to collaborate with other suppliers who
have complementary assets to complete the project (such as the Ford modular door listed
in table 5.1). Together, these form the long chains and clusters characteristic of the
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Ford's request for modular doors
(Budd/ Johnson Controls! Standard
Parts)
(Caterpillar Tractor! Mitsubishi)
Table 5.1	 Strategic contributions ofjoint ventures
Reasons for collaboration	 Automotive examplest
Active suspension systems (Moog/
Lotus)
Allante prestige sports model (GM
Cadillac! Pininfarina)
. Risk reduction
Product portfolio diversification
Dispersion andlor reduction of fixed costs
Lower total capital investment
Technological uncertainty
• Economies of scale and/or rationalisation	 Several car models (Hondal Rover)
Lower average cost from larger volume
Lower cost by using comparative advantage of
each partner
• Complementary technologies and patents
Technological synergy
Exchange of patents and territories
• Co-opting or blocking competition
Defensive joint ventures to reduce competition
Offensive joint ventures to increase costs
and/or lower market share for a third company
• Overcoming government-mandated
investment or trade barrier
Receiving permit to operate as a 'local' entity
because of a local partner
Satisfying local content requirements
• Initial international expansion
Benefit from local partner's know-how
• Vertical quasi-integration
Access to materials, technology, labour,
capital, and distribution channels
Regulatory permits
Benefits from brand recognition
Establishing links with major buyers
Drawing on existing fixed marketing
establishment
• Technological complexity	 N/A
N/A
Ikeda Hoover supplying seats to
Nissan (UK) (US Hoover! Ikeda
Bussan)
NJJtvllvll (GMJ Toyota)
Sources:	 Contractor and Lorange (1988, table 1-2); t Lamming (1993, pp. 87-89);
Dodgson (1991, cited in Lamming, 1993); § Contractor and Lorange (1988)
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network concept. Hence, similarities of these collaborative reasons can be found with
the three categories of technical cooperation in networks defined by Hâkansson (1987):
horizontal complementary cooperation (akin to complementary technologies); vertical
cooperation (akin to vertical quasi-integration); and horizontal competitive cooperation.
Freeman (1991), referring specifically to innovation networks, categorises 10 types of
network (table 5.2). He stresses that these are not mutually exclusive and the larger
firms may engage in multiple types of relationship. This list differs from many of the
previous views of network collaborations, in that it extends a widely held view of
collaboration existing within advanced R&D facilities, to include the contractual and
non-contractual transfer of knowledge and design expertise.[4} In particular, he
recognises the role of subcontracting and supplier networks in innovation, and of
informal networks.
Table 5.2	 Categories of innovation network
1. Joint ventures and Research Corporations
2. Joint R&D agreements
3. Technology exchange agreements
4. Direct investments (minority holdings) motivated by technology factors
5. Licensing and second-sourcing agreements
6. Sub-contracting, production-sharing and supplier networks
7. Research Associations
8. Government-sponsored joint research programmes
9. Computerised data banks and value-added networks for technical and scientific
exchange
10.Other networks, including informal networks
Source: Freeman (1991, table 1)
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5.3	 Approaches to managing design expertise
The first stage in assessing how to manage design expertise is to consider the available
engineering resources in terms of its capabilities (knowledge and skills). The process of
product design and development requires the accumulation and codifying of knowledge
in the form of a product. How this is achieved will depend on the availability of
resources and expertise (competencies) to convert these into the product. A firm must
decide how it is to balance these resources since, in the case of complex products, it is
unlikely to be able to retain all available resources and expertise to design, manufacture,
distribute and market the product. Where design is concerned, a firm may consider
realising its capabilities, and utilising those of other firms as bought-in expertise.
5.3.1 Core capabilities
In recent years, there has been much discussion given to the core competencies (or
capabilities) of a firm, and hence to concentrate internal resources on those tasks that
maintain the firm's competitive advantage. NEC, for example, has had great success
through over 100 strategic alliances, enabling access to technological expertise
(particularly in semi-conductors) whilst maintaining a core strength in components and
central processors - its strategic architecture (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990, p. 80).
The core capabilities of a firm have been defined in various ways, as:
the collective learning in the organization." (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990, p. 82)
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. "a set of differentiated skills, complementary assets, and routines that provide the
basis for a firm's competitive capacities and sustainable advantage in a particular
business." (Teece, Pisano and Schuen, 1990, p.28; cited in Leonard-Barton, 1992, p.
112)
. "the knowledge set that distinguishes and provides a competitive advantage."
(Leonard-Barton, 1992, p. 113)
Applying this notion of core capabilities, Leonard-Barton (1992) examines the
management of new product and process development projects, and identifies four
dimensions of its knowledge-based capabilities: first, knowledge and skills embodied in
people (often tacit in nature); second, knowledge embedded in technical systems
(includes both information and procedures); third, managerial systems (informal and
formal ways of creating and controlling knowledge); and fourth, values and norms in
undertaking the other three dimensions. She notes that this dimension is often
overlooked.
A firm will assign different importance to each of these dimensions, which is the hallmark
of its character: for example, a design studio may rely heavily on the knowledge
embodied within its employees (skills). Leonard-Barton stresses that a finn's core
capabilities are evolving and that a firm's survival depends upon successfully managing
that evolution. Therefore, managers of new development projects face a paradox: "core
capabilities simultaneously enhance and inhibit development." (Leonard-Barton, 1992, p.
112, italics in original) Table 5.3 compares the positive aspects of a firm's capabilities
with the potential rigidities that may ensue from such a focused strategy. She cites
several companies who managed these rigidities through various activities, namely:
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Managerial expertise
system career
Values and norms
benchmarking against best practice operations; using cross-functional integration; and
seconding engineers through job rotation. She concludes that all four dimensions will
need to be addressed if a capability is to become a core activity.
Table 5.3	 The paradox of core capabilities in development projects
Dimension
Skills! knowledge
Technical system
Capabilities (positive)
Excellence of project
members (such as
professional elite)
Technical sophistication of
company staff to perform
intra-firm testing, for
example
Accumulated knowledge of
past talented staff
embodied in the systems,
procedures and tools
Mechanisms to encourage
innovation (such as reward
and incentive systems)
Power and ability of
individual project members
to champion innovation
(empowerment)
Rigidities (negative)
Weakness to attract and
retain elite in non-
dominant disciplines
Skills and processes in
software or hardware
become outdated quickly
Dominance of technical
vs. project management in
development
Expectation of rewards
for innovative actions
(empowerment as
entitlement)
Cultural bias toward a
dominant discipline (with
associated higher status for
it)
Lower status for non-
dominant disciplines
(hinders cross-functional
integration), for example:
• who travels to whom?
• self-fulfilling
expectations;
• unequal credibility;
• wrong language.
Source: compiled from Leonard-Barton (1992)
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A practical application of core capabilities is provided by Venkatesan (1992) who
developed a strategic sourcing policy for Cummins based on identifying systems or sub-
systems, rather than proprietary, individual components. The main feature is to
determine which subsystems are significant for the success of future product generations.
To be strategically important, sub-systems must: be perceived by customers as having
important product attributes; require highly specialised design and manufacturing skills
and specialised physical assets, that few suppliers can provide; and, be technologies
where a significant technological lead may be gained. Any decision to maintain them in-
house will also depend on the relative advantage of a supp[ier's desi
	 c.t
capabilities and whether the company could afford to catch up with the best suppliers
and retain design and manufacture.
Venkatesan (1992, p. 102) argues that a distinction should be made between producing a
subsystem in-house and controlling its design and manufacture by remaining an expert of
its architectural knowledge (earlier referred to in Chapter Two). This knowledge
requires an elaborate understanding of customer requirements, systems parameters and
component specifications that together define the distinct product. It is the control of
this aspect of product development that provides a key aspect of a company's
competitive advantage. As Venkatesan (1992, p. 103) contends:
.when capable subsystem suppliers exist, it is not so important to be able to.
design and manufacture the subsystem [in this case the engine] in-house as it is to
have the ability to specify and control the performance characteristics of the
subsystem.
The result of this analysis was the outsourcing of pistons - a component previously
considered as strategic. However, to ensure control, Cummins maintains close
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integration with suppliers through, for example, design analysis and reviews, prototype
machining and testing equipment, and manufacturing process validation and certification
procedures.
The lessons to be drawn from considering the core capabilities in product development
are two-fold. First, a firm must clearly identifj what are its critical core capabilities in
terms of strategic component systems, thereby enabling selection of outsourcing routes
that enhance, rather than diminish, their long-term competence. Second, whatever the
sourcing decision, a key competence should be the ability to manage (or control) these
external inputs. This requires not only suitable coordination mechanisms (see Chapter
Four) but also individuals with the competencies to oversee the necessary process and
relationships. To achieve these, it is necessary to understand the parameters of design,
which are now examined.
5.3.2 Design capabilities
There is a range of alternative design capability choices available to a firm in managing
the design and development process. At one extreme of this continuum, a firm may
retain all the necessary design capabilities in-house, whilst at the other end, a firm may
outsource design work and act as a focal point for the coordination of the design
process. Between these extremes, there exist options with varying degrees of internal
and external design capability. Figure 5.1 illustrates this range of choices as a simple
continuum. As expressed in the previous section, these choices are analogous with the
make-or-buy decisions of supply.
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High, through
contracts
Weak (short-term)
Stronger (long-term)
Low/
limited
Variable
Figure 5.1	 The design capability continuum
In-house
design
capability
High, but
	 Control of resource
loose - --------------------+
Strong	 -Famiiaritjr,+
High	 --Accessthilhly+
Fixed	 CostI- --------------------+
Little	 Risk of knowledge leakage4- ---------------------P Potential
This continuum is similar to the three approaches to design management expressed by
Bruce and Morris (1995) - in-house, out-house, and a mixture of the two - and reflects
the different design responsibilities of automotive component suppliers identified by
Appleby and Twigg (1988). (The specific types of outsourced design capability are
discussed in detail later in this chapter.) Laage-Hellman (1987) presents a similar
continuum for process development interaction. He argues that, in general, few cases
represent the extremes, since process development necessitates interaction between the
customer and equipment supplier, consultants and so forth.
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Bruce and Morris (1995) present four factors influencing the design management issues
of in-house/out-house approaches: accessibility; familiarity; control; and cost. To these
factors, a further parameter requires inclusion: risk of knowledge leakage from the
design relationship (Dodgson, 1993). Hence, five parameters can be examined which
influence the design management choice:
• Accessibility: A dilemma along the design capability continuum is to what extent the
outsourced design capability is accessible to the focal firm. Three conditions
determine this: the complexity of the product, the amount of design work required,
and the need to meet deadlines (Bruce and Morris, 1995). Companies have adopted a
variety of mechanisms to facilitate accessibility, for example, the use of CAD/CAM
technology, guest engineers (engineers from supplier firms who permanently reside in
the customer company), and multi-media communication (such as video-
conferencing). [5]
• Familiarity: A competence of importance in the design and development of a new
product is familiarity with the corporate product range, manufacturing processes,
materials and market requirements (Bruce and Morris, 1995). Internally, this issue
has long been of concern. Traditionally, design has thrown drawings over the-wall to
manufacturing, whereupon much time, effort and cost have been spent tweaking the
design to fit manufacturing's requirements. Examination of this internal interface was
discussed in Chapter Four where, for example, familiarity of manufacturing's
requirements early in the design process through DFM and DFA would assist greatly
in shortening development times, quality and overall project management control.
If this analogy is transferred to the design capability decision, two issues arise. First,
in-house design has been regarded as a one-way communication process - vehicle
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manufacturers design a component and outsource production to the most favourable
bid (on whichever competitive bidding criteria are used). No concern is given to
DFM or DFA since the designer assumes knowledge of these requirements. For
standard items, an experienced designer may be able to use this accumulated
knowledge. However, for particular elements, communication with component
suppliers is vital if unnecessary iterations are to be reduced (Appleby and Twigg,
1988). Second, where process knowledge plays a significant role, the familiarity with
this process may lead to the outsourcing decision. Whichever the case, the
component supplier has a vital role in the design process, in a similar way to the
internal design/manufacturing interface.
Familiarity is thus dependent on communication and the strength of the relationship
between focal firm and external engineering resource. Where trust and partnership
develop out of supply relationships in the long-term, opportunities may exist to
transfer design capabilities too. Lamming (1993, p.183) provides an example of this:
Renault transferred design responsibility for all of its seating to a specialist supplier,
Epeda Bertrand Faure. The movement towards greater partnership and trust was one
reason given by some component manufacturers in their strategic adoption of
CAD/CAM systems (Twigg, 1990): expertise in design capability, and effective
communication (enhanced through CAD), enabled them to maintain a leading supply
role.
Control: Maintaining design capability in-house enables strict control over the design
management process. As increased outsourcing occurs, tighter project management
skills and controls are required. Whilst the contract (with penalty clauses) may act as
a driving force for external engineers to work to schedule, this authority becomes
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weak if effective communication mechanisms are not in place to facilitate its
completion. The use of a product data management database may assist in this,
combined with regular project review meetings. As Twigg (1990, p.131) argued:
As the location of design authority is dispersed, there will be an increased need
for the automotive company to control the design data - ensuring the interlinking
(or marrying) of components with one another. One means ... is for CAD/CAM
technology to act as the necessary coordinating medium.
. Cost: The overall cost of design resourcing will determine the location of sourcing,
and will involve contracting, transaction and negotiation costs Ti1liamson 1975).
Although external services tend to be costly, Utbax. et a (19%1, . 291')	 tt
that "sometimes the total cost of an internal staff is higher than using outside suppliers
on an interim basis ." An issue of major concern is the allocation of fixed and
variable funding, since external design inputs will be funded as a variable cost. A shift
to outsourcing may occur if fixed costs are viewed as too great, given limited
resource utilisation of specialist stafl or potential lack of maintaining currency of
knowledge. Paradoxically, as external sourcing of design becomes an integral part of
a firm's development process, and as relationships become stable, this resource may
need to be considered as pseudo-fixed. One issue that firms will need to consider is,
having moved further towards a greater share of outsourced design, the indirect cost
of moving back towards in-house design may be considerably greater.
• Knowledge leakage:
	 Whilst deliberate disclosure of commercially sensitive
information is unlikely within technological networks (Macdonald, 1993), firms are
none-the-less concerned that experience gained through collaboration with a supplier
may be transferred to competitors as knowledge embedded with supplier's design
capabilities. Clark and Fujimoto (1991, p.142) emphasise one downside risk of using
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black box suppliers as being the potential leakage of basic design and styling ideas to
competitors.	 However, a supplier's design capabilities are themselves the
accumulation of specialist knowledge from working with a variety of customers, so
there is an argument that without supplier collaboration, the benefits of their
accumulated design capabilities would not exist and innovation may proceed at a
slower rate. Contract research organisations, for example, are often brokers of
technology - providing important sources of technical expertise - by using their
accumulated up-to-date knowledge and experience, and synthesising it to meet
customer requirements (Haour, 1992). A strong argument limiting the risk of
knowledge leakage in the automotive industry is presented by Lamming (1993, p.
210, footnote 12), who argues that since the industry is a close-knit community, any
leakage would soon be realised, thus discrediting a supplier's reputation. [6]
Considering these issues, a range of influences on design sourcing across the capability
continuum can be examined (figure 5.1). The control of in-house resources needs to be
high to ensure project success, but it may be relatively loose since all activities can be
controlled under organisational mechanisms. Outsourced design requires greater
control, but the use of contracts, with penalty clauses for delay acts at the extreme as a
powerful measure. Alternative control mechanisms should be sought, however,
especially in the long-term as development partnerships rely on trust and cooperation.
In-house design has the advantage that there is strong familiarity of the product family,
processes and corporate strategy by the designers and engineers. In contrast,
outsourcing design generally leads to a weaker understanding of these, especially in the
short-term, but where long-term relationships and contracts persist, this familiarity
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becomes stronger and this factor becomes less differentiated from in-house design. In-
house design is generally assumed to be highly accessible to the finn; exceptions to this
may exist with multi-site operations, where physical proximity may exclude access to
product development partners. Whilst it may be argued that outsourced design capability
may be limited in accessibility, determination to complete the design andlor development
work may improve access. One influence on locating design resources will be cost. The
funds allocated to specific projects take into account the share of both fixed and variable
costs. As design operations become leaner, identifying the design and development
competencies of a firm, availability of funding for external expertise may limit the extent
to which such a strategy may be undertaken. Finally, security of technical knowledge: as
explained above, a strong impetus to prevent deliberate dissemination of competitive
product knowledge is the threat of black-listing due to spurious activities. Despite this,
there still remains a potential leakage of technical knowledge through outsourcing design
work. It is natural, for example, for a supplier to learn from their experiences and
embody these as improvements in their next client's product. Reduced risk, of course,
occurs through in-house design. An additional influence on the choice of outsourced
design capability will be the long-term relationships that exist with suppliers who are
considered development partners (Bruce and Morris, 1995; Lamming, 1993).
The five parameters influencing design management choice apply equally to process
technologies as to product. Whitney (1988, p. 88) describes how Nippondenso
cultivates in-house development of automation in order to: eliminate proprietary secrecy
problems; reduce mark-up costs from equipment vendors; and, build long-term
familiarity of the company's design philosophy within the project teams.
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Since the capabilities with which a firm wishes to compete do not remain static over
time, the design capabilities retained or outsourced by a firm will reflect its strategic
response to the competitive environment. Hence, firms traverse the continuum as their
operating parameters change. Whipp and Clark (1986), in their study of the Rover car
company, illustrate the various design capability transformations that Rover underwent
this century:
• 1905-32: In its infancy, Rover's design capability appears to have been without
strategic direction and by proxy. For example, in 1905 Rover brought in a contract
designer to design and build a small car, assisted by purchasing licences for major
components, and in 1910, a new contract designer was hired for 18 months, whose
designs formed the basis for cars until 1924. Design was not seen as a specialist
function; indeed, the Works Manager was responsible for design, in terms of annual
revisions for assembly. Another move to buy in design capability was the acquisition
of the Sangster car factory in Birmingham, with its low-cost model. However, the
newly released Austin Seven in 1922 competed on cost and out performed the
Sangster.
• 1932-71: Rover undertook a revolution in their design capabilities. After near
financial disaster in 1932, Rover developed an internal design capability for the first
time, under the direction of S.B. Wilkes - a design engineer. He introduced two
significant changes: first, robust car designs{7] were developed which could be
stretched over a number of years - the P-series; and second, the chassis and engine
were standardised as basic components, receiving only incremental development. By
the end of this period, internal design teams were responsible for car design; however,
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their knowledge base was deficient in a number of areas and thus relied on a number
of large suppliers for, inter alia, car bodies, dies, assembly line equipment, and paint
plants.
. 19 71-82: This period saw an attempt to establish a total design capability. Some of
this was due to the facilities present after the creation of the British Leyland Motor
Corporation, and the new thinking of executives acquired from Ford. A Specialist
Car Division was created, and the SDJ project was the focus to centre this design
capability. [8]
. 1982 onwards: Again, Rover returned to outsourcing much of its design capability.
Linking up with Honda of Japan, Rover has developed a number of robust designs,
stretching over a decade or more. Similarly, since the mid-1980s, Rover has
increasingly relied upon specialist suppliers for component design work (Appleby and
Twigg, 1988). Into the 1990s, Rover has continued to benefit from Honda's design
capabilities, and those of notable component suppliers.
Hence, Rover's design capabilities would at first glance appear to have turned full circle.
However, car design and production in the 1990s are very much different from the
beginning of the century; the complexity of the car has increased immensely over the
century, as too has materials knowledge. Also, Rover has never been typical of vehicle
manufacturers; for example, unlike Ford, Austin or Morris, design was not seen as a
strategic element for Rover until the mid-i 920s.
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5.4	 Design chains in the automotive industry
As a general trend, the increased use of technology and new materials in the product, and
the concentration toward core capabilities, means that the identification and management
of external design capabilities have grown in importance. In the case of complex
products, such as in the automotive industry (which have both a high user interface and
product integrity), an extensive network of external sources of information may be
necessary that contribute knowledge and expertise to the design and development of the
product.
The process of designing and developing an automobile resembles a complex web of
organisations interacting and contributing to a chain of activities. The traditional nature
of the manufacturer-supplier relationship was dominated by suppliers who supplied a
finished component, often from engineering designs supplied by the vehicle manufacturer
or, designed by the supplier from specified requirements. However, increasingly,
suppliers are contributing to design and engineering work much earlier in the process,
such that they are more than purely manufacturing sites. The various elements of the
total supply network - supply chain, aftermarket and design chain - were earlier
illustrated in figure 1.1.
5.4.1 The Zeta thermoplastic air-intake manifold [9]
This notion of a design chain can be illustrated through the development of Ford's
electronically ftiel-injected 1.6 litre Zeta engine, introduced in 1992. One of the most
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innovative components was a thermoplastic air-intake manifold, developed over a three
year period. The air-intake manifold is typically manufactured in aluminium but the use
of nearly 90 per cent plastic in this particular component led to the following benefits: 60
per cent weight savings; 20 per cent cost savings; improved fuel economy and
performance; and increased flexibility in design and manufacture, since more complex
shapes could be integrated into the component.
The air-intake manifold is a performance critical component (Appleby and Twigg, 1988),
for which reason design work is normally undertaken in-house by the vehicle
manufacturer. Ford's design engineers sought material knowledge from Du Pont in their
early design work, but were unable to resolve problems of noise and vibration,
dimensional stability, or the material's temperature capability. For these reasons, a
project team, based around concurrent engineering principles, was gathered bringing
together a variety of engineering resources (both in-house and outsourced) to solve these
problems:
. Ford engineers brought manifold design and engineering expertise;
. Du Pont brought material knowledge, supplemented further by a dedicated CAD
designer using techniques for material performance;
• Dunlop Automotive Composites was the moulder of the final component, and
contributed process expertise;
• Tooling Products were the tooling specialists;
• KlOckner, a process technology specialist, assisted Dunlop with designing the final
production cell;
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• Other specialist component suppliers contributed standard parts to the design: Bolhoff
(inserts); Dowty (seals); Elring (gasket design); and Elm Steel (ERG tubing).
These various design iterations have been transposed onto figure 5.2, as an example of a
design chain, where complementary assets of suppliers have been brought together in the
design and development of a particular component. If individual chains were then
extended for other major components, a web (or network) of chains would ensue.
The collective design and process iterations of this integrated, multi-firm project team
exemplifies the notion of design chain. Several important points can be drawn from this
example:
1) The design engineers of vehicle manufacturers require access to materials knowledge,
either through material manufacturers (such as Du Pont), or research laboratories
(such as universities): mechanisms must be in place, therefore, for them to access this
knowledge base, perhaps through the gatekeeper mechanism;
2) The component manufacturer has production knowledge that is important for product
design. In the case of the air-intake manifold, Dunlop must coordinate the supply and
assembly of further components to deliver the final component to the customer.
Where parts are standard, or are being carried-over from previous designs, there will
be little requirement for new design input. However, where a design may be radical,
performance, safety, or aesthetic critical (Appleby and Twigg, 1988), design
contributions by all parties may be necessary. Hence, design for manufacture
increases in importance and requires manufacturing inputs.
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Figure 5.2 Example of a design chain - air-intake manifold for the Ford 1.6 Zeta engine
Auto Assembly
(Ford)
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3) Toolmakers have a pivotal role to play in design iterations between vehicle
manufacturer and component supplier (Twigg, 1990). Their contributions are both to
the product design, and development of process tooling.
4) Equipment suppliers can provide new understanding to both product and process
design. As attention focuses on design for assembly, equipment suppliers may
increasingly be asked to advise on layout implications for product design.
5.5	 Supplier involvement in product development
There are many examples of suppliers' early involvement in product development, for
example: Cadillac, where 75 per cent of their development teams have supplier
representatives; Xerox, who have included suppliers in partnership since the early 1 980s;
and, Boeing, who co-locate suppliers in the manufacturing facility (O'Neal, 1993).
Whilst indicating their involvement, these illustrations do not extend our understanding
of the content of this participation. Birou and Fawcett (1994) have undertaken a detailed
comparison of European and US supplier involvement in product development activities,
investigating the dimensions (extent and type) of their participation. However, whilst
their examination provides useful insights to the degree of supplier participation as team
members, it does not distinguish between the types of product developed, and hence
supplier type. In this section, alternative views of supplier participation in product
development will be examined, in order to compile a composite view of supplier
involvement along the design capability continuum proposed earlier.
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The movement towards closer supplier involvement in design and product technology
responsibility has increased over the past decade. Evidence of the supplier having a
greater authority in the design process in the automotive industry, for example, was
provided by Ford, Jaguar and Rover to the House of Commons Trade and Industry
Committee (1987).
An important insight to distinguishing between supply and design chains of operations is
the contribution made by individual organisations during various stages of product
development. Figure 5.3 illustrates a simplified view of supplier input to various stages
of the vehicle manufacturer's product development process:
1) At concept stage, for example, design houses (such as, Karmann, Pininfarina, or Ital
Design) may contribute design expertise to styling [10], or suppliers of body
components may contribute manufacturing advice to model stylists, where
manufacturing finish might influence aesthetic.
2) At the detail engineering stage, multinational component system suppliers may take
responsibility for proprietary parts (such as GKN), or others may provide black box
designed parts (such as Lucas, Motorola, or Rockwell); as in the Ford Zeta case cited
earlier, material producers also have a role to play in design; the properties of new
materials or application in novel ways may require specialist input to the design
process.
3) At the process engineering stage, manufacturing knowledge is paramount, and again
external expertise may be sought. Toolmakers are particularly important here,
especially for body aesthetic items - see the case of body die tooling in Clark and
Fujimoto (1991) - as too are equipment manufacturers, raw material suppliers, or
process specialists (such as, in casting or plastic injection moulding).
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Figure 5.3 Supplier-vehicle manufacturer information exchanges in product
development
Note: Individual feedback has not been indicated for simplicity. Each stage represents an
activity, rather than an organisational unit.
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Clark and Fujimoto (1991) propose a categorisation of supplier involvement in product
development, based on the creation of information assets for a particular component (see
section 3.3.1 earlier):
1) Supplier proprietary parts (parts developed entirely by parts suppliers): these are
catalogue items (for example, batteries and spark plugs) which are low cost, or the
vehicle manufacturer has little control over quality.
2) Black box parts: parts whose basic engineering (functional specification) is done by
the vehicle manufacturer, but whose detail engineering is performed by parts' suppliers
(for example, functional parts and subassembly systems). This tTansates into an
approximate 3 0:70 division of engineering responsibility in favour of the supplier.
The vehicle manufacturer is able to utilise supplier knowledge, whilst maintaining
control of basic design and total vehicle integrity. Suppliers therefore have a
competitive edge through their knowledge accumulation. These parts tend to be high
design quality, yet relatively low cost. The risks of this outsourced capability are: a
potential dependency on suppliers' engineering capabilities, thereby diminishing
negotiating strength; knowledge leak to competitors (as discussed earlier); and
vulnerability to loss of technological capabilities. Therefore, it is important for vehicle
manufacturers to maintain the core capabilities in-house.
3) Detail-controlled parts (functional and body): parts that are developed entirely by the
assembler from functional specification to detail engineering, although subcontracting
of process engineering and production may occur. In the case of body parts, Clark
and Fujimoto found that vehicle manufacturers tend to do process engineering in-
house and lend the tools and equipment to the suppliers.
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However, this categorisation does not adequately incorporate the important role that
process engineering makes to the design as well as production of the part. For example,
in injection moulding, the toolmaker has an important role as a third party; thus, the
supplier may act as a liaison between toolmaker and vehicle manufacturer.
These roles were incorporated by Appleby and Twigg (1988) in a broad classification of
design responsibilities within the sector. Where a supplier has total design authority, the
customer outlines the parameters in which the component must operate (the design
specification), but the responsibility for the design input and quality standards lies with
the supplier; this is typical of black box and proprietary black box subassemblies (such as
drive units and clutches). At the other extreme, there are suppliers of, for example,
catalogue items (such as fasteners), with little design input into the automotive product.
Appleby and Twigg (1988) defined these varying design relationships, assigning simple
ratios of design authority to introduce a debate into the division of design responsibility
in the supply-assembly chain (table 5.4).
Between these two extremes are a variety of situations where suppliers and assemblers
are in a situation of mutual interdependence, in which components are critical in terms of
safety and performance, or are important to the overall design and cosmetic appearance
of the vehicle. Typical suppliers with this relationship include the producers of inlet and
exhaust manifolds, valve springs, steering wheels and trim. Of importance for this group
is the requirement for design interaction and communication between supplier and
assembler. For example, in the design of inlet and exhaust manifolds, the internal port
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Inlet and exhaust
manifolds, cylinder
heads, blocks;
steering wheels and
trim; valve springs,
crankshafts
Fasteners
Table 5.4 Design authority and component type
Supplier Input Design authority Characteristics 	 Examples
(supplier:
assem....................................
Black box
	 80:20	 Subassemblies, proprietary Electrical
parts; major design	 accessories, clutch,
authority with supplier; 	 brakes, drive
black box dimensioned by assemblies
assembler
Standard Parts 20:80
Performance/
	
60:40 to 40:60
safety/cosmetic
critical
components
Specification purchasing by
assembler; design for
performance or cosmetic
aspects by iteration
between supplier and
assembler; specific supplier
inputs being design for
acture, specific
assembler inputs being
dimensioning for
performance and so on.
Assembler specifies and
purchases from standard
parts lists; in-house
technical development by
supplier for a wide range
of customers
Source: Appleby and Twigg (1988)
dimensioning - critical for engine performance - is performed by the assembler, whilst the
casting supplier will contribute to the design through its knowledge of the casting
process. Conversely, performance related expertise may reside with the supplier, such as
in the design of valve springs. Computer simulations of new engine developments are
carried out by spring manufacturers, and spring design can enhance and modify engine
performance (Twigg, 1990).
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Where components are cosmetically important, yet safety critical (such as steering
wheels, bumpers, and certain trim items), the supplier has a process-related expertise and
responsibility to produce designs which interrelate with the complete vehicle (as
envisaged by the assembler) - for example, the steering wheel with the fascia. Although
there may be an important independence from the supplier, such as with an expertise in
new materials (for example, urethane mouldings), design responsibility is more evenly
divided (Twigg, 1990).
Appleby and Twigg (1988) identified tooling as a fourth type of design authority. This
provides a necessary input of production process knowledge, which ensures a producible
design. Both the vehicle manufacturer and the component supplier have specific design
and process knowledge which give them authority in designing an individual part, or
group of parts; each may make an input into the other's design operations - particularly
when changes arise in neighbouring (or interlinking) parts - but may also receive an input
from tooling operations.
Further examination of supplier involvement in product development necessitates
consideration of the Japanese model. An important aspect of Japanese supply relations is
the involvement of suppliers in the design and development of products. Kamath and
Liker (1994) propose four types of supplier involvement evident in Japanese product
development: partner, mature, child, and contractual (table 5.5) - each may play different
roles to different customers:
Partner: Typical suppliers in this role are first tier providers of subsystems, where full-
service of design and manufacture occurs, for example: heating, ventilating and air-
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conditioning systems; exhaust systems; alternators; and seating. However, Kamath
and Liker observe that there exists a misconception outside Japan that all first tier
suppliers are treated as close partners. In specific circumstances, partner suppliers
may have an input to the pre-concept stage where specifications for the subsystem are
determined. Because of the complexity of product, and the necessary involvement,
there is intensive communication between both parties.
. Mature: These suppliers design and manufacture complex assemblies as full systems,
for example, door panels. However, due to fewer technological capabilities, they
contribute less design responsibility than the partner suppliers. In this case, the
customer provides critical specifications, such as performance, interface requirements,
or space constraints, and the supplier takes responsibility for detailed design and
prototyping (build/test cycles). Again there is intensive communication from concept
stage onwards.
. Child: There is greater joint development work with this supplier, but this is largely in
the form of minor product changes. The supplier may act as consultant at the concept
stage, but its major role does not occur until detailed design and testing. However,
the customer is likely to undertake critical testing of the parts internally.
Communication is not intensive until the component prototyping stage.
. Contractual: In this role, the supplier is seen as an outsourced manufacturing centre.
All design work is by the customer; only where there is a unique manufacturing
capability (such as flexible automation), would a supplier's design input be sought.
Thus, communication only becomes frequent during late prototyping and
manufacturing ramp-up.
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Table 5.5	 Supplier roles in product development (the Japanese model)
Partner	 Mature	 Child	 Contractual
Design	 Supplier	 Supplier	 Joint	 Customer
responsibility
Simple assembly Simple partsProduct
complexity
Specifications
provided
Supplier's
influence on
specifications
Entire
subsystem
Concept
Collaborate
Complex
assembly
Critical
specifications
Negotiate
Detailed
specifications
Present
capabilities
Complete
design
None
Stage of	 Pre-concept	 Concept
	
Post-concept	 Prototyping
supplier's
involvement
Component-	 Complete	 Major	 Moderate	 Minor
testing
responsibility
Supplier's	 Autonomous	 High	 Medium	 Low
technological
capabilities
Source: Kamath and Liker (1994)
Lessons from the Japanese model of supplier-customer relations have led to an advanced
model of supply being advocated by many firms (see, for example, Lamming's
partnership model in Chapter Three). Bonaccorsi and Lipparini (1992) investigated the
supplier role in an advanced model of supply in the product development process.
However, this investigation takes little account of the design capabilities of the suppliers
involved.
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In aggregate terms, the level of supplier involvement in design and development activities
may be more than half of the total procurement cost of engineering. In automotive
engineering, for example, 10 per cent of engineering procurement costs is for supplier
proprietary parts (for example, off-the-shelf items, such as, tyres or batteries), 40 per
cent is for black box items (for example, systems or modules designed and developed to
customer specifications by primary suppliers), and the remaining 50 per cent is designed
and developed in-house by vehicle manufacturers (Clark and Fujirnoto, 1991). What
these figures do not demonstrate, however, is the increasing grey box element where
suppliers may sit-in with a vehicle manufacturer and provide process knowledge for
product design work. For example, a foundry has process expertise that is essential to
contribute to the design of an intake manifold, if design for manufacturability is sought.
Similarly, these figures do not emphasise the design consultant's contribution at concept
stage. Such organisations provide design and development expertise as a professional
service and may provide prototype parts; however, they do not manufacture parts.
Hence, the classifications of supplier involvement proposed by Clark and Fujimoto
(1991), Appleby and Twigg (1988), and Kamath and Liker (1994) require re-
examination. This may be achieved by examining the location of design responsibility
between vehicle manufacturer and supplier with the input into the vehicle manufacturer's
product design process. Figure 5.4 transposes these typologies onto such a matrix. The
position of each supplier type has been hypothesised based on the approximate degree of
design authority/contribution made by each party, and the first major input to the design
process by the supplier. Thus, whilst a supplier may largely contribute manufacturing
knowledge
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Figure 5.4	 Typologies of supplier involvement in automotive product development
(a)	 Clark and Fujimoto (1991): generic supplier roles
Vehicle___________	 ____________
Manufactier	
Location of design responsibility	 Supplier
Pre-concept
*
Input
to
vehicle
manufacturer's
product
development
process
Production
(b) Appleby and Twigg (1988): UK supplier roles (based on Rover Group)
(c) Kamath and Liker (1994): Japanese model
Conuual
\•\	 \\\. \'s\
Note: These diagrams are nominal representations of each pair of authors' work.
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to design engineers, it would nonetheless be appropriate to indicate an input closer to
detailed design rather than production stage.
Figure 5.5 presents a composite of supplier involvement in the product development
process. It is a nominal indicator of supplier involvement in the UK automotive industry,
based on the author's experience and the relative positions indicated in figure 5.4. The
figure extends the previous classifications to incorporate additional dimensions. The
grey box area indicates the ambiguous contributions made to largely vehicle
manufacturer design work, especially process and assembly knowledge held by the
supplier. Second, proprietary items have been divided into two types: those that are
designed to customer specifications, yet comprise proprietary technology of the supplier
(for example drive shafts); and those that are proprietary catalogue items, where design
and development by the supplier occurs independent of the vehicle manufacturer, and
contact with the customer occurs as the delivery of a finished item. Third, a less
complex parts category has been added to reflect in-house designed parts that require
little external design input. These parts reflect the availability of both design and process
knowledge competence within the vehicle manufacturer. (In practice, there may be
overlaps between the categories: Kamath and Liker (1994) refer to Nippondenso as
providing both standard catalogue parts and the option of proprietary parts design for
customers.) The characteristics of each category are summarised in table 5.6, together
with typical examples of component parts. Not included in figure 5.5 and table 5.6 are
the suppliers of material or toolmakers referred to earlier. It is assumed that their
participation may occur at any point in the development cycle, and with any category of
supplier.
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Figure 5.5	 Supplier involvement along the design capability continuum
In-house design
capability
Design
ProprietaryIIIL
critical
specifications
Standard
catalogue parts
off-the-sh)
Pre-concept
Input
to
vehicle
manufac-
turer's
product
development
process
Production
Location of design responsibility
Vehicle	 .r Supplier
Manufacturer
Notes:
1. This diagram is nominal in its representation of supplier positions.
2. The positions of supplier involvement are relative to the vehicle manufcturer's request for
supplier involvement in the product development activities.
3. The contributions of toolmakers have not been included, since they are assumed to participate
with all supplier categories.
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Less complex
parts
Standard
catalogue parts
(off-the-shelf)
Table 5.6 Typology of supplier involvement
Supplier Input Characteristics 	 Types of Example
Assembler in-	 Core competencies/aesthetic critical 	 Major body panels;
house design	 engines; electronic
management systems
Design houses	 Design and prototype work	 Cabriolet hoods; body
styling
Proprietary	 Major systems and subsystems; similar Clutch; brakes; drive
parts	 to black box but reliant more on	 assemblies; seating
proprietary technology
Black box:	 Subassemblies; major design authority Electrical accessories;
critical	 with supplier; black box dimensioned 	 modular doors
specifications	 by assembler
Detail-	 Specification by assembler; design for
controlled:	 performance by iteration between
functional parts supplier and assembler; technical
knowledge sought (mainly process
related); specific assembler inputs
being dimensioning for performance
and so on.
Detail-	 Specification by assembler; design for
controlled:	 cosmetic aspects (aesthetic) internal
aesthetic parts	
and external by iteration between
supplier and assembler; specific
supplier inputs being DFMJ DFA
Inlet and exhaust
manifolds;
cylinder heads, blocks;
valve springs;
Exterior trim:
Bumpers; wheel trim;
Interior trim:
Fascias; steering wheels
Specification by assembler; minimal
supplier input mainly process-related
Assembler specifies and purchases
from the supplier's standard parts
catalogue.
In-house technical development by
supplier for a wide range of customers
(may be proprietary technology)
Fabrications
Fasteners; gaskets; audio
equipment; batteries;
alternators (in the case of
Nippondenso)
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Finally, an area of early supplier involvement is highlighted: this area signifies the
movement towards which some supplier firms are being asked to have early inputs to the
design process. In some cases, this involves pre-concept discussions, particularly in the
case of aesthetic critical parts (for example, bumpers or fascia) where material type, and
aesthetic are critical components of styling and definition of the marque. Formal
involvement for such suppliers may not occur until later in the process, but their tacit
knowledge of process is invaluable at this genesis period.
Two categories of supplier-provided engineering resource can also be identified: those
with specialised expertise (able to undertake in-house R&D and provide complete
systems or sub-assemblies), and others who although unable to undertake original work
are able to offer specific process (often tacit) knowledge and toolmaking skills (OtNeal,
1993). Such contributors may be the silent designers, referred to by Dumas (1988).
Hence, the network of design and engineering expertise extends throughout the design
base.
Extending Dumas's terminology, one might consider silent partners an apt label for those
suppliers of product, process and material engineering knowledge: they may not be the
end supplier, but are the purveyors of expertise. The use of informal networks plays an
important role within design chains. Process engineers (also known as manufacturing
and industrial engineers) have expertise on how a product can be manufactured, which
are importance contributions to interactive design. Hence, their contribution is often the
tacit knowledge they can input to product development, as opposed to the codified
formal specifications latent in traditional exchange mechanisms.
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5.6. Summary
This chapter has developed the components of design chains further and examined the
supplier role in automotive product development. It began by examining the concept of
network and showed that technical collaboration and outsourcing of design capabilities
require careful management of the relationship (coordination) from all partners. A
typology of suppliers has been presented in terms of design capability, which may help
understand their different participating roles in product development. As supplier inputs
move upstream, the role of partnership relationships under Latnniin lean supply model
will become increasingly important: in particular, [The use of complementary
technologies and patents] is perhaps the core of technical change in lean production."
(Lamming, 1993, p. 205) The inter-organisational coordination issues are now examined
through analysis of several suppliers involved in design chains with a UK vehicle
manufacturer, using the inter-firm information processing perspective developed earlier.
NOTES
1. On a cautionary note, Macdonald (1992) suspects that the undertaking of technological
collaboration may bring about the dilution of the effective informal information networks that
underpin the ability of firms to innovate and compete!
2. The use of transaction cost analysis (Williamson, 1975) in networks has caused much debate
(see for example, Janllo, 1990; Ciborra, 1992), not least since industrial networks are
unbounded, with one firm's network crossing many others. However, boundaries may be
drawn around particular parts of the network enabling analysis for such an approach.
3. Walker and Webber (1984) provide a detailed application of the transaction cost approach to
make-or-buy decisions within the US automotive component industry.
4. Afriyie (1988) emphasises that focus has been biased towards R&D activities and technology
hardware in studies on technology transfer and policy analysis, whilst the roles of other
knowledge assets (such as design capabilities) have been largely neglected. This thesis
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supports this view insofar as much attention has focused on the Research with less emphasis
on the Development.
5. Twigg (1990) provides a detailed examination of CAD/CAM. The use of multi-media in
outsourcmg design capability is currently being examined in a European Commission funded
project, SMAC (Suppliers & Manufacturers in Automotive Collaboration).
6. One potential threat was experienced by Rover in 1965, when the Pressed Steel Company was
acquired by British Motor Corporation (BMC) - a major competitor. Rover relied on Pressed
Steel for car bodies and advice on the handling of new materials. Thus, Rover had entrusted
them with knowledge on their future vehicle styling and innovations (Whipp and Clark, 1986,
p.77). This matter was settled in 1968 with the formation of British Leyland Motor
Corporation, which included the merger of, inter alia, Rover and BMC.
7. For a detailed explanation of robust designing (vis-à-vis lean designing) see the work of
Gardiner cited in Clark and Starkey (1988). Robust designs enable a design template to be
developed into future variants - what in the automotive industry is termed family platforms. A
transformation can be followed as a composite design is reworked and then stretched into a
design family (for example the Ford Cortina). Japanese automotive manufacturers have
become particularly successful at this.
8. It should be noted too, however, that component suppliers and Rover's labour force
contributed design expertise to the SD] project (Whipp and Clark, 1986, p. 129).
9. This example, and figure 5.2, is extrapolated from secondary material in the article: Working
as on', Vehicle Engineering and Design, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 7-8, in Engineering, Vol. 232,
November 1992.
10.Design Houses are a form of contract research organisation. Haour (1992) provides a detailed
examination of the issues in utilising contract research organisations as a source of external
technical expertise.
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6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
6.1	 Introduction
In Chapter One, the rationale for a study on the automotive industry was outlined. The
preceding chapters have emphasised the need to understand the dynamics of the product
development process, and the context of design and process expertise communicated
was emphasised. The nature of the inter-firm design relationship is extremely complex
and this has been illustrated in the previous chapters. However, further contextual
explanation is required, to understand better the dynamics of these operations, with
analysis of the experiences of a vehicle manufacturer and a number of its OEM suppliers.
6.2	 Research approach
Discussion of the research approach requires consideration of the research objectives,
alternative research strategies, the contributions of other studies, and the choice and
definition of the unit of analysis.
6.2.1 Research objectives
The broad objective has been to determine the changing nature of the inter-organisational
engineering design process between vehicle manufacturer and automotive component
suppliers, where these suppliers contribute specific knowledge to the design of the
overall product. This has been achieved through:
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1. describing the elements of the emerging inter-firm design relationship (vis-a-vis the
internal product development process);
2. determining the critical information process needs in a specific project;
3. determining the mechanisms used to incorporate knowledge/expertise external to the
firm; and
4. examining the dynamics of(1) with (2) and (3).
The research has been directed towards the operations issues concerning the
management of this development process across firms, and has adopted an information
processing perspective of inter-firm linkages.
6.2.2 Choice of research strategy: case study
Yin (1989) outlines five research strategies available for social science study: experiment,
survey, archival analysis, history, and case study. Each strategy is appropriate under
specific research conditions and presents alternative approaches for data collection and
analysis.
The first task, in identifying the choice of research strategy, is to determine the purpose
of the study, which may be exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory. The decision will be
determined by: the type of research question being asked; the extent of control that the
investigator has over the actual events being studied; and, the degree of focus on
contemporary versus historical events (Yin, 1989).
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no yes
no yes / no
Table 6.1	 Choice of research strategy for an exploratory investigation
Strategy	 Form of research	 Investigator control	 Focus on
question	 over events	 contemporary
events
Experiment	 how / what / why	 yes	 yes
Survey
Archival
analysis
History
Case study
who / what / where /
how many / how
much
who / what / where /
how many / how
much
how / what / why
how / what I why
no	 no
no / possible	 yes
Source: adapted fromYin (1989, table 1.1)
This research project is essentially exploratory in nature, investigating what are the
process and antecedents that shape the buyer-supplier relationship. In this respect, any
one of the five research strategies is appropriate. However, since the research questions
have sought explanation as to how the supplier and vehicle manufacturer conduct
product development and why particular issues promote or hinder the exchange of design
information, the experiment, historical, and case study approaches appear appropriate.
Thus, with the focus of research on contemporary events, and with little control over the
events available to the investigator, Table 6.1 suggests that the case study is the most
favourable strategy to pursue. Similarly, since the concept of inter-firm design
transactions is not adequately explored in the academic literature, it is essential for the
investigator to be present throughout the data collection process. The clarification of
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concepts, and appropriate interpretation of the subject to informants is necessary to
ensure consistency in data collection. The case study approach is suitable for this task.
The research strategy has involved, therefore, an empirical and descriptive approach to
studying the product development process. This reflects a tendency of qualitative
research to be actively used where areas of study are newly explored andlor where the
dynamics of relationships are to be investigated. 	 Table 6.2 outlines the main
characteristics of the qualitative, case study approach. The case study approach is
particularly appropriate under conditions viheTe th TeaTth subject is poofiy
understood, where relationships and structures need to be developed further, and where
complex interrelationships exist: all of which are characteristics of this study.
A qualitative approach was adopted for this research, in part from the complexities
surrounding the relationships between a focal company and its suppliers involved in
product development. This approach is well suited for deveioping a comprehensive view
of a complex, multi-person organisational process: the research investigates a complex
network of technical, product-process, organisational, managerial and contractual related
issues. Moreover, since this study extends beyond the boundary of a single firm - to an
inter-organisational process - there has been an increased need to understand further the
complexities of this process as it exists under different organisational structures and as it
operates within different, yet mutual, operations.
The research is concerned with investigating two sets of relationships: first, the intra-firm
complexities for the focal vehicle manufacturer, and those for each of the supplier firms;
and second, the complexities of the inter-firm transactions. The case study is a suitable
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vehicle to reflect these complexities because of the closer involvement with the research
subjects, and of its advantage where interrelationships (both internal and external) are
complex: the primary goal of this approach is to discover the relationships and structures
(Table 6.2).
Table 6.2	 Main characteristics of the case study strategy
1. Useful in the exploration of unknown, or poorly understood, areas.
2. Useful in generating, or formulating, hypotheses.
3. Allows for exploration of poorly understood research subjects and concepts.
Does not rely on standard instruments, but permits multiple methods.
Data is fixed by triangulation.
4. Has advantages where the proposed subject is unknown territory or when
interrelationships are complex; for example: those involving interpersonal behaviour.
5. Permits little control over research variables or experimental design.
6. Requires time in gaining access and is )abour and tune thtensive in prac(ice.
7. Primary goal is to discover relationships and structures.
8. Permits the use of flexible and unstructured techniques for research which may vary
between cases studied.
9. Allows a close relationship with research subject and, through this, to gain access to
privileged and confidential information.
1 0.Has only questionable validity for other cases across a population.t
t	 the question of validity is raised later in this chapter, when the issue of analytical, rather
than statistical, generalisation is argued as valid for the case study approach.
Source: adapted from Bessant and Grunt (1985, table 3.1)
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6.2.3 Relationship to other studies
In the absence of prior studies on the management and coordination of inter-
organisational integration in product development in the UK motor industry, it was
decided that a quantitative approach was not appropriate (as previously discussed).
Bensaou (1992) adopted a quantitative approach, using existing knowledge of
integration mechanisms, in examining inter-organisational coordination in the buyer-
supplier relationship in the USA and Japanese motor industries: however, his work
concerned the relationships throughout the entire production process from design to
manufacture, whereas this research concentrates on a detailed examination of part of this
process.
Bensaou contributes new understanding to this relationship but does not apply his
examination of integration mechanisms solely to the inter-organisational product
development relationship. In addition, it casts a wide net over the production process, at
a single moment in time, and is limited by the asymmetry of the data set: the supplier-
buyer relationship is examined solely from the viewpoint of the buyer (motor vehicle
manufacturer), with little to no regard to the supplier's management processes. Hence,
although a number of determinants of the product development process can be identified
and examined from a quantitative perspective, without a thorough understanding of the
practising process to be examined and the dynamics under which it operates across firms
- which themselves have localised processes - the resultant findings limit the analysis to
that of the focal vehicle manufacturer, and will not enable an understanding and
examination of the relationship - an exchange transaction.
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A qualitative approach provides useful data given the absence of case studies that
investigate the project management of a highly complex product across a network of
contributing firms.	 Although there are excellent examinations of the product
development process of motor vehicles (for example, Clark and Fujimoto, 1991;
Fujimoto, 1989; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992), these view the process largely from an
asymmetric perspective - that of the vehicle manufacturer project management process -
and often as a single entity, or as a set of systems following the same process. The
existence of various project management styles is recognised (see for example,
Wheelwright and Clark 1992) but these are generally viewed as isolated processes.
This research provides, therefore, a case study in which a central project management
process (the vehicle manufacturer) is examined, together with a network of associated
project management processes (those of external suppliers of parts and expertise) whose
collective contributions are to the same product. Suppliers of components enter the
vehicle manufacturers' product development processes at different times, and have
different types of input. It has been necessary, therefore, to examine each process
separately and to assume non-uniformity.
6.2.4 Unit of analysis
The research has adopted a single-case, embedded design.[1] The single case is the
product development process of Rover Group Limited. Since this process involves
multiple buyer-supplier design relationships, and a variety of simultaneous project
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management programmes, these are considered sub-units of the case study. Thus, there
are multiple units of analysis embedded within the case study. [2]
Yin (1989, pp. 47-49) presents three rationales for the single-case as an appropriate
research design, namely where: (1) it is the critical case in testing a well-formulated
theory; (2) it represents a rare or unique case; or (3) where a phenomenon has previously
been inaccessible to observation or analysis. As the research is seeking to explore the
phenomenon of design chains, with little previous available research, and no previous
studies of the UK inter-firm product development process have been found, the rationale
for a single-case seems appropriate.
Where a single-case has many sub-units, as in this case, a more complex (embedded)
design may be appropriate. The use of sub-unit, cases can provide insights and focus
into the larger case study, and in this situation of examining dynamic relationships would
appear a necessary choice. (The major disadvantage of this choice of design is been the
threat of concentrating too heavily on the sub-units, at the expense of the larger unit of
analysis.)
The unit of analysis (operational definition) for this study is the product development
relationship that exists between a single vehicle manufacturer and six automotive
component suppliers that contribute design-engineering expertise.	 Hence, the
operational boundary of the study is the information system boundary of the product
development process. This boundary includes the product development organisation of
the vehicle manufacturer (focal organisation), and the project management organisation
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of a selection of automotive component suppliers. Each firm is a system (intra-firm
process) unto itself, but is also an element of the wider information system of the focal
organisation. Across these sub-units, the inter-firm process has been examined.
Within the vehicle manufacturer, the product development organisation refers to those
members engaged in major product development projects - this level of analysis equates
to that used by Fujimoto (1989).[3] In the case of the Rover Group, the organisation is
separated by product division, namely: Land Rover; small and medium car; and large car.
Each of these divisions operated autonomous project engineering teams, but in a few
cases used the same purchasing staff (see Chapter Seven for more details) as other
divisions. Similarly, in the component suppliers, there were project teams dedicated to
working solely with Rover Group (across all divisions), whereas in others, there were
project teams who would tend to work with Rover, but may also have clients in other
UK and European car companies.
Automotive project management usually requires that multiple projects (model year
changes or new developments) are undertaken simultaneous within the organisation, thus
the organisation represents a bundle of projects.	 This research examines the
management process relevant to multiple projects, whereas Fujimoto (1989), for
example, concentrates on the management of a single project with individual product
development organisations. Indeed, preliminary discussions with automotive suppliers
suggested the opposite to an underlying assumption of Fujimoto's work: that vehicle
manufacturers manage all of their projects in a similar way (Fujimoto, 1989, p. 152).
This assumption may be due to the need for standardising data for macro level analysis.
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However, although there exists a broad, project management process, the availability of
resources (especially people and time) means that project leaders manage the process in-
line with these; hence, the process differs in almost all cases. Hence, it is necessary for a
micro study of this nature to account for these differences.
The choice of the primary research organisation (focal organisation) was based on:
1. evidence that it had been actively increasing the contribution of component suppliers
to product development activities;
2. it had been a previous research site of the author and therefore offered familiarity;
and,
3. there was a greater possibility of frequent access to research subjects since it was
locally situated.
Rover had been actively encouraging CAD adoption by its suppliers during the 1980s
and had welcomed and encouraged their participation in engineering development. In
some areas of expertise, Rover was now relying significantly on utilising external
engineering resources. Building of existing cooperation between the Purchasing
Department of Rover Group and the Operations Management Group at Warwick
Business School, participation was sought with Rover Group in this project. The six
suppliers were selected for reasons of manageability - given time and access constraints -
and differences in product and operation - explained in the following section.
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6.3	 Research procedure
The topic of product development is highly confidential and competitively sensitive to
investigate. Not only are the specific product designs of competitive importance, but
also the systems (protocols, organisation, and procedures) used in bringing them to
market. The depth of analysis required for such a study can also be daunting to would-
be interview sites. For these reasons, the approach made to companies to participate in
the research was taken with great care: a resultant feature of which was an eight month
time-lag between first approaching a motor vehicle manufacturer and gaining approval to
undertake the study. This initial time-lag was added to by intermittent meetings due to
operating time-scales and the availability of staff Later in the project, participation with
supplier companies became uncertain due to relevant senior executives being overseas
for considerable time-periods. The early approach to senior executives was also seen as
essential for the study, since only then could an appropriate framework over access and
clearance be established with working in the product development organisation.
In April 1993, a meeting with a senior executive at Prime-Computervision - a key
supplier of Advanced Manufacturing Technology to the UK and World motor industry -
resulted in new contacts being made in the Rover Group - one of the major UK volume
motor manufacturers. Between May and June 1993, a series of initial interviews with
Product Engineering staff at the Rover Group was undertaken during which the validity
for a study on design relationships was confirmed. Indeed, initial discussions indicated
the research field was of current concern to the Rover Group and the approach to the
company had been timely.
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These interviews led, by way of a circuitous route, to a formal approach to the
Purchasing Department for Rover participation in the project.[4] The participation
sought was to interview a number of suppliers with product design and process
knowledge, as well as the Rover personnel who liaised with them. At this time, it was
emphasised that participating companies would receive three deliverables from the study:
a research report based on the findings of their company (this would be privy to them
alone); a general report based on the collective synthesis of all companies; and, time
permitting, a briefing meeting at which the findings would be disc ssed with
participating companies. In this way, the project has sought to feedback findings to
industry as they are found, and to validate the importance of this area of study through
feedback. In addition, results have filtered back to Rover through personnel in Quality
and Reliability, and the European SMAC project. [5]
In October 1993, a senior manager based in the Purchasing Department was assigned by
Rover as coordinator between Rover, its suppliers and the author. The Rover
coordinator served an important role in alleviating uncertainty over access to information
and gave authority to the project both within and outside the company. A previous study
by the author, with another automotive company, had experienced significant problems
when working on automotive product development where staff were reluctant to discuss
issues, due to uncertainty over the authority and limits of the project.
Discussion then took place on the selection of the suppliers for study. First, the author
compiled a list of operations and components - based on the author's experience,
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provisional interviews, and a literature review - which frequently require engineering or
manufacturing dialogue between vehicle manufacturers and component manufacturers.
Hence, a number of key components were identified from a product system that
illustrated the variety of design expertise employed: those that required a combination of
internal and external design inputs. The variety of expertise used in the design of a
product was illustrated in Chapter Five, but may indicate specialist, technical knowledge
(such as spring dynamics), process knowledge (such as casting), critical performance
knowledge and so forth.
This list was refined through discussion with the Purchasing Department, and a final list
of firms was then compiled in consultation with the Supply Directors of Rover Group.
Eight commodities (otherwise known as components or parts) were finally identified for
study. Two of the commodities were designed by the same firm, hence in total a group
of seven suppliers was finally agreed upon. Discussion with the firms resulted in six
suppliers agreeing to participate in the study - the seventh finn was willing to assist, but
time constraints on their part excluded them from the final study.
6.3.1 Summary of the interviewed firms
In total, seven firms provide data for this study. The Rover Group is the focal company:
a manufacturer of small, medium and large cars (for example, mini, Rover 200, and
Rover 800) and four-wheel drive, off-road vehicles (for example, Land Rover and Range
Rover). Table 6.3 lists the six participating suppliers, and the seven commodities
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originally investigated. These are divided by supply area: powertrain and electrical; trim
and hardware; and chassis.
ELECTRICAL was chosen since the harness commodity undergoes a large amount of
technological change, especially near to manufacturing ramp-up. The electrical harness
is an interesting commodity to investigate, since it is an integrating system, which may
continue to undergo changes until the final stages of design, and may be the last element
to have the design fixed. However, it is also one of the first required for production,
since it is the spine of the vehicle's electrical system. Rover Group has, over the past
decade, gradually reduced its competence in electrical design to such an extent that,
today, it is fully dependent on external, electrical design engineers. EXHAUST is a
provider of exhaust systems and catalytic converters. Rover is one of its major
customers. Exhaust systems were selected for study since this plays an important part in
the performance of the engine. Exhaust systems are increasing in design sophistication
and close dialogue is required between engine designer and exhaust system engineer.
DRIVE-SHAFT is a supplier of drive shafts. It is a front-end design engineering
supplier, with a major role as a black box designer.
PLASTIC provides small and medium-sized plastic injection mouldings (including wheel
trims and fascia components). BUMPER provides medium to large-sized plastic
injection mouldings (especially the bumper). Where these components interface critically
with styling, they have an input at the front-end of a design programme. Finally,
WINDOW provides engineering expertise in window regulators.
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Table 6.3	 Summary of the supplier firms (by vehicle component area)
Supplier	 Commodity
PowerTrain and Electrical
ELECTRICAL
	
Electrical harnesses
EXHAUST
	
Exhaust systems
DRIVE SHAFT
	
Drive shafts
Trim and Hardware
PLASTIC
	
Small to medium plastic mouldings
BUMPER
	
Medium to large plastic mouldings
Chassis
PLASTIC
	
Wheel-trim plastic mouldings
WINDOW
	
Window lift regulators
6.4	 Validity
The validity of the case study approach used in this research requires examination of the
quality of constructs used, whether the findings are generalisable - that they have external
validity, and the reliability of the methodology and findings.
The first criticism made against case studies is often that the methodology fails to
develop sufficient operational measures, and that findings are too subjective. For these
reasons, the units of analysis were chosen that provided processes that could be
examined in whole, and standard protocols provided base-line information of these
processes. Similarly, to ensure validity of data, the key informants were selected based
on their contribution to the key roles across the buyer-supplier relationship, namely
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Purchasing/Sales and Design Engineering staff. In this way, key events and activities
could be verified. Lastly, draft case studies were discussed with key informants for
verification purposes.
A second major criticism of case studies concerns the generalisation of findings. The
disadvantages of the case study are the time consumed in gaining access to companies,
and the question of validity of the conclusions to other cases in the vehicle (or similar
competitive) industries. Nevertheless, the case study approach offers the most
appropriate method for analysis in the absence of other comparable studies, given the
need to understand better these relationships and to contribute new analysis to a rapidly
increasing topic of discussion on product development management. The criticism of
generalisable research is usually applied to the failure of case studies to establish
statistical generalisation based on samples or populations. However, as Yin (1989)
emphasises, it is a mistake to consider case studies as representing samples of a
population, rather case studies can be used for analytical generalisation. In this way,
inferences from the case study findings may be generalised to a broader theory, and
verified through their replication.
There could have been a potential problem with the case selection procedure. Although
suppliers work actively with vehicle manufacturers, the past decade has seen significant
rationalisation of the supply base and poaching of staff (both to and from the vehicle
manufacturers). A shroud of mistrust still exists in the supply base over research projects
seeming to permeate from their customers. A concern may exist over the bias of firms
used. First, the Rover Group may not be representative of vehicle manufacturers.
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Indeed, concern should be directed toward the representativeness of the findings, rather
than the representativeness of the firm to the population. The firm uses external
engineering resource far greater than many other automotive companies, and reflects the
context of a firm committed to using external sources of expertise. A view supported by
Ian Robertson (Group Purchasing Director) who, when referring to the increasing use of
suppliers' engineering resource, stated: "All car makers are moving in a similar direction,
but Rover is probably ahead of its European rivals" (Management Today, 1 May 1992).
Second, the list of suppliers does not represent all suppliers that can potentially
contribute engineering expertise to the Rover Group. The suppliers were chosen to
reflect examples of design relationship that existed, and to provide opportunity to
examine more closely the exchange and integration of operations. Concern may be
raised as to the preponderance of firms that have established design links, that may be of
concern to the Rover Group, or are uniquely unusual and of interest. However, such
concerns ignore the purpose of the research, which is to provide insight and
understanding of the dynamics of the process, and such selection of finns is conducive
to achieving this.
This leads to the third criticism of research design, namely: reliability. Critical here is
whether the research can be repeated, with the same results. For this reason, the
procedures are well documented, and a research protocol was used to map the process.
Since there are specific participants in the existing buyer-supplier relationships, similar
results would be expected on repeating the research. A flexible case study protocol was
used to exploit the context surrounding the buyer-supplier relationship. Projects are not
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uniform and it was necessary to have an adaptable framework that would reflect this, yet
allow consistency of data collection. An exploratory project requires immediate
investigation of the context of decisions. An aide-mémoire (Appendix B) enables base-
line information to be collected, whilst allowing flexibility for contextual discussions.
Two final concerns of validity are the assumptions made of the process being
investigated, and changes that may occur over time to the research field. The literature
on product development often assumes that a process in place will be rigidly followed,
and that such a process has well-established pvoceduce.s. This is rct !i'js tl't	 is'
and, as such, a quantitative survey may not have been appropriate of the in situ process.
For this study, any changes in policy will be reflected in the cases and add to the context
of decisions made. Second, a further problem relating to time is the subject of new rules
and programme methods that new models require, or the individual thoughts of
programme directors. Hence, one potential flaw in the research design might be the
changes occurring through the course of study. However, since the project is
investigating the processes in question, where these have occurred they are documented.
Thus, the findings will still remain valid, since they are again context relevant.
6.5	 Research interview
Each interview consisted of a semi-structured dialogue primarily with management
personnel. These interviews were of 1-2 hours duration and were divided into three
sections: general information about the company itself, the process of project
management within the firm; and issues surrounding the liaison and exchange of design
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related information between vehicle manufacturer and supplier. The key points of the
interview schedule were outlined in an aide-mémoire (protocol) - presented in Appendix
B.
In summary, information sought about the company included: competition and market
environment, buyer-supplier relationships, organisation structures (such as ownership,
and management structure), planning and decision making (inter- and intra-firm),
production operations, and so forth. Additional information on the firms was obtained,
where possible, from, inter a/ia, newspaper reports, company annual reports, computer-
based sources of company data, and internal company documents.
6.6	 Summary of research approach
The research method used in this thesis is:
1. qualitative in nature;
2. case study oriented - where the case study is a single-case, embedded design;
3. the unit of analysis is the buyer-supplier relationship, set within the boundaries of one
vehicle manufacturer and six automotive component suppliers (with early involvement
to the product development process); hence, there are two focuses for study: (a) the
intra-firm process at each site; and (b) the inter-firm process;
4. Semi-structured interviews are the basic data collection method.
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NOTES
1. There are four types of research design: single-case (holistic); single-case (embedded);
multiple-case (holistic); and multiple-case (embedded). Yin (1989) provides a useful outline
of the strengths and weaknesses of each design.
2. This situation is not, however, a multiple-case, embedded design, since all internal projects are
governed by the same over-arching corporate programme.
3. Using Fujimoto's definition of product development organisation, the product development
organisation is defined as "a set of activities which converts market information and
technological information into tangible/intangible assets for commercial production"
(Fujimoto, 1989, footnote 5, p. 151). Within this, product planning, product engineering, and
process engineering are included, but those research activities that are not directly related to
commercial production are not.
4. The importance of gaining Purchasing's support cannot be over-emphasised. The Purchasing
Department plays a central, pivotal role in buyer-supplier relations, and Product Engineering
personnel saw Purchasing's full support as vital.
5. Suppliers and Manufacturers in Automotive Collaboration is a RACE Programme funded
project of the European Commission, investigating ways of enabling automotive manufacturer
engineers to have real-time access to automotive suppliers' product databases. The project
involves 14 partners, including Rover Group, TRW, and Renault.
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7 DESIGN MANAGEMENT IN ROVER GROUP
7.1	 Introduction
The main purpose of this chapter is to describe the project management procedure at
Rover Group, and to illustrate the main strategies used to incorporate suppliers in the
design and development process. The key procedures that affect project management
and supplier involvement are identified, most notably the use of cost management
procedures, the role of staff engineers, and the CAD/CAM data exchange policy. This
chapter is based largely on interviews with Rover Group engineering staff and purchasing
staff; who liaise with the suppliers reported in Chapter Eight.
7.2 Company background
Over the past decade, Rover Group has been transformed from a company in decline to a
competitive player in Europe. Although a medium volume manufacturer, Rover Group
has changed its image from that of a mass producer to an upmarket, niche, prestige
player (European Monitor Business, 3rd Quarter 1994). A considerable factor in this
turnaround has been the collaboration with the Honda Car Corporation that began in
1979. For example, the Rover 200, 400, 600 and 800 models are all based on joint
development with Honda, and each company sells the other approximately £400 million
of car parts per year (The Financial Times, 22 February 1994). The benefit of this
collaboration was emphasised most strongly to the author on 1 February 1994: whilst
conducting an interview with a Rover product engineer, at the Canley site in Coventry,
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the announcement was made that BMW had bought Rover Group from British
Aerospace for £800 million. The overall atmosphere of the product engineers in the
open plan office was concerned with how the working relationship with Honda would be
affected, more than how BMW might affect Rover.
In 1993, vehicle sales totalled 442,000 units (Rover cars: 368,500; Land Rover: 73,500)
and the total sales revenue of the Rover Group was £4,301 million, with export markets
accounting for 41% of total sales (European Monitor Business, 3rd Quarter 1994) and
the total UK workforce was 33,900 (The Financial Times, 24 February 1994).
Rover Group continues to be the largest producer of passenger vehicles in the UK
(figure 7.1). In 1994 it produced over 390,000 cars, 71,000 Land Rover Discoveries
and Range Rover, and over 24,000 commercial vehicles (car-derived vans and Land
Rovers). Figure 7.2 illustrates the production rates for Rover Group over the 1989-94
period. An interesting feature of this graph is the increase in Range Rover and Land
Rover Discovery production, where markets in the USA and Europe have increased sales
of these models considerably in recent years.
The production and engineering facilities of Rover Group are based at six primary
locations. The Longbridge site, in Birmingham, is the main assembly plant responsible
for the Rover 200/400, Metro, and Mini, as well as the manufacture of engines,
transmissions and castings. The majority of the Purchasing function is located at
Longbridge, although Land Rover related purchasing activities are based in Solihull. The
Solihull site, to the East of Birmingham, is the assembly plant for Land Rover
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Figure 7.1	 UK car production (1989-94)
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Defender, Discovery and Range Rover models. It also manufactures engines,
transmissions and components. The third production site is at Cowley, in Oxford. This
is the assembly plant for Rover 800, 600, MG RV8, Maestro, and Montego. In
Swindon, there is a body and pressings facility, and tooling for Body-In-White. Canley,
in Coventry, accommodates the vehicle concept and design, Group product engineering,
and commercial divisions. At Gaydon, near Banbury, there is a vehicle design and
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testing facility with climatic wind tunnels, prototype build centre, structural analysis
facilities, component test laboratories and engine test facilities. In 1995, it has been
announced that Rover is expanding this engineering facility. From 1997, all new vehicle
design and development operations will take place at Gaydon (The Financial Times, 13
March 1995).
Table 7.1 summarises the main product families of the Rover Group in 1995. Many of
these are long-standing products, such as the Mini, which was launched in 1959, or the
Land Rover, which originates from the 1 940s. Many of these vehicles form product
platforms for which there are a series of planned changes throughout their life cycle -
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normally model year changes, but also possible radical changes. These changes enable
new technology (process and product) to be introduced, and for market appropriation to
be maintained through styling changes. 	 The commercial/specials segment is
characterised by car derivative vans and Land Rover derivatives. The Land Rover
specials are vehicles produced to customer specification such as army ambulances, fire-
tenders and so forth. The specialist nature of the specification requires bespoke design,
which also requires supplier participation for particular commodities (parts or systems).
Table 7.1	 The product families of the Rover Group (995)
Segment	 Examples
Large-car
Mid-sized
Compact
Sup ermini
Mini
Speciality/roadster
Sport-utility
• Rover 800
• Rover 600
• Rover 200
• Rover 400
• Rover 100 (Metro)
• Rover Mini
• Rover MG RV8
• Rover MGF
• Land Rover Discovery
• Range Rover
Commercial/specials	 • Land Rover Defender
• Land Rover specials (such as fire tenders)
• Maestro
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7.3	 Organisation for product development
Product development in Rover Group is organised on a project matrix basis, around
cross-functional project teams. There are three vehicle business units: Small and
Medium Car (for example, Mini, Metro, 200 and 400 models), based at Longbridge;
Large Car (for example, 600 and 800 models), based at Cowley; and Four-by-four
vehicles (for example, Land Rover and Range Rover), based at Solihull. A further
business unit is the Body and Pressings operations in Swindon. These business units
were established in February 1991 to focus attention on particular vehicle operations.
Each vehicle business unit is responsible for the total vehicle programme assigned to its
unit, and there is a Project Director within each respective business unit to manage each
vehicle project. Each project is sub-divided into smaller elements, for which project
(team) leaders are assigned to manage these. For each commodity, an autonomous, core
team is established to project manage that component or system. Typically, this team
will comprise a component (design) engineer, a purchasing representative (agent),
technical support, and a representative from the selected supplier of the commodity. The
component engineer is given responsibility for the cost management of that commodity
(this issue is discussed in detail later in this chapter).
Discussions with members of different core teams indicate a wide variation in their
operations, not least since there is no policy on how core teams are set-up and function.
Once a core team is assigned to a project, they decide what is to be done, based on their
experiences. This flexibility of approach did not find approval from some interviewees
from the purchasing function. They wanted clearer definitions of responsibility and were
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informally adopting an approach developed by one of their colleagues to facilitate this
process. In the absence of a policy, one purchasing agent had specified the activities
required of all team members, to determine the location of responsibility - an example of
this is provided in Appendix C. This unofficial framework was finding widespread use
amongst several project teams.
A related issue concerned the coordination of core teams, and whether this was
purchasing or engineering led. The transfer of cost management responsibility onto
design engineers was supported by team members, but se'era purchasIng managers
considered their expertise in liaising with the supply base was not being utilised. The
view was expressed that purchasing managers had developed many contacts with outside
organisations, had an overview of the entire business and, as such, were in a position to
cross-fertilise projects. At the time of interview, the design/component engineer was
commanding a greater role in design and management tasks within core teams.
Each vehicle business unit is supported by several corporate facilities: the testing
facilities at Gaydon; Forward Programmes; and Group Engineering. Forward
Programmes is a multi-fi.inctional group responsible for undertaking concept, styling, and
packaging for new projects. Vehicle styling develops the vehicle's concept into a
physical form, whilst concept engineering (also known as detailed design) converts the
designer's model into engineering expressions using CAD. The CAD generated models
are kept on a product database to ensure product integrity throughout the development
and manufacturing stages. The first prototype of a new model is produced within this
activity. Through the Purchasing function, Forward Programmes also provides feasibility
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lists and features lists for incorporation into new projects, during which time potential
suppliers will be identified together with their engineering process availability and
willingness to participate in design and development. It is through this responsibility that
the liaison with suppliers, referred to above, is channelled into the company's product
development process. In this way, the expertise of the Purchasing function assists in the
pre-selection of suppliers, rather than as part of the in situ core team.
Group Engineering is a multi-disciplinauy function with specialist engineering functions
within it.	 Powertrain Engineering comprises departments investigating engines,
transmissions, engine management systems, fluid systems and emissions. Body In White
is responsible for engineering the physical structure of the vehicle. Trim and Hardware
are responsible for the exterior and interior features such as seats, fascias, and climatic
controls. Electrical is responsible for all aspects of electrical/electronic vehicle systems.
Chassis Engineering is responsible for front and rear suspensions, manual and power
steering, braking systems and engine mounting systems. Engineering Support Services
provide a technical/analytical service, such as prototype engineering, vehicle evaluation
and reliability testing, and material technology.
7.4	 Product development process at Rover Group
The project management programme of Rover Group is principally a tollgate system
(such as the General Electric example in Chapter Two). There are three broad phases -
the decision and planning phase, the delivery phase, and the post-launch phase - which
226
are further divided into sub-phase activities. Each sub-phase is driven by milestones, at
which time a review activity takes place. The overall process is illustrated in Figure 7.3.
In July 1993, a Project Management Policy (Issue 3.0) was implemented by the Rover
Group, to supersede the existing Project Management Guidelines (Issue 2). These
guidelines were, as the title suggests, only guidelines and, although widely distributed to
project teams, interviews with both engineering and purchasing staff revealed that many
personnel had never used or seen this document. In the past, it has been at the discretion
of project managers and programme directors to determine the techniques followed. The
development of Issue 3.0 was seen as a move towards integrating the project
management approaches, and all other project management guidelines were withdrawn
from use in January 1994, when Issue 3.0 became a Rover Group Policy document - to
be adhered to by all project teams.
The integrated nature of the project management policy (PMP) forms the basis of
Rover's achievement of BS5750, and is reflected in the other procedures incorporated
within its framework, namely: timing management guidelines, a cost management
process, problem and release management process, reliability management process, and a
product supply procedure (also known as the design methodology). This latter
document was developed in 1989 with staff from the Advanced Technology Centre at
Warwick University and Rover engineers and provides a structured approach to design.
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Figure 7.3 Project management process at Rover Group
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The design methodology provides a procedure for determining solutions to specific
product objectives, and to ensure all feasible information sources, tools and techniques
have been considered in that selection process. The structured nature of the design
methodology means that it has not been formally incorporated into the PMP document.
The PMP has a less rigid system of control, which relies upon the project team to
determine how best to undertake the project, whilst driven by a checklist of success
criteria for each milestone of the process.
Large Cars was the first business unit to test the new policy, both informally and formally
as part of their product investigation letter in February 1994. The implementation of the
PMP has followed a cascade approach, with each copy being issue controlled. A
company-wide learning programme has introduced the policy to senior groups of staff
who, in turn, cascade its purpose further across the organisation. The reason for this
approach has been to move away from the situation cited earlier, where the guidelines
were received, but not acted upon. The first cascade involved the senior and middle
management staff of the Purchasing Department in January 1994.
Rover Group has adopted an integrated approach to product development, with all
functions and activities having an input to all stages of the process. The PMP was
designed for use by all product/project teams, functions and associates, as a guide to how
Rover Group conducts product development, manufacture and post launch activities.
(Post launch is included since there will be occasions when model year changes
constitute minor programmes.)
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Using the generic information systems approach outlined in Chapter Three, the product
development process at Rover Group is now outlined. In the absence of a single project
management approach by Rover Group prior to the PMP, the following description of
Rover's development process is a composite based on interviews and the emerged PMP.
However, the review milestones have remained constantly throughout the previous
procedures and these enable an understanding of the key events that are undertaken.
7.4.1 Concept generation
The concept generation stage of Rover's project management process is termed the
product template phase. The basis for all of Rover's product programmes is the
Business Template, which is derived from the Corporate Plan. This phase develops this
template into a broad specification for a product - be it a complete vehicle or a
powertrain unit. The perceived customer wants are analysed against the overall external
environment to generate a Product Template.
In Chapter Three it was indicated that vehicle manufacturers use three main sources for
generating the product concept: the strategic function, the customer and the research and
technology function. Rover begins by considering its strategies, objectives and policies.
The strategic function reviews all collaborative agreements (especially those held with
Honda) to consider this effect on the proposal, as well as provide appropriate corporate
performance targets. Consumer research and analysis are undertaken to establish the
trends/opportunities and requirements of, for example, environmental, safety/security,
quality and reliability. The team liaises with the Research and Technology group to
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analyse technology trends and technology opportunities, to review any proposed
materials against current and anticipated legislation and company targets and policies
(such as ozone depleters, recycling, and exhaust emissions), and to review anticipated
competitor developments.
The vehicle aesthetics are developed as concept themes and concept packages, and
Rover and Land Rover marque values reviewed. The Power Unit packaging 	 I
requirements, including possible future applications, is also defined at this stage.
Consideration is also given to potential carry-over parts, and ways In which complexity
can be reduced. Rover reviews all existing projects in order to look for parallels for joint
development of new parts and to incorporate any common themes for the sharing of
design and tooling.
The respective Business unit will be nominated for responsibility for the project, and unit
definitions and respective supply and logistic strategies identified. The Jogstics strategy
is developed at this phase, to drive the downstream operations of design and
manufacturing feasibility, thereby developing logistics, design and manufacturing
simultaneously. Rover establishes their preferred supplier strategy at concept, which
also accounts for any collaborative agreements and in-house manufacturing requirements
already underway. After having identified these, a synthetic model cost is calculated
based on piece price assumptions (including nominated suppliers), and incorporates
components logistic costs; preliminary timing plans are constructed, together with
developing supplier success criteria.
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Finally, programme costs, resources and timing are established. The overall project team
costs are determined (such as the engineering resource, facilities, prototype materials and
so forth), and project leader, key players and project skills identified. An overall
objective milestone plan is determined for the whole programme, and timing plans
estimated for long-lead time items, build, tooling and capital expenditure milestones.
The interaction of other programmes such as manufacturing and facilities, or Research
and Technology, is also determined for their input to the overall schema.
At the end of this phase, a review meeting is held when the product template is evaluated
against the Corporate Plan. The successful completion of this activity culminates in the
issuing of a Product Investigation Letter (PIL).
7.4.2 Product planning
At Rover Group, product planning consists of two phases: the product select/an phase;
and the programme approval phase (known as the D-Zero (DO) event).
7.4.2.1 Product selection phase
This phase generates and reviews several product opportunities that meet the
requirements of the Product Template. The successful completion of this phase
culminates in the issuing of a Product Development Letter (PDL) and the commitment of
engineering resource to achieve a robust DO event (which signifies programme
approval).
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A design theme is established by Styling for both exterior and interior designs, as 2D and
3D models. Initial colour and trim are developed, and ergonomics models used to assess
interior comfort. Scale models are developed for investigating the aerodynamic
principles of the design themes, and the mechanical unit (under bonnet package) is also
agreed.
The majority of components for use are identified from several sources. First, potential
Research and Technology (or shelf engineered projects) are identified and selected.
These must have reached RO (or later) - an equivalent Research and Technology phase to
DO. Second, the maximum number of carry-over parts is considered in relation to the
capability of the project to accommodate these. Third, the maximum number of blue-
print components is considered for inclusion. A blue-print component is one that is
accepted as a company standard over all products, thereby assisting reliability, major
piece part savings and manufacturing processes. Another example is a parameter blue-
print, where the dimensions of a component change, but all the design principles remain
constant (Internal Quality and Reliability Briefing, 1992). Before making any changes
to any existing or carry-over components, a review is undertaken of the design/supply
integrity to alleviate expensive changes to components across all business units.
There is substantial supplier involvement at this stage. Whilst Purchasin.g and
Engineering identifr and discuss preferred suppliers, supplier nominations are made for
all known parts, make-or-buy components are identified, and vendor tooling lead time
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constraints and cost estimates are discussed. Those suppliers that have been nominated
are briefed about the manufacturing reliability targets and logistics objectives.
Effective Cost Management (ECM) commences for all elements of the programme.
Detailed product development costs are estimated for the product feasibility study, and
an outline of product development costs is made through to volume production. An
objective timing plan is prepared for the programme, indicating the interaction of other
programmes (both approved and proposed) and vendor timings.
If a unique powertrain project is being undertaken, the powertrain concept phase (DL1)
is expected to be completed within this phase. The successful completion of this phase is
the issuing of the vehicle/component PDL.
7.4.2.2 Programme approval phase (DO)
This phase develops the selected product and aims to achieve the resolution of all timing,
financial and technical concerns, including the building and testing of simulators. DO is
the key programme review, If the programme requires powertrain concept and
development activities (DL1 and DL2 respectively), these are carried out in this phase -
unless a unique powertrain project has already begun.
The entire programme team ratifr the vehicle styling with full engineering, manufacturing
and logistics feasibility, plus marketing agreement. Several models are produced: a fibre
glass model for market research, a master model developed on CAD for early surfacing
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feasibility, and a full-size aerodynamic test and development model. This phase sees the
interior and exterior styles approved and signed-off, colour and trim agreed, the surface
measurement released to downstream stages, and the powertrain and mechanical unit
packages approved and signed-off.
One of the main activities within the DO phase is the production of design specifications
for each component or system. Any critical design characteristics must be identified and
confirmed at this stage, with all blue-print designs and planned carry-over components
finalised. A detailed Product Definition is developed, including specifications, styling,
number of options, number of colours (interior and exterior), and number of parts
(degree of complexity). Any Research and Technology projects should have been
selected but only if there is sufficient confidence that the technology can be adapted at a
product DO. All components or systems design have Failure Mode Effects and Criticality
Analysis (FMIECA) performed which help determine the development plans.
This phase also involves establishing the intended manufacturing processes. DFM and
DFA are important elements of the design process, hence any intended processes and
process technology is considered for inclusion in the design process. Similarly, the
manufacturing and logistic feasibility are determined, as well as the decisions on in-house
and outsourcing, where and how specific components or systems are to be made. The
product design should evolve in conjunction with the intended supplier, in-house
manufacturing and the logistics strategy. By the end of DO, the purchasing route should
be established and the majority of suppliers nominated. The tooling plan for in-house
and outsourced parts should be agreed and signed-off by all parties during the phase.
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There are regular review meetings by the project team, most importantly to define and
agree such issues are complexity, late configurations, component assembly levels, and
supplier capacity planning. The product development plans, costs and resource levels
should be agreed and communicated to all parties involved. The project timing plan
through to volume production should be loaded onto the Rover Project Management
(RPM) database with key milestones indicated. (The RPM is viewed by Rover as a key
mechanism for providing a central resource for maintaining coordination of the project.)
The culmination of the DO event is a draft Product Policy Letter (PPL) for the
vehicle/component, which is sent for Rover Group Board of Directors' approval. This
PPL defines the priority for this programme within Rover Group. If the programme is
approved by the board, a PPL is issued. This signifies the continuation of the project
programme and demonstrates commitment of the Rover Group of resources to it. This
resource will include long-lead funding to deliver the product to volume, having first
established its priority in terms of volume and existing product plans.
7.4.3 Product and process engineering
Product and process engineering activities involve two phases at Rover Group: the
engineering development phase (D02), and the engineering validation phase (Dl).
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7.4.3.1 Engineering development phase (D02)
The Engineering development phase (D02) is a design-prototype-build-test cycle through
which vehicles can be built and tested from a robust engineering design specification, and
within the financial constraint of the programme. The successful completion of the D02
event is indicated by the authority for all parts to be production tooled. If powertrain
projects are undertaken, this phase will include the DL3 validation phase.
All styling elements are finalised in this phase, and any under-bonnet elements should be
updated to the latest design level and signed-off. These allow a full production intent
specification to be released and a bill of material to be drawn-up. All components and
systems should have functional performance measures, and the design FMECA is
reviewed and updated from the previous phase. Any problems should be registered
centrally in the project management system.
All components and systems are brought together in a DO2IDL3 build phase, to test
representative vehicles and prove all major derivatives and options. The last cars (or
power units) should be built by manufacturing to maintain authenticity of production.
After this, a level of Engineering sign-off should be reached that indicates a design has
developed to the point that can be validated during the Dl phase and is capable of
proceeding to full manufacturing phase.
All components and systems are procured off production release specifications and
drawings, and supplier parts are tested under a Conformity of Production (COP) test
237
programme. Regular project management team reviews take place, particularly
regarding cost issues.
7.4.3.2 Engineering validation phase (Dl)
The engineering validation phase (Dl) involves the building and testing of a vehicle with
production parts that meet engineering's specification. (Powertrain validation is
conducted at DL3, and activity VBI forms the start of process validations.) The
successful completion of this phase occurs with zero-warranty and with a supportable
level of confidence that there are no major engineering concerns outstanding, and the
project continues to meet the financial and timing commitments proposed at the DO
event. By the end of Dl, the project should ideally receive engineering sign-og but on
average, 70 per cent of projects receive engineering sign-off by the end of this stage.
Process engineering and manufacturing requirements are validated from parts sourced
from the final production system, and reliability critical items are checked. Lists of
reliability critical items are generated at the concept stage, based on past experience, and
include items that: have a poor service history or an unproven service history; are safety
critical; would cause expensive maintenance if they failed; have stringent tolerances for
manufacturing or performance; have life limitations that adversely affect cost of
ownership or availability; and those that have long procurement lead times.
Although design engineers have the opportunity to consult component reliability
information, interviewees reported the need for late engineering changes, or short
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availability of time for final design, often means there is little time available to consult
this information. Similarly, guarantee and warranty/validation test information receives
little review for the same reasons. On a related issue, the warranty information collected
is acquired for cost recovery, not specifically for customer satisfaction, so there is a
question as to how this loop can be closed to ensure that warranty information captures
customer satisfaction information, and hence can be fed into the product design process.
7.4.4 Production
There are several phases that may be viewed as pre-production, and production
validation activities: quality proving, manufacturing build, volume, and post-launch.
The quality proving phase (QP) is the quality maturation phase. Vehicle parts are built
off production ready tooling, utilising production facilities both in-house and at suppliers.
The successful completion of this phase is signified with the signing-off of product
development, and after manufacturing has identified and resolved all conformity to
production concerns. Product development sign-off is achieved when the following sign-
offs are complete: Engineering, Logistics, Manufacturing, and Service.
The key objective of the manufacturing build phase ('M build) is to enable both in-house
operations and suppliers to run production facilities at track speed to ensure
manufacturing assignments, logistics support and so forth are prepared for full
production. All components or systems are manufactured off production tools and
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production facilities. Manufacturing may only proceed to volume when a product sign-
off document is released.
The volume phase may include advanced volume, or a ramp-up plan for proposed
volume production. These units are the first vehicles built from the completed company
infrastructure, and should meet launch criteria.
Finally, each Business Unit (Small and Medium, Large, or Four-by-four) will support
post-launch activities identified by the commercial division. The hand-over of the
project to the current engineering team takes place at this stage.
7.5	 Effective cost management
Effective cost management (ECM) is a set of procedures for the control and
management of component costs for all new programmes. It has three objectives: first,
to provide a level of confidence over the cost elements of a new model programme at the
DO event, to enable an informed decision of the viability of the programme; second, to
establish clear ownership of cost by the component engineer; and third, to design to a
cost rather than cost a design, through working with suppliers over cost levels, vis-à-vis
quality and reliability (Rover Group ECM Document). Hence, the product development
process at Rover can be seen to be driven by the ECM process. The responsibility for
total component costs is given to the component engineer from the initial design phase
through to post-volume production. Although, other members of the core team may be
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delegated some cost cutting measures, the final responsibility generally lies with the
component engineer.
For every new component being designed, a cost pack is developed by the core team.
This pack will be managed by the component engineer responsible for that
component/option, and consists of a sketch of the component, the expected volumes, the
target weight and so forth. In conjunction with Purchasing, the core team identifies all
potential suppliers (if no preferred supplier is available) and a cost pack is sent to the
potential suppliers to establish an initial understanding of costs, and to allow suppliers to
demonstrate their experience and knowledge into a written response. The core team
refine the specification further and a quotation analysis form (QAF) is sent to each
supplier. Comparison of the completed QAFs leads to nomination of the final supplier,
who will then join the core team. This normally takes place within the product selection
or programme approval phases, although purchasing staff reported some supplier
selection continuing after the DO event for non-critical, standard components. Where
necessary, the supplier's expertise is utilised to develop a detailed design specification to
achieve a robust design, from which detailed costs can be generated. A cost target can
then be set, with the core team, and especially the supplier, committing to deliver to this
target cost. It is then the responsibility of the component engineer to adhere to these
costs.
The skills required of component engineers are now increasingly different from those
previously required. With the responsibility for ECM comes a need for new skills in
negotiation, time management, computer literacy, teamwork, leadership and so forth. In
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general, design engineers accepted the need to take responsibility for managing
component cost, however, concern was expressed over the appropriateness of
undertaking ECM prior to the DO event, by a senior engineering manager. He argued
that ECM determined a fixed design too early in the process, at a time when alternative
ideas were still benefiting from discussion. In his view, "there is a need for an early
release of 'quick and dirty' design ideas - approximates rather than rigid finalities - with
which suppliers and designers can work." This view may reflect a traditional design
engineering concern that design should lead costs, but nonetheless it was surprising to
hear this from a senior manager.
7.6	 Supplier strategies
The Rover Purchasing Quality Strategy (1991-95) has within it, three processes that
focus attention on Rover's supply base. These are supplier reduction, component
strategy development and supplier selection, and supplier development. These processes
illustrate the importance of suppliers to Rover's design and development process and the
formal procedures for coordinating their participation.
In Chapter Three, supplier reduction was seen as a general trend by all vehicle
manufacturers. As key suppliers are integrated into the product development process,
further reductions progress and, in the case of Rover, by late 1989, there were
approximately 300 primary suppliers, with a further 2,000 secondary suppliers (Bertodo,
1989a). Figure 7.4 characterises the supplier structure at that time. Since 1989, Rover
has continued to rationalise its supply base from over 2,000 to about 700 in 1994, with
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plans to reduce this figure further to 360 by 1997 (The Financial Times, 5 November
1994). Concurrent to this supplier reduction, in 1992, Rover began a process of
identifying strategic long-term suppliers, in a move to focus supplier expertise in a core
group of primaiy suppliers; by 1994, approximately 360 core suppliers were accounting
for 75 per cent of Rover's purchases (The Financial Times, ibid).
The second process involves component strategy development and supplier selection.
The Purchasing and Engineering functions periodically meet to discuss component
strategy, covering issues such as carry-over parts, blue-print designs, and strategic
components. Since 1991, databases have been created to hold this information for new
vehicle programmes to access. Taking a pan-business perspective, and to some degree a
vision of the future, purchasing staff and staff engineers (discussed later) cooperate to
identify potential strategic suppliers.
The third process is supplier development, discussed in Chapters Three and Foir. lt.
1991, Rover began a process of selectively involving guest engineers in their product
development activities. Whilst this is specified as a clear supplier process, discussions
with Rover staff in early 1995 indicates that there are many guest engineers working
within Rover Group, but little was known as to their numbers and depth of participation.
(This issue is re-visited in Chapter Eight.) Synchronously to this, in 1992, Rover
established supplier development teams to assist particular suppliers in meeting the
requirements of RG2000, in much the same way as Nissan sends supplier development
teams.
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Figure 7.4	 Supplier structure to support new product development
Source: Bertodo (1989a, figure 3)
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7.6.1 RG2000 and supplier selection
A simultaneous programme to these, if not a driving force behind them, is RG2000: a
supplier specification to ensure Total Quality and continuous improvement from the
primary suppliers. In 1987, Rover Group began their Total Quality Initiative and a
culture of continuous improvement. In 1990, RG2000 was specified to extend this
philosophy to the first tier suppliers. Prior to RG2 000, Rover Group already had a
supplier quality assessment system (ARG100), but the new programme linked both
operational quality systems with strategic issues. A pre-requisite for RG2000 is supplier
accreditation to BS5750 (or EN29000/ISO 9000), but it goes further, assessing supplier
attitudes to its workforce, Total Quality, its corporate strategy, and how it meets
customer needs. The long-term aim of RG2000 is that supplier partnerships will evolve,
whereupon both Rover and supplier will understand each other's business needs. Within
Purchasing, there is a technical group of engineers - Purchase Technical Support - who
are a supplier development team with responsibility for assessing suppliers for
conformance to RG2000.
Rover Group recognises four categories of supplier as part of the RG2000 supplier
initiative:
1. proprietary/jointly designed components/systems;
2. major functional and non-functional components and assemblies;
3. simpler components in normal or high volumes;
4. less complex or special components in low volumes (Supplier Business Specfi cation
RG2000).
245
Along with quality standards or institution accreditation, the suppliers of categories one
and two components are required to demonstrate capabilities in project management,
total quality improvement, and business performance to be accredited the higher
category RG2000. Referring to figure 5.5, these two categories are similar to those
supplier groups - proprietary, black box, detail-controlled functional and aesthetic parts -
that are being required to have an earlier involvement in product development activities.
Hence, Rover attributes 30 per cent of their supplier rating system specifically to
assessing the project management capabilities of these two categories. The RG2000
specifications are extremely detailed, but the key points for category one and two
suppliers are: the presence of a project manager; formal systems and procedures in place
for planning, reviewing and implementing design and development activities (for
example, suppliers should be able to demonstrate a project plan and review programme,
to undertake design FMEA at component and system level, and to perform prototype
manufacture, development and approval); control procedures of process planning,
tooling and capacity planning; quality systems and procedures are reviewed, in line with
legislative requirements or Rover group requirements; and the application of RG2000
principles to the subcontractors of these major suppliers. This latter point reinforces the
emerging pattern of responsibility being placed on primary suppliers identified in Chapter
Three.
In summary, RG2000 assesses the project management process of the supplier, to
ensure, inter alia, there is: detailed design component information; a good paperwork
procedure and an effective project management process is in place; a framework for
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process critical capabilities and component critical capabilities; and a consistent approach
to project management is terms of attention to detail. These measures reflect the needs
of early involvement being requested of suppliers in product development.
7.6.2 Supplier inputs to design and development
At the styling/concept stage, there is very little supplier involvement at present.
However, where there is a need to assess feasibility of manufacture and so forth, a
supplier will be sought for their manufacturing expertise. In this case, a list of strategic
suppliers will be consulted that Purchasing has established with the assistance of the staff
engineers. By the DO event, 80-90 per cent of the suppliers for a project should ideally
be nominated, although the selection of suppliers equates approximately to the following
pattern: 300 selected prior to DO, 600 having been selected by the DO event, and 1,200
by the Dl event (Rover Supply Manager respondent). It is very important to know
which suppliers are involved as early as possible. Many suppliers in trim may be
nominated at the pre-digitising stage, to ensure their input of manufacturing expertise.
Suppliers of seats and door casings are examples of components where the supplier will
be identified early in the development process.
An example of the benefit of supplier participation in design is a plastic injection
moulding of the fascia for a Rover Large Car project. The team leader assigned a project
manager to oversee the design and completion of the component. Personnel were drawn
to form a core team, and included: the Rover project manager, a supplier technical
liaison representative, a toolmaker (selected by the supplier), and liaison staff from Rover
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manufacturing (Large Cars), and Rover production. Besides the supplier representative
on the core team, the supplier firm dedicated three further personnel to work inside
Rover for about three days per week, and two at the supplier company, reflecting the
need for continual dialogue between both Rover and supplier design staff for a detail-
controlled aesthetic component.
Supplier input was seen as significant for cost reduction and ease of manufacture. By
changing a mould line from 15 degrees to 18.5 degrees (a supplier design suggestion),
for example, it was possible to include the glove-box as an integral part of the fascia
moulding, thereby eliminating the need for a separate mould, plus fixtures. For this
component re-design, it was important for the supplier to see the final assembly position.
The supplier suggested moulding in an internal mark on the fascia to assist positioning
the component whilst on the assembly line, for ease of assembly. Similarly, it is
important to have a manufacturing input too. For example, if the original specifications
of separate design teams suggest using M6 and MS fasteners for separate components,
manufacturing may suggest that only one type of fastener could be necessary for both
parts. If M5 fasteners only are used, then an estimated saving ofO.4O per vehicle could
be made, which would be a considerable saving on volumes of 100,000 units. It is these
types of benefits that are driving Rover Group towards closer involvement of suppliers in
the design and development process.
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7.7	 The role of gatekeeper
Staff engineers are a Group Engineering Resource with separate staff engineer groups
for Chassis, Trim and Hardware, Electrical, Powertrain, and Body Pressings. They work
within all business units, across all model range sizes, and provide a central source of
expertise to all vehicle projects - where and when required.
Staff engineers are examples of the gatekeeper form of coordination mechanism referred
to in Chapter Four. The responsibilities of these gatekeepers are characterised by an
electrical harness staff engineer. His primary role is "to act as an indirect interface with
external suppliers", whilst the direct interface is the responsibility of each project team to
liaise with suppliers. This particular staff engineer maintains a knowledge of new harness
developments in three ways: first, by talking directly with potential harness suppliers
(four of whom are UK based, and one France based); second, by working with Rover's
Vehicle Cost Group to disassemble systematically competitor products, thereby enabling
an understanding of their technology developments; and third, by attending trade shows
and consulting technical journals. These latter sources of information tend to be of
limited benefit since they focus on overall developments in the field, rather than
providing specific technical solutions. Furthermore, he maintains direct links with
several second tier suppliers, such as suppliers of electrical connectors and cable
protectors in order to be aware of the larger design chain implications.
The second role of staff engineers is to ensure all business units are following any
common component strategies. For example, that they are all using standard fuseboxes,
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connectors and so forth, wherever possible. Third, they work closely with Purchasing
to determine component cost issues, enabling a reduction in costs as far as is feasible.
Fourth, staff engineers need to be aware of new process technologies within their
respective component business. Harness manufacture, for example, is a very labour
intensive process; therefore, lowering the piece price (of which one-third is attributable
to labour costs) necessitates working with suppliers for improvements in process
technology.
The final role of the staff engineer is to act as arbitrator, on internal design issues. The
need for engineering changes in a new project will lead, for example, to compromises
from component engineers. If these cannot be resolved at the engineer level, then the
staff engineer may intervene to assist. If it is still not resolved, then it will be escalated
up to the team leader, or to the chief engineer for the project. An example of this latter
case is where changes will impact on body-in-white. Generally, these design details are
frozen early in the project, hence changes will require for the unfreezing of these, which
can only be authorised at Project Director level.
Compiling the interviews of four staff engineers from Electrical, and Trim and Hardware,
the overall role of staff engineers in Rover Group are:
to liaise with Purchasing in formulating the supplier involvement strategy;
. to assist in the component strategy in terms of logistics, DFMJDFA, design for
disassembly, and so forth;
. to liaise with Forward Programmes to discuss potential carry-over parts to future
vehicle projects;
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. to liaise on a component basis, and act as an information resource on the current
technology;
to act as gatekeeper to Marketing and Manufacturing about forthcoming product and
process technologies, for example, in universities and supplier companies;
. to know about the new developments occurring in component technology and, where
new materials are suggested by suppliers, they should liaise with material specialists to
assess their suitability/appropriateness; hence, they liaise between suppliers and Rover
Group on technical matters.
The position of staff engineer is generally assigned to personnel with extensive job
experience within Rover's engineering activities. It is a crucial integrating mechanism,
both internally and externally, and interviews with purchasing, engineering and suppliers
reflected the importance that this gatekeeper's tacit knowledge plays in product
development activities.
7.8 CAD/CAM data exchange
Since the mid-1980s, Rover Group has sought the exchange of product data in computer
form with suppliers. In 1983, Austin Rover, as it was then, augmented a Computer
Integrated Engineering programme to design, engineer and manufacture motor vehicles.
solely from data contained in a 3D computer model. A crucial part of this programme
was the participation of suppliers in this, since at that time 60 per cent of a typical Rover
car was constructed from bought-out materials. Twigg (1990) discusses this adoption
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policy and the subsequent affect on the supplier base in detail. Suffice it to say, by 1987,
the adoption of CAD/CAM by Rover suppliers resembled the following pattern:
a small number of suppliers had adopted 3D systems compatible with those of the
Rover Group; a larger group had installed some CAD facilities which were not
directly compatible with Rover but which were, potentially, compatible via a data
exchange format; the majority of suppliers were concerned and interested in
adoption but had made no commitment to invest; and, another large group had
shown neither commitment nor interest in CAD related investments. (A Rover
study cited in Twigg, 1990, pp. 98-99)
These findings of a Rover study were supported by the research during the same period
by Twigg (1990), who concluded that the adoption of CAD/CAM by suppliers was
critically determined by the opinions and perceptions of the design relationship between
vehicle manufacturer and component supplier, particularly the need for design
communication. In the absence of reliable data exchange formats, the choice of system
was based upon the importance of parent company (Group), customer or internal
considerations (Twigg, 1990). Where suppliers clearly demonstrated a black box design
responsibility, Group compatibility of system or internal reasons determined the system
choice, but where there was an iterative need for design communication between Rover
and supplier, suppliers generally selected customer compatible systems either as a direct
purchase or through use of a bureau service specialising in Rover supply.
The requirement for suppliers to have CAD/CAM systems compatible with Rover's
systems still remains important in the mid-1990s. The transmission of design data in
digital format, as opposed to manual drawings, is part of Rover's strategic aim of
reducing cost, improving quality and developing products right first time. The aims
were specified in the 1983 CIE programme, and appropriately drive the current strategy.
To this end, Rover Group has a CAD/CAM data exchange policy that outlines the steps
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to be taken by suppliers in transmitting design data with the company. Three groups of
external resources need to exchange design data with Rover, for Rover to be able to
undertake concurrent engineering within the extended boundary of outsourced design
expertise: suppliers; toolmakers (including jig, tool and facilities' suppliers); and contract
design houses. Figures 7.5(a) and 7.5(b) illustrate the generic approaches to CAD/CAM
data exchange based on whether Rover or the supplier has design responsibility. Where
Rover has the clear design responsibility, the early release of CAD concept data enables
toolmaker and supplier alike to determine manufacturing feasibility and prepare
CAD/CAM processes sooner in the process. In the case of supplier design responsibility,
Rover releases a design specification and maintains design liaison throughout the early
design stages. These can be seen as extremes of a continuum between which a grey area
is developing with a need for greater design and manufacturing liaison and feedback.
Where a major interface exists between components, especially functional and aesthetic
parts, suppliers are increasingly residing at Rover-based CAD terminals to complete
drafting tasks, both for the use of the central product data management system, but aiso
for liaison with Rover engineers.
Rover prefers, where possible, for suppliers to select CAD/CAM systems that are
directly compatible with the Computervision CADDS4X system (although other systems
are used at Rover where specific applications are viewed as providing greater benefit).
Wherever possible, suppliers are encouraged to adopt an identical system, for several
reasons:
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Figure 7.5	 Rover/supplier design responsibility and CAD/CAM data exchange
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1. this eliminates data conversion requirements and associated problems;
2. there is no loss of geometnc entities or design functionality;
3. engineers are able to share a common design environment and language;
4. there is no risk of data corruption from different software revision levels (Rover
CAD/CAM data exchange policy, 1991).
The importance of sharing a common language was reinforced in an interview with a
Senior Manager in Computervision (the major CAD vendor to Rover Group) in April
1993:
Although there may be direct compatibility been a Computervision system and
another vendor's system, the use of vocabulary is often different and can be
confusing: a picture to one system may be a drawing to another. As a result,
face-to-face discussions are imperative to ensure accuracy. However, when a
common vocabulary is established, discussions of solutions by telephone are
possible.
The type of data transferred also impacts upon decisions of system selection, since the
specific format of the digital design information varies with the component or system.
For example, powertrain components tend to require solid modelling information, body
panels require 3D surface data, and turned components use 2D CAD data. In 1991, the
availability of data exchange standards affected the various transfers of data in different
ways. For example, for 3D wireframe and 3D surface modelling transfers, Rover
recommended IGES, VDA-FS and Honda standards to suppliers, since they performed
well in CAD/CAM data exchanges. For 2D detail drawing, IGES performed fairly well,
but for 3D model-based detail drawings, IGES performed poorly. The presence of a
CAD/CAM data exchange policy enables Rover Group to convey their exchange
requirements, and to offer suppliers an indication of how data transfer may be achieved.
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In support of this, Rover provides assistance to suppliers and toolmakers in the form of
CAD/CAM advice, testing and joint development. The ability to transfer CAD/CAM
data successfully is an important criterion in Rover's supplier selection procedure.
7.9 Summary
This chapter has outlined the project management process at Rover Group and
demonstrated the holistic approach of the Project Management Policy (PMP). Whereas
project teams have generally followed an ad hoc process to vehicle development in the
past, the change towards a policy document in 1994 is drawing the company towards
recognising the need for a standardised process. This enables individual project teams
the flexibility to retain some autonomy of how the process is implemented, whilst
providing control mechanisms through the checklists and review procedures. The
supporting documents to the PMP also provide further control and analysis within this
flexible approach.
Table 7.2 summarises the main features of the project management activities at Rover
Group. The process has three main points of interaction with suppliers. First, suppliers
who are seen as strategically important have an early input to the product development
process, at the product selection prior stage, often helping prepare the product
specification itself. These suppliers are generally system, key proprietary parts, or
critical functional or aesthetic parts suppliers (as indicated in table 5.6). These suppliers
will be nominated through discussions with purchasing agents and staff engineers.
Second, the majority of suppliers should be selected by the end of the programme
256
Table 7.2	 Summary of Rover's approach to project management
Project management	 Rover's features
elements
Characterisation of process Phases and gates.
Dominant characteristics 	 Cross-functional project team focus, based in business units;
core engineering support facilities.
Key mechanisms	 Programme directors in each business unit oversee all projects.
Project manager assigned to individual projects.
Senior management review at key events.
DO event gives project go-ahead; QP event production go-ahead.
Project status review meetings between Rover and supplier on
monthly basis.
Key partnership suppliers brought in at pre-concept and concept
stages.
Use of guest engineers and staff engineers.
ECM and RG2000.
Major phases in a
development project
7 stages (6 key gates/milestones):
1. Product template;
2. Product selection;
3. Programme approval (DO event);
4. Product development (D02 event);
5. Engineering validation (Dl event);
6. Manufacturing development (Quality Proving
event/Manufacturing event/Volume production);
7. Post-launch.
(Powertrain development has separate, but similar stages and
events.)
Dominant type of project 	 Evolutions, enhancements and incremental improvements for
model year changes: emphasis on speed.
Platform/next generation projects largely performed in
cooperation with Honda (although not exclusively).
Typical project duration	 12-24 months for model year changes.
3-6 years for new vehicle projects.
Primary performance 	 Customer satisfaction (through quality and cost reduction);
drivers	 Robust design;
Technical performance;
Speed.
Formality of process	 Holistic in approach, but formalised reporting procedures
through each gate. PMP supported by: timing management
guidelines; cost management process; problem and release
management process; reliability management process; and
product supply procedure (design methodology).
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approval stage, when the DO event takes place. Where suppliers are interfacing with
long lead-time items, aesthetically critical or new technology parts, extensive interaction
will already be taking place. For others, receipt of detailed specification will not occur
until after the DO event. Third, the final major interaction of suppliers in product
development occurs in the engineering development phase (D02 event), which
culminates in a robust engineering design specification. Any new supplier involvement
after this event will generally involve outsourcing of standard production requirements,
rather than product development activities.
Overall, Rover has several mechanisms for promoting suppliers who can meet the
objective of closer product development participation: RG2000, supplier development
teams to encourage continual improvement within supplier manufacturing processes,
supplier circles for those suppliers most closely involved in early product development
activities, open-book cost accounting to facilitate long-term cost reductions, and the
encouragement of guest engineers to work on site at Rover.
One deficiency with the PMP is the lack of a formal procedure for capturing the
experience of previous projects. Although the policy enables existing parts to be
considered and carry-over parts are examined, discussions with component engineers,
staff engineers, support staff and purchasing agents indicate an absence of a formal
procedure for every project. There have been isolated post-project reviews, but these
have been at the behest of project directors. Since the company was undergoing a
substantial change in its approach to project management at the time of the research,
there is reason to be believe that such reviews will become more widespread. There is a
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computer network known as the Group Learning Exchange Network (GLEN) which
could provide one mechanism by which project experiences could be captured for future
reference. However, the process of creating such data is time consuming for individuals
and, at present, a voluntary exercise in which few staff choose to participate.
The key participants in design relationships between Rover and its suppliers are indicated
in figure 7.6. At the interface between Rover and supplier, initial discussions involve the
Rover purchasing agent and component engineer (project manager for a specific
commodity), and the supplier sales representative and supplier project manager (normally
based in engineering). This relationship signifies the traditional role of Purchasing and
Sales, but with the added participation of Engineering. Along with these members of the
project core team, staff engineers play a key role in advising Purchasing and Engineering
of supplier capabilities. These design relationships are now examined in detail in Chapter
Eight.
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Figure 7.6	 Key participants in design relationships between Rover and its suppliers
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8	 DESIGN MANAGEMENT IN TILE DESIGN CHAIN: DESCRIP11ON
AND ANALYSIS
8.1	 Introduction
This chapter examines the participation of particular suppliers in the design and
development of vehicle components to the Rover Group. Six component suppliers are
examined, along with three major examples of the design relationship with Rover Group.
The cases are then analysed to determine the dynamics of the design relationship that
exist between these suppliers and the Rover Group, and conclusions drawn of the main
features of how inter-organisational design relationships are coordinated.
8.2 BUMPER (Case 1)
BUMPER is a Preferred Supplier to the Rover Group, and has been a manufacturer of
medium and large plastic injection mouldings for approximately 20 years. Its main
product lines are bumpers, fascias and grilles, and is in a unique position of being the sole
supplier of bumpers to the Rover Group. Other major customers include Honda, Unipart
(for aiermarket sales), Peugeot, and Volvo Truck. The major share of its business is
spread between Rover, Honda and Unipart. The Unipart business is particularly
important, since BUMPER has to guarantee the supply of bumpers to the aftermarket for
up to 10 years after the effective life-cycle of a car model. In 1989, the company
underwent a dramatic expansion, following which BUIMIPER has witnessed a doubling of
both profits and turnover between 199 1-94.
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BUMPER is located in Warwickshire, midway between Rover's main production sites in
Oxfordshire and the Midlands. It designs and manufactures injection mouldings on site.
In the case of Rover bumpers, they have been traditionally injection moulded at Banbury
and transported the parts to Rover's paintshop at Swindon, where the parts were colour
painted. From there, parts would be transported to Cowley or Longbndge, as required.
As part of a policy towards 'closing the loop' to control both the moulding and painting
operations, BUMPER purchased this paintshop operation in the early 1990s.
8.2.1 Design relationship with Rover
The typical bumper for Rover Group involves two stages. First, a feasibility study will
be requested on developing a bumper with the vehicle concept group. At this stage,
engineering hours will be logged, and for this BUMPER has placed a guest engineer
within Rover. A cost pack will then be generated and a quotation analysis form raised.
It is normal for BUMPER to be awarded Rover's contracts, and the close relationship
with concept reinforces this.
Figure 8.1 illustrates the design relationship between BUMPER and Rover Group. A
typical project team for the bumper comprises: a project manager, account manager and
guest engineer from BUMPER a design engineer and purchasing agent from Rover; a
toolmaker; and, a material supplier. There is a Design Review meeting each month for
the project team.
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Figure 8.1 Design relationship between BUMPER and Rover
Toolmaker	 IMaterial supplier
L____	 i
In addition to the project team, BUMPER maintains a close working relationship with a
Rover staff engineer from Trim and Hardware. The guest engineer resides permanently
at Rover's Canley site, working mostly with the concept group. This arrangement is
important since BUMPER works with the 'A' surface taken directly from the clay model
at concept stage. The guest engineer is a former Rover employee, who took early
retirement. Given the importance of Rover business, B1IIWER recruited him to work
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solely on Rover projects. Besides the guest engineer, BUMPER's project manager is
another ex-Rover employee. In total, BUMPER has nine project engineers devoted to
automotive work, together with 3-4 account managers. On average, there are 6-7
projects underway in any one year, with an average length of a project being
approximately 12-18 months; in the case of Land Rover projects, these are longer (3-4
years).
The material supplier has an important design contribution, insofar as it advises on the
mould flow of the specific material to be used. Hence the relationships in figure 8.1 can
be seen as representing the transfer of design and process expertise. BUMPER has been
using one toolmaker, based in Hampshire, for most of its bumper and fascia toolmaking
requirements for over 20 years, a result of which has been the development of a close
design relationship. Rover communicates directly with this toolmaker: hence, a tripartite
relationship exists between Rover, BUMPER and this particular toolmaker. This direct
tooling relationship partly reflects the importance of bumper tooling to Rover, since they
generally rely upon one set of tooling for a bumper, for the life-span of a model. This
contrasts with Honda's approach of using three sets of tooling. This difference
dramatically influences the design and timing of the tooling programme.[1]
Remuneration for design and development work between BUMPER and Rover is not
completed until the project reaches volume. There are no separate project management
fees - unless the decision to cancel the project is made - since these are covered in the
price per unit of production. [2] Therefore, BUMPER ensures all contracts include both
development work and production. However, this system of payment does not include
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the work of toolmakers. There is a long established agreement (approved by suppliers
and automotive manufacturers) with the Toolmakers Guild for the payment of tooling
work: one-third of total costs are payable on ordering a set of tools; two-thirds of the
payment should be made on delivery of the tools; and final payment should be met one
month after delivery.
BUMPER is experiencing a problem with Rover with regards to tooling payment. After
having approved the cost of an order, Rover's purchasing function is taking 1-4 months
to set the order, and pay for the ordering of materials. At this juncture, Purchasing
issues a Letter of Intent towards the costs of the tooling. Meanwhile, BUMPER is
expected to collaborate with the toolmaker on producing the tools, without the
toolmaker receiving any payment from Rover. When one realises that the final cost for a
set of tools may be £1.5 million, a Letter of Intent does not carry sufficient power for a
toolmaker to commit engineering resource, in the absence of the one-third payment. The
knock-on effect of this situation is that if BUMPER organises a meeting to discuss the
design of a commodity, much of the meeting may be spent with the toolmaker asking
Rover when the first payment will be made. This not only uses up otherwise valuable
time, but accentuates the problem further. Hence, one major obstacle towards closer
design relationships between Rover and suppliers who require upstream collaboration of
tooling sub-contractors, appears to be the logistics surrounding the Letter of Intent.
Despite encouraging suppliers to work in partnership, Rover has an apparent inability to
place orders efficiently, which creates particular problems for injection moulding
suppliers.
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BUMPER does not have a formal, documented project management process, although it
has procedures in place that control the process. This ensures conformance with
BS5750, and RG2000. It follows a standard procedure with all customer requests, but
believes in adapting the process to the specific project. For example, project managing a
fast track programme (such as project ALPHA discussed below) is subject to different
parameters, speed and size, compared to long lead-time projects (such as those typical of
Land Rover). When there is sufficient time, CAD facilities will be utilised extensively;
however, if time is critical, BUMPER finds it more manageable to perform manual
drawings and to have a flexible, if not ad hoc, approach. The rigidity of CAD in a time
pressure situation would hinder, rather than help. BUMPER finds that Land Rover's
project management skills are less developed than those of the two Rover car business
units.
The pressure of time is accentuated by the fact that, increasingly, there is no time
available for soft tooling within the customer delivery schedule, not least due to delays in
payment for tooling work. Hence BUMPER is faced with managing a tripartite
relationship where there are conflicting tensions of a toolmaker wanting payment, and a
customer demanding the meeting of prescribed project milestone reviews.
8.2.2 RG2000
BUMPER was one of the pilot companies for RG2000 accreditation, when the supply
agents who assessed their procedures arranged only periodic visits. However, the supply
agents now appear to be much more alert to the need for continual improvement, and are
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constantly checking that BUMPER is following the systems and procedures in place to
meet the RG2000 specifications.
BUTWER believe there is a conflict between the operating procedures of RG2000, and
the internal demands of Rover's divisions to accelerate the development process. The
RG2000 procedure of Dl, QP, M build, and Volume are satisfactory requirements for
normal programmes, where time is adequate, but the demands of fast-track projects
conflict with this procedure. Suppliers are required, from Dl onwards, to provide a
Supplier Component Status Report (SCSR) at each development phase, as a project
control and component quality record. These records are used by Rover both for project
control and future auditing. As the project manager emphasised in one interview: "it is
hard enough to get the parts produced to short schedules, let alone jump over all the
paperwork requirements of RG2000." BUMPER argument that when Rover Sales and
Marketing want a product to enter a market window within 12 months, then SCSR,
control plans and so forth (requirements of RG2000) should be waived until a later date -
that is f the supplier has demonstrated a track record of meeting quality and delivery
reliability in the past. Otherwise, BUMPER may have to re-assess fast-track projects in
terms of their viability to meet procedure requirements.
Alongside the demands of Purchasing for SCSR's BUMPER is realising an increasing
demand from Rover's Logistics department. In response to this, BUMPER has
employed a full-time logistics person to ensure design engineers meet all schedule
commitments. Assigning a full-time person to this task has helped considerably,
particularly during the M-build phase when confirmation of completed tasks becomes a
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daily task. Delivery reliability is a paramount objective for preferred supplier status, and
the employment of someone to undertake this control reinforces this view at BUMPER.
Similarly, the project manager expressed the view that Rover's control plans for
drawings, flow paths and so forth, there is no one of these that will satisfy the
requirements of all projects: exceptions exist, and these should be firmly stated at the
beginning of any new project, and an account of this fact should be made by all
participants. The procedure has to be robust, yet flexible. At present, BUMPER
believes the plans are too rigid.
An example of this is the difference in part and process complexity. A mould trial for a
bumper means something completely different from a mould trial for door handles or
interior parts. Since a bumper is aesthetically critical, it needs to be as near perfect as
possible for the trial to be beneficial; this fact, plus the size of commodity, requires
minimum lead-times of between 2-4 weeks, whereas other components may be achieved
within a day. At present, the structure of the SCSR flow paths assumes one process path
can represent all suppliers, but this does not reflect the different processes in component
complexity.
BUMPER has practised an open-booking costing system for about 10 years. As a result,
it was easy for them to adapt to the demands of UK automotive companies for first tier
suppliers to adopt this system. The use of Effective Cost Management on Rover projects
had no dramatic affect on BUMPER, since they had already practised such a working
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system - although not in name - with the Cowley-based Purchasing department, before
ECM become standard practice.
8.2.3 Project ALPHA
The project management procedure outlined above typifies the early involvement of
BUMPER in the design process with Rover. A variation to this procedure, however,
illustrates how the design relationship, and its management, can be affected by early
involvement. Project ALPHA, although possibly an extreme case, demonstrates how the
process develops if, first, earlier supplier involvement is sought for an exterior body part,
and second, the project is a fast-track programme.
ALPHA was a small car facelift project. It began in 1993, for planned volume in 1995.
ALPHA was subtly different from normal Rover projects, since the Styling group had
initiated the drive to undertake the styling change, and BUMPER were involved from the
outset. A Styling engineer was nominated to explore the feasibility of several concepts,
and the project manager at BUMPER was asked to support this process, particularly
since it was to be a fast-track project, and decisions had to be quickly made for
presenting a package to the Rover Board. BUMPER brought in a toolmaker to assist in
the feasibility study.
The initial meetings were based around a clay model, where various ideas were iterated.
The project manager (BUMPER) set about building the cost information, without the
Sales team (which was unusual) but following the standard procedure at BTJMPER. The
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reason for this was to meet a deadline set by Rover Engineering and Styling to present
the overall costs to the Rover Board. Normally, cost packs are sent to BUMPER, and
the project manager would build a quotation with the Sales department. The cost
information was very broad, based on worse cost and ideal cost scenarios, which
outlined a budget that could be presented. Since the project was to be a short
development cycle, the presentation included a full breakdown of feasibility, prototypes,
costs, ancillary equipment, packaging, tooling, product design and detail (based on
BUMPER undertaking the work), material selection, and timing.
Once ALPHA had been approved, a project team was formed consisting of the Styling
engineer, a design engineer, a purchasing agent, the BUMPER project manager, and the
toolmaker. The project was to re-design the front-end of an established small car. Two
obstacles were immediately apparent: first, the small car was notoriously one of Rover's
worst body designs (in terms of dimensional stability); and second, the dimensions were
not held on the CAD database, and few of the drawings were available too. The Styling
engineer and BUMPER's project manager arranged a meeting with the toolmaker and
design engineer, and as a group they devised a way of achieving a design from the clay
model that the toolmaker could develop the tooling from. The steps taken were: first, to
digitise the styling clay model; second, BUMPER's guest engineer detailed crude layouts
of both the front and rear bumpers in three weeks; and third, this information was passed
to the toolmaker who hand-made two models of the bumpers. When the Styling
engineer, project manager, purchasing agent and toolmaker were all satisfied with the
product integrity, sign-off was approved and these models were then re-digitised. The
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data was then re-smoothed (re-drawn), so that the drawing matched up with the tooling
points. The two models were then scanned to produce cutter paths for the tools.
Parallel to this process, once the models had been signed-off as being visually acceptable
to Styling, a full stacking exercise was undertaken at the toolmakers. (A stacking
exercise is a type of prototype-build-test cycle, for establishing the progress of work for
the entire programme.) A new bonnet was prepared by Rover, and two fenders were
taken that had been validated by engineering. These parts were then hung around a
frame together with models of the bumpers, headlamps, and grille (another BUMPER
responsibility). This provided an occasion for all participants (including body-in-white)
to establish the level of fit, particularly since with such a fast track programme, there was
little time to stand back, look, check and assess everything. The whole exercise took
around 8-10 hours, with a number of follow-up actions for all participants to undertake.
This stacking exercise provided an important opportunity to coordinate everyone's
involvement, as well as ensuring a robust direction for moving downstream with the
project. The view of the project manager was that this opportunity to interact is
absolutely crucial for the success of a fast-track programme. Once everyone was
satisfied that the project was viable, further engineering detail was developed, and
tooling continued. The need to respond to engineering changes was constant throughout
the project. Information was being constantly exchanged between Rover, BUMPER and
the toolmaker on a daily basis (using telephone, fax, and informal face-to-face visits),
such as changes to the tools and providing the engineering detail for the B' surface
design. This continued and status meetings were held, initially fortnightly, until a
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consensus decision was taken by the team that the intensity and frequency of information
exchanges between the three companies could be relaxed. Thereafter, meetings were
returned to the normal monthly design reviews.
Rover felt that with the compressed development programme, there was no time for any
prototyping, and there would be no initial engineering validation (Dl) event. AL P1-IA
moved directly from product development (D02) into quality proving (QP). This
decision created some problems. First, a new department had been established at Rover
since the project began - Complex Quality Department (CQD). CQD attended one of
the monthly status meeting and requested BUMPER to initiate a QP event - parts
produced off tools and off production equipment. BUMPER argued that CQD could
call the next phase a QP build, but from BUMPER's point of view, this would still be a
Dl event, if not something more upstream.
At the time of interview (April/May 1994), the QP event (Rover's interpretation) bad
just taken place - three days ahead of schedule. There was no slippage in the
programme. The process had taken approximately 12 months from feasibility to off-
tools production (QP). In April 1993, initial discussions had begun with Styling, and the
effective starting point had been the feasibility study in June 1993.
The project manager viewed building a capable team as paramount for the success of a
fast-track project like ALPHA BUMPER had worked on a previous Rover fast-track
project for a sports car bumper. This was achieved in only nine months. Unfortunately,
some Rover staff believed this demonstrated the way forward in shortening bumper
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development; however, the time compression could only be achieved because all of the
body-in-white information was available as CAD data, and it was only for the
development of one bumper. The bumper had been changed using existing body-in-
white information, thus the top-line, bottom-line and mating faces on the body surfaces
(using existing pick-up points) could be quickly established. In the project manager's
view, the only possibility of achieving faster lead-times is to freeze the body-in-white
information earlier, and to get it right first time.
One hindrance to forging stronger relationships with Rover is that there is a high
turnover of staff on projects. BUMPER reckons on 3-6 months to develop the trust and
dialogue required for a design and development team. They have an excellent working
relationship with Styling, Engineering, and Purchasing. However, in the past, BUMPER
has found a high turnover of purchasing agents involved through the course of
programmes. On ALPHA there was only one purchasing agent, but for another car
project there were two purchasing agents, and for a Land Rover project there had been
at least three or four. This can cause problems because new purchasing representatives
frequently ask for justifications of decisions made over a year before.
At QP phase of ALPI-LA, BUMPER had still not received a fully released production
drawing from Rover. This was causing knock-on affects. The demands of RG2000
required SCSR's to be completed with an issue number, but since none had been
released, BUMPER was having to complete forms with 'no formal release of drawing yet'
written in place of a part number. (At the time of QP, the only drawings for ALPHA in
BUMPER's possession were their own digitised originals.) This was contrary to
273
BS5750 which required a fully released drawing, before tooling could commence, or
ancillary equipment could be purchased. However, by waiting, the delivery schedule
would be missed. This situation illustrates BUMPER's view that there needs to be a
greater degree of flexibility within the existing Rover system to accommodate such
programmes.
BUMPER also found that they were frequently asked to achieve cost downs in ALPHA.
They reduced costs in excess of £70-80,000 from the initial quote, some of which meant
that expenditure on ancillary equipment could not occur until after QP, which went
contrary to the requirements of RG2000. The original plan was to scan the model for
NC cutter paths, to cut two foam moulds, and cast back from these for ancillary
equipment. However, this was waived until M-build. However, this course of action
had been agreed in meetings (and minuted) in order to drop a further £12,000 from
model making. The proviso was that ancillary equipment would be delivered for in time
for M-build. One result of this was a strained relationship between BUMPER and
Rover: some parties within Rover deemed BUMPER to be a supplier that was failing to
meet the official instructions - not adhering to the SCSR instructions - despite the reality
of BUMPER having a minuted agreement on this course of action.
Another cost reducing measure met with an unfavourable response downstream.
BUMPER accommodated many changes in the development approach to assist in
reducing the total cost of ALPHA. For example, the grille was put together using push
nuts, instead of the more usual heat-staking method. This saved £20-30,000 to the
budget. However, questions were raised by downstream operations as to why the heat-
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staker method had not been used. The suggestion of fixing had again been by team
consensus, and was deemed the best solution to meeting the engineering and budget
requirements.
BUMPER found that early in the design process of ALPHA there was a high degree of
trust in making decisions over the project. However, the further towards volume the
project proceeded, the more they were being asked to carefully minute the decisions of
meetings, to safeguard these for future discussions. There appeared to be a changing
relationship, because of RG2000 demands and the lack of continuity through the process
from Rover staff
8.2.4 Summary of BUMPER
BUMPER is a preferred supplier of Rover and supplies all of Rover's bumper
requirements. Rover is a major customer (together with Honda-version vehicles) and the
aftermarket. BUMPER has supplied Rover for over 20 years, and has developed a close
working design relationship for over a decade. The main features of BUMPER's project
management approach are presented in table 8.1. The process is contract driven, and is
defined by the requirements of each customer's project management milestones. This
follows a standard approach to managing all contracts, but is non-documented. The key
mechanisms of this approach are the customer's milestones (stage gates), a dominant
manager who oversees all projects, and a long-standing tripartite relationship between
BUMPER, Rover and a toolmaker. BUMPER undertakes a design projects in response
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to customer requests. These may be as a reply to a specification, or as an early input at
the concept stage of a new project.
Table 8.1	 Summary of BUMPER's approach to project management
....	
BUMP ER.'ti...
Characterisation of process
	
Contract driven (flexible procedure)
Dominant characteristics
Key mechanisms
Major phases in a development project
Dominant type of project
Typical project duration (months)
Primary performance drivers
Project team focus, with dominant project
manager
Contract.
Project manager overseeing all projects.
Long-standing, tripartite relationship
between Rover, BUMPER, and
Toolmaker.
Phases defined by customer's process
(milestones are the same as Rover's)
Evolutions/all types (model year changes;
experimental)
12-18 (Rover)
36-48 (Land Rover)
Delivery reliability;
Speed;
Aesthetic conformance
Formality of process	 Standardised, non-documented overall
process - flexible for each contract.
Procedures conform to BS5750 and
RG2000.
A bumper is an aesthetic critical element of the total vehicle integrity and, as such, the
design authority clearly resides with Rover. However, in order to ensure a close parity
to style and to facilitate downstream requirements, BUMPER has based an employee
permanently within Rover. BUMPER is accredited to BS5750 and currently meets the
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requirements of RG2000. BUMPER's primary performance drivers are reliability in
delivering the final product for assembly, and hence each customer milestone - crucial for
RG2000 accreditation, aesthetic conformance to the vehicle integrity, and speed of
product delivery.
BUMPER uses both technical and organisational mechanisms in their exchange of design
information. CAD information is exchanged, but their guest engineer uses the CAD
system on site at Rover. Of major importance to BUMPER is the effective delivery and
iteration of information, when necessary. Hence, BUMPER believes that for their
product, telephone, facsimile and face-to-face meetings are the crucial mechanisms.
Similarly, in the early stages of development, discussions are almost daily, whilst later the
monthly status meetings are adequate mechanisms - unresolved tooling payments,
notwithstanding. Finally, the stacking exercise is seen as an importance integration
mechanism, since the whole product with all interfacing elements can be examined.
BUMPER has identified some problems in its design relationship with Rover. These
revolve around the purchasing interface. First, the delayed payment for tooling work
unnecessarily impacts upon the project review meetings with Rover and toolmaker, and
places stress on an otherwise satisfactory and long-standing relationship. Second, in the
case of project ALPHA, the speed of delivery necessitated non-conformance to RG2000.
Despite assurances that this course of action received Rover authority, ill-feeling had
arisen over a non-SCSR routine. Finally, the high turnover of purchasing staff at Rover
experienced over several projects was frustrating to BUMPER, not least because a
knock-on effect was the inevitable return to previous decisions made or re-negotiations.
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8.3 DRIVE-SHAFT (Case 2)
DRIVE-SHAFT is a major Original Equipment Manufacturer of drive shafts to the world
automotive industry, and is located in Birmingham. It employs over 1,000 people in
Birmingham and has a turnover of over £80 million (1993). It is a subsidiary of a UK
parent, which has operations in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the USA. The parent
has three R&D centres (UK, Germany and USA) that support the line companies. The
main customers of DRIVE-SHAFT include Rover, Honda, Toyota, Nissan, Ford and
Chrysler.	 Rover is one of DRIVE-SHAFT's major customers, commanding
approximately 40 per cent of sales; significantly, the Japanese vehicle manufacturers' UK
transplants account for one-third of sales and is a growing segment of work. They have
only one competitor in Europe - a GM subsidiary - and therefore have no independent
competition. Ford has its own internal production line for drive shafts, but they use
DRIVE-SHAFT's expertise for design work.
8.3.1 Project management organisation
Since 1989, DRIVE-SI-TAFT has undergone three re-organisations of its product
development organisation. The first change occurred between 1989-91, when the
company was traditionally organised with several functional areas interfacing with
customers in product development (figure 8.2a). Individual functional departments
existed for Sales (Commercial), Product Engineering, Product Testing, Design and
Development, Jig and Tool, and Quality.
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Figure 8.2 Product development re-organisation at DRIVE-SHAFT
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Between 1992/93, a closer focus towards teamwork was sought and Product
Engineering Teams (PET) were created (figure 8.2b). Each team was given the
responsibility to deliver a project from the concept stage through to volume production
levels of approximately 10,000 units. Each PET consisted of a team leader (also an
applications specialist); a design engineer; a draughtsman; and a quality engineer. Under
this structure, Sales was still a separate function, as were the manufacturing engineers -
who were seconded onto projects as required. Jig and Tool also remained separate. In
1993, product engineering was again re-organised, but towards an individual customer
orientation (figure 8.2c). There are currently six Customer Business Units (CBU), one
each serving: Rover; Honda; Toyota; Nissan; Chrysler and others; and Ford. Each CBU
consists of a team of three: a team leader; a sales executive; and a draughtsman. (There
are three sales executives for the six teams.) Each CBU is co-located alongside the other
CBU's. The only separation of activities is the CAD terminal for the draughtsman. Each
CBU has a dedicated CAD terminal, but these are pooled together in a central office
area. There a two Quality Engineers who serve all six CBU's, and they are located in the
centre of the same office. Every month, each CBU presents their project to the other
business unit team-leaders and the business unit director. This enables cross project
learning, as well as feedback of ideas.
DRIVE-SHAFT has five factories on site in Birmingham: four factory lines producing
individual component types, and one final assembly line. Each factory line has a
manager, a manufacturing engineer, a resident engineer, Jig and Tool stafl a
maintenance planner, and two or three maintenance engineers: The manager has the
main control, although the CBU team leader retains responsibility for volumes up to
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10,000 units. A resident engineer is located on each shop floor (these have been
dispersed from the PET's and have responsibility for product development links to each
CBU). Similarly, the manufacturing engineers have been dispersed from a central core to
each shop floor. Each factory has its own Jig and Tool section. To maintain product
development links between the factory lines and the CBU's, there is a CAD terminal
located in each factory for Jig and Tool, the manufacturing engineers, and the resident
engineers.
In February 1994, DRIVE-SHAFT located a guest engineer in the Engineering
department at Rover's Longbridge plant for two days per week. This move was the
suggestion of DRIVE-SHAFT in order to maintain close design and development links.
This was in response to the retirement of the Rover Design Engineer who had sole
design responsibility within Rover for drive shafts. His retirement meant a major loss of
drive shaft design knowledge, hence the suggestion of DRIVE-SHAFT to locate a guest
engineer within Rover. DRIVE-SHAFT bad been successfully operating a guest
engineer at Nissan since September 1993, where he was working four days per week.
The guest engineers feedback product development opinions to each business unit.
However, one drawback that DRIVE-SHAFT is experiencing with the guest engineer is
that the customer tends to involve them in day-to-day operations, thus diminishing the
amount of time spent on product development work. Figure 8.3 distinguishes between
the two guest engineers. The Rover guest engineer is biased towards design engineering
tasks, whereas the Nissan guest engineer is more oriented towards quality control tasks.
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Figure 8.3 DRIVE-SHAFT's guest engineers
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DRIVE-SHAFT's parent company has a Standard's Committee, which meets bi-monthly
and is made up of one representative from each line company. Its purpose if to ensure
manufacturing, quality and design standards are being met within the company, and best
practice is being operated.
8.3.2 Design relationship with Rover
Requests from Rover for quotations for new projects typically involved discussions
between DRIVE-SHAFT's Rover Business Unit (sales executive and team leader), and
Rover's purchasing agent and staff engineer. (Since there is a high carry-over of parts,
and the commodity is a mature product, the knowledge and experience of the staff
engineer is preferred over a design engineer in the very early negotiations.) However,
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the introduction of a guest engineer in Rover, has drawn his expertise into these
discussions.
DRIVE-SHAFT normally receives a well-defined specification for a new project, with a
large number of carry-over parts (typically 75 per cent). The commodity is well-
established and, therefore, only requires minor changes to it for each programme. Also,
there is very little difference in the way each new project is managed between Rover and
DRIVE-SHAFT. The major changes for new projects tend to be packaging-related
(such as the length of shaft required). The specification Rover issues typically includes
volume versus engine specifications, engine timings, and other vehicle data (such as
engine and gearbox data). DRIVE-SHAFT analyses this data and usually forwards a
design proposal within six weeks, which involves a joint meeting as outlined above. One
week prior to this, DRIVE-SHAFT has an internal review meeting to put forward any
required changes. As a preferred supplier, their proposal normally meets Rover's
requirements. Although a preferred supplier, DRIVE-SHAFT stressed that they do not
operate an open-book cost accounting system with Rover.
Once a contract has been agreed, project meetings occur each month, and continue with
exchanges between the CBU, Rover's purchasing agent, and a Rover design engineer (in
place of the staff engineer). Prototype drawings are undertaken between DO and Dl
phases, with parallel discussions continuing on product piece price, tooling, and
production control. The sign-off of production drawings occurs at Dl, and represents
the drawing as intended. Pre-production (QP to M-build) occurs in close cooperation
with the resident engineer on the factory line (as mentioned above). This engineer
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collaborates closely with the CBU and can be viewed as a manufacturing mutual
adjustment mechanism. In general, DRIVE-SHAFT uses common procedures across all
CBU's for project management, such as project timing plans, and prototype raising order
procedures. However the management of the interface with each customer differs by
business unit. In this way, the customer's requirements are centred on a few, familiar
people, but control of the process conforms to company policy.
8.3.3 Summary of DRIVE-SHAFT
DRIVE-SHAFT is a preferred supplier of Rover and supplies all of Rover's drive-shaft
requirements. Rover has been a major customer for over 20 years, and DRIVE-SHAFT
has been working closely in design work with Rover for over a decade. They design and
supply proprietary technology, with design authority residing clearly with themselves.
Since their product is mature, with 75% of parts typically being carried over from each
model, roduct development tends to be incremental. Due to this level of carry-over
parts, Rover includes the staff engineer responsible for liaison with DRIVE-SHAFT in
the early discussions on product development; however, once the contract is confirmed,
a design engineer takes over from the staff engineer.
The main features of DRIVE-SHAFT's project management approach are presented in
table 8.2. There are customer oriented business units, each of which consists of a core
team of three staff (team leader, sales executive and draughtsman), and there is a resident
engineer on each product line to ensure functional support. The business units are co-
located. The development process for each business unit follows that of their respective
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customer, within an overall corporate project management approach that includes
common, formalised procedures, such as project timing plans, and prototypes raising
orders.
Table 8.2	 Summary of DRIVE-SHAFT's approach to project management
an aemn.Elem Y!..:ILl.I.tu.....
Characterisation of process
	
Customer oriented business units
Dominant characteristics
Key mechanisms
Major phases in a development project
Dominant type of project
Typical project duration (months)
Primary performance drivers
Formality of process
Core team of 3 staff (team leader, sales
executive and draughtsman); co-located.
Liaison with functional support (resident
engineer).
Cross-project learning through monthly
review meeting (internal coordination).
CAD facilities and resident engineer in all
product areas to facilitate integration.
Phases follow customer's process
Incremental (mature product)
N/A
Delivery reliability;
Functional conformance;
'Best practice' (manufacturing, quality and
design)
Common formalised procedures, such as
project timing plans, prototype raising
orders.
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A key integration mechanism is the cross-project learning exercise each month that
enables each business unit to feed ideas into each other and maintain their collective
knowledge for the benefit of all customers. Internal integration is more important to
DRIVE-SHAFT, than external integration, after the contract has been secured.
Therefore, DRJVE-SHAFT has given product development responsibility to resident
engineers at the shopfioor, to work alongside manufacturing engineers, and jig and tool
engineers. In addition, there is a CAD terminal located at each factory line, facilitating
links to the business units. The main external mechanisms are a monthly review meeting
with Rover, and a guest engineer residing in Rover for two days per week. The choice
of this second mechanism was in response to Rover losing its own internal drive-shaft
expertise through retirement. DRIVE-SHAFT realised a need for drive-shaft expertise in
other design activities, and suggested the use of a guest engineer. However, a drawback
to this has been the guest engineer's involvement in day-to-day operations that Rover
employees seek. The primary performance drivers of DRIVE-SHAFT are delivery
reliability of the final product, functional confbnnance and achieving best practice in
manufacturing, quality and design - a corporate wide goal.
8.4 ELECTRICAL (Case 3)
ELECTRICAL is a division of a UK conglomerate, located in the North Midlands. It is
a Preferred Supplier to the Rover Group. ELECTRICAL is divided into five business
units, based around: wiring harnesses, fusebox and components (including electrical
connectors), high tension and battery leads, cable, and light leads (in which it is a second
tier supplier). In 1990 it formed a joint venture with a Japanese harness manufacturer,
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and they have a trading relationship in which ELECTRICAL sells cable and components
to the Japanese partner and contracts services (such as corporate marketing, engineering,
and computer services). Both companies are managed by the same management team.
The main customers of ELECTRICAL are Rover Cars, Land Rover, Honda, Toyota,
Jaguar, and several others; in addition, it also supplies to domestic cable customers and
tier two suppliers (such as they have tier one suppliers as their customers, not the vehicle
manufacturers). In 1993/94, ELECTRICAL and its Japanese partner jointly provided
over 80 per cent of Rover's harnessing requirements. Both companies supply harnesses
to Rover, but the joint venture was established to support and supply the harnesses for
the Japanese-based vehicles of Rover - Rover 200/400/600, and the Honda Concerto
which Rover built for Honda. The Rover harnesses supplied by ELECTRICAL are
solely for Rover designed vehicles, namely: Land Rover, Range Rover, Maestro, and
Rover 800. (For the purposes of this thesis, only the wiring harness operations of
ELECTRICAL are examined.) Management of the wiring harness is a production
critical task. The harness is one of the final component systems to receive sign-ofi yet is
one of the first elements of the vehicle to be installed on the assembly track. Therefore
control of the overall process is paramount to both the supplier and the customer.
8.4.1 Organisation changes to facilitate project management
Prior to 1989, ELECTRICAL was functionally organised, but in an effort to improve
new product introduction, they began to use multi-functional teams. As a result, they
devolved operational activities into the production units and created separate business
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units. Each business unit reports through to the General Manager on a monthly basis
and, in order to deliver their expected capabilities, engineering and sales account teams
were devolving to each business unit in 1994. ELECTRICAL's introduction to multi-
functional teams was a result of the Rover 200/400 programme in 1989. During volume
ramp-up, a disaster was narrowly averted. Major lessons were learnt from a project that
consisted of a new car, on a new site, and with a new labour force. In particular,
ELECTRICAL learned much about multi-functional teams. Although there had been a
multi-functional team for the 200/400 programme, it had been badly formed,
inadequately resourced, and poorly planned - although ELECTRICAL believed it had
been planned well at the time. In order to complete the programme, ELECTRICAL
needed to import management staff from the parent company, but since it was such a big
issue with Rover, ELECTRICAL revisited the programme through a post-project
appraisal, and augmented changes to their project management process.
Each business unit has the responsibility for manufacturing, engineering, sales,
administration and finance. All operational elements are therefore controlled by the
business units. Engineering has responsibility for new product introduction across all of
the business unit functions. All business unit engineering activities have been devolved,
except for a small nucleus - essentially the advanced engineering activities (such as the
test laboratory which was too small to distribute out) - which acts as a central resource.
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8.4.2 Project management
ELECTRICAL has a clearly defined project management process. This was first
established in the harness business unit since this is where most projects are undertake; in
reality, every model year change requires a new wiring harness, whereas for high tension
leads, changes are not made until the end of an engine programme life cycle. Generally,
60% of a harness can be carried-over from previous model years, in which case the
engineering resource may only be part of a person. However, in the case of Land Rover
specials (where there are specific country variants of vehicle) or different engines
requiring specific engine harnesses, there will be fewer carry-over elements.
Figure 8.4 indicates the main elements of the process. There is a high level of control,
consisting of nine main points, over five stages: opportunity evaluation,
design/development, validation, implementation, and support. (Rover's key milestones
have been placed on figure 8.4, for comparison). It is the customer's delivery dates that
drive each cycle. The previous project management process followed this overall
procedure but it was performed informally, with review stages only being undertaken if
necessary. This meant that each gate either consisted of a formal review meeting or a
document sign-off. The present system requires both a formal review meeting and
document sign-off.
For ELECTRICAL, the key process event is the overlap between design/development
and validation. After every audit build, there are major engineering changes, which
become critical if Rover delays the programme build phase. In one project,
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ELECTRICAL had to cope with over 2,000 engineering changes over a two month
period, although 20% of these originated from within ELECTRICAL. Much of their
design activity is about ensuring the product can be produced to the requisite process.
Electrical harnesses can be produced by two methods: a fixed board, which is very labour
intensive and slow, or a carousel which is faster, but less flexible. Each time an
engineering change is requested, the project manager has to consider the likely impact on
the available processes. One adaptation ELECTRICAL is making to their design work is
the use of optimised designs, which will enable them more options to accommodate
changes. By building flexibility into the product, ELECTRICAL believes they can
maintain a quick response to Rover's schedule demands. Both Rover's engineering and
purchasing departments are in favour of this optimised design route, because of the
critical time pressures in delivering the harness.
The project management process identifies the skill requirements of each team member,
and where in the project cycle they are to be used (fiJi-time or part-time): this assists the
creation of a resource profile. Figure 8.5 provides an example of a profile for a harness
project. A harness project for ELECTRICAL is fundamentally a manufacturing facilities
engineering process, rather than a product development and design process; hence, a
project manager is not required to make a major input until after the programme has
already begun.
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Figure 8.4 Project management process at ELECTRICAL
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Figure 8.5 Team profile for ELECTRICAL projects
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292
ELECTRICAL has approximately 12-15 design engineers who can be called upon to
work on a project team. At any one time, there will be approximately 8-9 projects in
harness that are significant enough to warrant the formation of a project team. Since the
potential members of the team have other responsibilities, a team will only be formalised
when a development activity has been approved to be undertaken. The assigning of a
project manager and a team does not occur at the same time for all projects. For
example, in Land Rover projects, there may not be a project team formed early on, but a
group of people may well have been identified for it, since ELECTRICAL has staff
permanently working on Land Rover projects. In addition, there is a senior project
manager who oversees all Land Rover projects.
In 1994, ELECTRICAL was trying to co-locate the core team adjacent to the
manufacturing operations. A crucial issue with this decision was that if the design
(guest) engineer was spending most of his time at a CAD terminal, then his desk must be
co-locatd with the team. Sixty per cent of the teams are housed adjacent to production,
rather than sitting them in an ivory tower away from production. In this way, the design
team can be close enough in order to raise issues easily with production. The project
team maintains responsibility for the project into volume ramp-up, where there is a
steady state - normally at volume and 90 days thereafter.
In the past, the customer would design the wiring harness and deliver a detailed drawing
to ELECTRICAL, for them to manufacture and deliver the final commodity. The
present process is essentially the same, insofar as ELECTRICAL is concerned with
preparing to manufacture at capacity and deliver harnesses to the customer. Their main
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concern is to ensure manufacturing engineering input upstream in the process. By
undertaking design engineering in-house, the design process has shifted the overlap of
the customer from where it once was.
The Quality and Engineering Manager emphasised the importance of bringing the design
work in-house, as follows:
Now, ELECTRICAL is able to provide the cover for that element of the process
[design and development] so that it is true simultaneous engineering. The front
end of the process is about preparing the design for manufacture, and making
sure that the customer doesn't botch up this so that it is awkward for
manufacturing to make - which has previously been the cause of putting all of the
costs up. That is the theoiy, and in reality it is actually the truth l It does work,
so it is a win-win situation.
8.4.3 Design relationship with Rover
There are monthly project review meetings with engineering, purchasing and logistics
staff from Rover ELECTRICAL has an excellent working relationship with Rover,
evident by the use of guest engineers and confidence within Rover's logistics department
to issue very late engineering changes. The logistical requirements of ELECTRICAL are
well understood by Rover such that changes to the design can occur up to a very late
stage with Rover being confident that delivery of finished harnesses will not be affected.
The Commercial director attributes this to having guest engineers working closely inside
Rover, and having dedicated project teams who have gained the trust of the people they
deal with at Rover.
The original undertaking of design and development work by ELECTRICAL for Rover
was a result of Rover depleting its expertise in electrical engineering (at least at
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component design engineer level). ELECTRICAL proposed the idea of a guest engineer
to work within Rover's project management structure, thereby using their expertise to
have an early input into the design process. The use of guest engineers means that there
is constant feedback about a project to ELECTRICAL, which helps compress the
development time, which further assists ramp-up because they know what to expect.
The previous system meant that ELECTRICAL would critique the drawings for errors,
or ask for technical details to check functional loading. They were not empowered with
the authority, but such comments were necessaiy to reduce the number of engineering
changes downstream. The adoption of guest engineering means that they are now
empowered to do this.
It was as a direct result of working with their Japanese partner that ELECTRICAL
suggested putting guest engineers into Rover. This policy has spread and they now have
guest engineers in Honda, Jaguar, Land Rover, Rolls Royce and Massey Ferguson. The
reasoning behind using the guest engineer in Rover was to improve the new product
introduction process, by getting involved at a time when ELECTRICAL could influence
the customer: at least that was their perception. The crucial reasoning was emphasised
by the Commercial Director as follows: "If customers want tighter time-scales, but keep
producing badly designed harnesses, how can we stop them doing that? One way of
doing this is to put a guest engineer into the customer".
The placement of guest engineers in Rover, by ELECTRICAL, has not been without
concerns. They are located inside Rover to work on a current model year, but
increasingly, they are diverted into performing other tasks for Rover. An issue for
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ELECTRICAL is whether to control their guest engineers, or to let them get as involved
as much as they possibly can, thus becoming fully integrated within Rover, and
commenting on future projects to assist design for manufacture. If no formal contract
exists, how far should their staff contribute?
This highlights a key commercial issue for ELECTRICAL. When they introduced the
guest engineer concept into Rover, the purchasing staff helped develop the current
process of design relationship, and supported the venture. This group of staff has
changed, and with it a different perspective that does not appear to understand the level
of ELECTRICAL's engineering commitment to Rover's business. The guest engineer
concept has assisted in developing the idea of partnership, but ELECTRICAL is worried
that this may gradually be eroded. One result of this uncertainty is that ELECTRICAL is
changing their operating procedures on development work. They are keeping track of the
time they undertake on development and prototype work, and will charge it back to
Rover if they do not finally receive the contract. At the same time, design engineers
within Rover are wanting to see another guest engineer brought in.
This raises another issue of clarii'ing exactly what ELECTRICAL's involvement is
about. Giving ELECTRICAL the money to refund the time that their personnel have
spent is one issue, but their key business is not to perform development work, but to
manufacture wiring harnesses. Their expertise and experience used early in the design
process enables design costs to be reduced from the start, and they perform this work to
assist their manufacturing operations. If their share of manufacturing business is
reduced, the guest engineer will become a redundant coordination mechanism.
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8.4.4 Project BETA
BETA is a Land Rover project which involved developing a composite harness for a
model year change of several of the Land Rover products. ELECTRICAL met with
Rover in late 1992 to discuss BETA, and the project was reaching ramp-up in late 1994.
The original specification was to develop three harnesses, but early in development, this
was reduced to two. Hence, a number of deviations (changes) were received early on, as
the third vehicle's related elements were removed from the composite design.
Table 8.3 illustrates a summary of the number of deviations received through the
development of BETA. Some of these deviations were proposed by ELECTRICAL, to
meet manufacturing engineering requirements, whilst the majority originated from Rover.
These deviations are compiled for the composite harness, but do not reflect the number
of extra phases introduced for BETA. ELECTRICAL is finding increasingly that Rover
is adding to the number of project phases. For example, during BETA, extra engineering
validation phases (D12 and D13) were added to one of the BETA models, due to crash
test failures. This brought forward the M-build by four weeks, and QP and M-build were
run concurrently, since QP was off-tooling and M-build was off-tool and process. One
dis-benefit of the extra build phase is an increased number of engineering deviations.
Rover often raise more deviations because the extra event provides the opportunity to do
this; however, for ELECTRICAL, these may be unnecessary changes. In addition, they
find that many raised deviations are in fact incorrect. In 1994, for example, a drawing
issued to ELECTRIC from Land Rover was 3 modifications old: a difference that the
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product management database at Rover should have indicated if the latest release
drawings are being used.
Table 8.3	 Number of project deviations in BETA (by
	
origin)
Project phase	 ELECTRICAL	 ROVER
Product development (D02)	 0	 139
Engineering validation (Dl)
	
24	 178
Quality proving (QP) 	 73	 345
Manufacturing build	 50	 293
Advanced volume/ Volume	 10	 121
Total number of deviations
requested
	 1233
Some of these deviations were received as Rover undertook an initial static build and
chose to re-route the harness through the bulk head, rather than the side panels as
originally specified, in order to accommodate the inclusion of ABS, cruise controls and
other elements. Further deviations were the result of an initial crash test failure, which
required the re-routing of the harness as strengthening panels were added.
One problem ELECTRICAL faced on BETA was the high turnover of Rover purchasing
staff they liaised with. Over an 18 month period from 1993 to late 1994, ELECTRICAL
experienced three changes of purchase agent on BETA. This created tension in the
relationship since there was a knock-on effect with payment procedures. The first
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purchase agent had agreed to the tooling and pricing at Dl. However, he moved jobs
arid his replacement insisted on making changes to the previously agreed procedures.
This person then moved, and a third person repeated the same exercise. Whilst
ELECTRICAL was issued a letter of intent to proceed with tooling, it took them over
12 months to receive payment for this work. ELECTRICAL's experience is that their
engineers sign-off a part, Rover receive the parts, and as purchasing are about to sign-off
the part, the responsible person moves.
Due to the number of deviations received during BETA, ELECTRICAL proposed a
post-project review of BETA to Rover. A multi-disciplinary team of Rover and
ELECTRICAL staff has been established to examine the procedures and structures for
improving product development cooperation.
8.4.5 Summary of ELECTRICAL
ELECTRICAL is a preferred supplier of Rover and is the sole supplier of electrical
harnesses to Rover. Rover has been a major customer for over 20 years, and
ELECTRICAL has been increasing its design contribution to Rover for over a decade,
especially as Rover reduced its own internal competence to design and develop electrical
harnesses. They now retain design authority over this component system, and since it is
liable to receive substantial engineering changes, ELECTRICAL has 10 guest engineers
permanently based at Rover, to try and pre-empt minor corrections, and to facilitate early
feedback of design. In addition, there is a chief project manager with responsibility for
Land Rover projects, since there is a high turnover of special orders requiring unique
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harness configurations. The need to reduce the time taken in engineering changes,
ELECTRICAL is considering moving towards optimising the design of harnesses thereby
building-in flexible configurations.
The main features of ELECTRICAL's project management approach are presented in
table 8.4. The process is based on phases and gates, with a key driving force being to
meet the needs of manufacturing-engineering. It is well defined and documented, with
five phases and nine review gates. One of the key activities is the overlap between
design/development and engineering validation. There are multi-functional teams, based
around business units, such as harness. It was a result of an established close relationship
with Rover that led to the introduction of multi-functional teams within ELECTRICAL.
Engineering activities are centred around each business unit - except for a core of
engineering services that are too small to warrant devolution - and design engineers are
co-located with manufacturing engineers.
The key mechanisms that ELECTRICAL use for internal integration are the co-location
of design and manufacturing engineers, multi-functional teams, based in business units,
and a senior project manager to oversee Land Rover projects. All of these mechanisms
have the objective of assisting manufacturing engineering, since the final engineering
sign-off tends to occur just prior to production, and speed of final delivery is important.
Liaising with Rover, ELECTRICAL has adopted a guest engineer approach in order to
facilitate design for manufacture as early upstream as possible. The primary performance
drivers of ELECTRICAL are delivery reliability and speed in responding to engineering
changes.
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Table 8.4	 Summary of ELECTRICAL's approach to project management
Project Management Elements
	
ELECTRICAL's features
Charactensation of process	 Phases and gates to meet manufacturing-
engineering's needs
Dominant characteristics
Key mechanisms
Major phases in a development project
Dominant type of project
Typical project duration (months)
Primary performance drivers
Formality of process
Multi-functional teams, based in business
units.
Engineering activities devolved to each
business unit, except a core of engineering
services.
Senior project manager.
Senior management review at milestones.
Co-location of design and manufacturing
engineers.
Use of guest engineers.
Overlap between design/development and
validation (concurrent engineering).
5 phases (with 9 review milestones):
1. Opportunity evaluation
2. Design/development
3. Validation
4. Implementation
5. Support
Evolutions, enhancements and incremental
improvements (model year changes); speed
is critical.
No typical project. (All vary)
Delivery reliability.
Speed (engineering change response)
Well defined and documented procedures.
8.5 EXHAUST (Case 4)
EXHAUST is a subsidiary of a UK private company, established in 1987. The parent
company designs, develops and manufactures Original Equipment (OE) products, such
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as fuel tank systems, exhaust systems, and catalytic converters. EXHAUST is based in
Coventry, and is predominantly a production site. The factory layout at EXHAUST has
dedicated lines, but is flexible for future models. EXHAUST works closely with another
division, based in Oxford, in developing exhaust systems and catalytic converters with its
customers. In 1994, EXHAUST had a turnover of over £30 million, and it produces
approximately 8,500 car sets (exhaust systems) per week. The main customers of
EXHAUST are Rover, Honda and Saab. For example, it produces the exhaust systems
for the Rover 200/400 (Honda Concerto), Rover Metro, Rover 600 (Honda Accord),
and Saab 900 and 9000 series, as well as catalytic converters for Rover 200/400, Rover
Metro, and Rover 600.
8.5.1 Product development
EXHAUST has adopted different design relationships with its customers. For example,
Saab prefers to design their own exhaust systems, relying on EXHAUST for process
engineering inputs. Honda, follows a similar procedure, designing their own exhaust
systems in Japan, and sending the drawings across to the UK. EXHAUST feeds back
design changes to Honda, but generally they find that these are not incorporated into the
latest designs, but find their way into future modifications or model changes. The design
procedure of Rover contrasts with both of these. Rover outlines the required scheme,
and relies on EXHAUST to design the complete system. Since 1993, Rover has given
complete design authority for the system to EXHAUST; previously, although
EXHAUST performed the design work, the authority for design remained with Rover.
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There is fierce competition in the OE market, and EXHAUST competes on the quality of
product, price, delivery reliability, response time in prototype build, its design capability,
and new product support. As a relatively small company, they are more reliant on
Rover, than many other companies are with their customers. However, EXHAUST sees
a major competitive edge for them is being able to respond quickly to Rover's needs and
to provide prototyping facilities and experience. They have two main competitors, both
UK based, of which one supplies Land Rover. However, each company has
concentrated on aligning itself with a few customers, with a result that there is very little
poaching of existing business, although they are still in competition with each other.
The project management process at EXHAUST consists of two stages. The first stage
involves product design and development, which is undertaken at the division's Oxford
site. The second stage is conducted by EXHAUST and involves the implementation
project to take the design forward to production. EXHAUST follows Rover's project
review phases very closely, with Dl and QP events being key activities. The commercial
function of the parent company is responsible for all quotations to customers.
At the outset of a project, a New Products Introduction Meeting is held regularly, with
representatives from engineering, production, quality, purchasing, and design. A total of
20-25 people are brought together into a project team for the entire process, but the
product engineering phase, at EXHAUST, requires 10-12 core members. A project team
typically represents engineering, sales, estimating, quality, production and purchasing.
The core team has representatives from both EXHAUST and its Oxford division, with a
project engineer from EXHAUST taking responsibility for coordination and timing.
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When the design is agreed, there are key dates for the build phases (aligned to customer
build requirements), and a Letter of Intent from Rover is issued for tooling. This
signifies the contract has been awarded. However, the Letter of Intent tends to be issued
late due to further engineering changes being demanded from Rover. (Rover has its own
tooling engineers who have an input into the design process, and advise on tooling
requirements.)
The design responsibility lies with the Oxford site. EXHAUST's design engineers have
close links with customers, frequently exchanging ideas, and visiting, for example, Rover
sites. A design review is held near to completion of the development stages, and
previous similar designs are reviewed alongside the new product. By late D02, workable
drawings are developed, and formal drawings are produced. There can be agreed late
product development due to changes from associated parts, but these require the
approval of EXHAUST. The design department is responsible for prototype testing
(Dl) and the Oxford site accommodates prototype workshops and testing equipment
(such as vibration, dynamic performance, acoustic performance, and engine power
testing equipment). There is close liaison between design engineers and manufacturing
staff. The design engineers all have working knowledge of the manufacturing processes,
and development staff have some manufacturing knowledge and experience. There is
constant feedback of ideas to prototype stage from manufacturing engineers.
The sample build procedure signifies the handing over of the project from design to
production. It involves three trial builds. The first quality proving build (QP) is run by
the project team in conjunction with the engineering department to set up and prove out
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the manufacturing process. The second trial build incorporates the production staff into
the core team, and the third trial build - advance volume build - is performed by the
production engineers at EXHAUST, to finally, prove the process. Afier QP, the project
team conducts a post-project review. The entire process is documented step-by-step in a
New Product Introduction Procedure, Timing Plan Procedure, and FMEA Procedure.
8.5.2 Summary of EXHAUST
EXHAUST is a preferred supplier of Rover and supplies a majority of Rover's car
exhausts. Rover is a major customer (together with Honda). The main features of
EXHAUST's project management approach are presented in table 8.5. The process is a
detailed phase and gate system, following Rover's own milestones. This reflects the
importance of Rover as a customer for design activities, since their other major
customers generally perform their own design work, relying upon EXHAUST for
production activities. Over the past seven years, EXHAUST has developed a close
working design relationship with Rover, and design authority now resides with the
design engineers of their sister company.
The project management process consists of two stages: product design and
development, focused on the sister division; and manufacturing implementation
performed by EXHAUST itself. This process is conducted by a cross-functional team
from both divisions, and the project manager is assigned from EXHAUST. The process
is formalised with documented procedures for new product introduction, timing plans,
and FMEA. EXHAUST develops evolutions, enhancements and incremental
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Tab'e 8.5	 Summary of EXHAUST's approach to project management
Project Management Elements	 EXHAUST's features
Characterisation of process
	
Phases and gates
Dominant characteristics
Key mechanisms
Cross-functional team.
Design responsibility focused on sister
division, with transfer to EXHAUST at
manufacturing implementation phase.
Project manager assigned from EXHAUST
to oversee entire process.
Design Review Meeting (Dl) between
EXHAUST and sister division, and Sample
Build Procedure (QP) are key activities.
Previous designs are formally examined.
Post-project review.
Major phases in a development project 	 2 stage phase (following Rover
milestones):
1. Product design and development
2. Manufacturing implementation
Dominant type of project
Typical project duration (months)
Primary performance drivers
Evolutions, enhancements and incremental
improvements (dependent on customer)
N/A
Delivery reliability; speed in prototype
build; design capabilities; new product
support
Formality of process	 Formalised/documented procedures:
New product introduction procedure;
Timing plan procedure;
FMEA procedure.
improvements to existing products, and all previous designs are consulted during each
new project. Finally, EXHAUST conducts a post-project review as part of their
continuous improvement programme. EXHAUST sees their primary performance
drivers as delivery reliability, design capability, new product support, but in particular for
design activities, their speed in prototype build. This latter point is supported by the
306
importance EXHAUST places on the design review meeting between the sister division
and itself at Dl, and the sample build procedure at QP.
Since EXHAUST received detailed specifications from Rover, their main concern is to
ensure internal integration between the sister division's design and development group,
and the manufacturing implementation team at EXHAUST. However, the sister division
maintains close liaison with Rover through regular visits, and from Rover's own tooling
engineers, advising on tooling requirements. In addition, there are monthly review
meetings between Rover and EXHAUST to advise on progress. Internal integration is
maintained through the cross-functional focus, and the role of the manufacturing oriented
project manager.
8.6 PLASTIC (Case 5)
PLASTIC is a manufacturer of small and medium size plastic injection mouldings (up to
1000 tonne machines). It has been a supplier of solely automotive parts since 1987,
providing both interior and exterior trim, and under-bonnet components, for example,
cooling system components, safety trays, speaker grilles, mirrors, sunroofs (secondary
supplier), wheel trims, and fascias.
PLASTIC has an annual turnover of between £15-20 million (1992/93), which has risen
from £12 million in 1988/89. The company employs 380 people (three times the number
it employed in the late 1980s) at Coventry, which is its sole UK site. It has a sister
company in France, which cooperates with French car companies. Both companies
307
design and manufacture independently, although along similar product lines;
nevertheless, there is cooperation in the design of speaker grilles.
The managing director of PLASTIC emphasised in an interview in 1994: "We do not
want to be the number one supplier of our product range alone, but want to share the top
with a few others companies." His view was that, in this way, a group of core suppliers
to the vehicle industry can have a greater portion of the automotive pie, and utilise their
expertise to a greater extent.
PLASTIC is a first tier supplier to Rover, Ford and Honda, and a second tier supplier to
Nissan. It is a Preferred Supplier to the Rover Group. It participates in design work
with the UK based engineering centres of Rover, Honda and Ford, and in 1994, its
design work with Rover was centred at the Canley site in Coventry. PLASTIC does not
have the resources for research and development facilities, but has been nurturing an
international collaborative relationship with a US plastics company since 1989, and a
Japanese plastics company since 1993. They do not design collectively, but have
exchanged design ideas for their unofficial partners to utilise their design expertise at a
local level. For example, PLASTIC's experience in developing expansion tanks for
Volvo was exchanged with the US company; at a later date, the US company exchanged
their experience in developing plastic battery trays to PLASTIC. The managing director
sees these relationships as one way of keeping informed with the technological
developments of the industry, and of providing new design ideas to their customers.
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8.6.1 Project management
There is a weekly, new product meeting each Friday morning. This is attended by the
project control coordinator, all project managers, and representatives from
manufacturing engineering, quality, production and logistics. Before each meeting, there
is a New Product Timing Sheet produced for each set of new products (for each
customer); these are updated weekly, providing data on customer timings and
PLASTIC's expected times. The project control coordinator was a necessary creation to
ensure communication between all PLASTIC's engineering staff and customers. Each
day, all engineering project managers report their location to the project control
coordinator. In this way, any customer request can be responded to immediately. The
managing director believes this was an important development for maintaining close
design relationships with customers. Similarly, the weekly project review acts as a
mechanism for maintaining current state of expertise and for sharing experiences (not
innovation) across customers. Occasionally, PLASTIC arranges for guest speakers to
present to the meeting, in order to maintain their collective skill base and expertise.
8.6.2 Design relationship with Rover
PLASTIC has two guest engineers located within Rover. The first is a product manager
responsible solely for Rover related interior trim. He spends two day per week at the
Canley site. The second is a product manager responsible for interior and exterior trim,
and wheel trims for both Rover and Ford projects. PLASTIC designs and manufactures
the following product items for different Rover vehicles: vents; wheel trims; cooling
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tanks; splash shields; and a variety of fascia related components (such as instrument
bezels, centre fascia console, and glove-box). In addition to this close relationship in
design, PLASTIC recruited an ex-Rover purchasing agent to their Sales and Estimation
team.
PLASTIC normally enters the product development process at post-concept stage. A
cost pack from Rover is issued to PLASTIC and two other suppliers. This cost pack is
then discussed internally between the Sales manager responsible for Rover accounts, and
a designated engineer (by component area), who establish cost estimates based on the
cycle time, material, tooling charges, and ancillary equipment (such as assembly jigs and
gauges).[3] (They are a preferred supplier for wheel trims, expansion tanks and vents.)
A quotation analysis form (QAF) is returned to Rover and if successful a Letter of
nomination is received from Rover. The cost of design work may, or may not,
incorporate the cost of tooling; this is decided by Rover. A design FMEA is undertaken
only if PLASTIC is nominated as supplier.
Once Sales has issued a Sales Engineering Note (SEN), the project is effectively
initiated. This SEN is a document that specifies the level of funding, and allows tracking
of expenditure. It is the project manager who decides how this funding is to be
allocated. A SEN is issued for individual items, or assemblies; hence there would be
individual SENs issued for right and left vents. With each SEN issued, an Advanced
Quality Planning (AQP) file is raised. This document tracks the items through to volume
at 5,000 units. The AQP consists of the product timing plan, QAF, quotations for
tooling, design information, and a contact sheet listing all people who are likely to be
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involved in the development through to volume (typically the product manager, logistics,
production, quality, manufacturing engineering, purchasing, and sales). These people
meet on a regular basis, when changes are required. The timing plan is the responsibility
of the project manager, who provides this for Rover.
At the design stage, the product manager and a CAD engineer work together on
developing the design proposal. This is submitted to Rover for approval. If approved,
PLASTIC orders the bought-out parts and initiate tooling for material, jigs and gauges.
PLASTIC has in-house tooling facilities, but tooling is sub-contracted out to commercial
toolmaking firms, with whom they work in designing the product. At D02, a prototype
tooling and build event takes place. This normally requires only a model, therefore no
off-tooling parts are required. Experience with Rover suggests that most development
work continues unhindered until Dl (off-tool) build. PLASTIC normally expects to
receive engineering changes after the Dl build The engineering change procedure is
undertaken by the manufacturing engineer.
Final project sign-off is only approved by the collective decision of the Engineering
director, Commercial director, Finance director and product manager. The end of the
new product development process is indicated when volume levels have reached 5,000
units - in some cases, this could be two years into production.
An inconsistency with Rover's project management system was illustrated by one of the
guest engineers. If PLASTIC is given full design responsibility for a project, then they
have responsibility and pressure to deliver to Rover's timing plan. This had never
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changed in PLASTIC's experience. However, if Rover retains full design responsibility,
there are often late deliveries of detailed design from Rover to PLASTIC, which causes
delays in tooling delivery. In such cases, PLASTIC may be asked to miss out the Dl
phase to satisfy the longer term commitments of delivering the final parts on schedule.
The decision as to who has design responsibility is related to the expected volumes. If
the volume estimate is small, design work tends to be in-house with Rover; if, on the
other hand, large volumes are required, Rover outsources the design responsibility to
suppliers, such as PLASTIC.
8.6.3 Summary of PLASTIC
PLASTIC is a preferred supplier of Rover and supplies Rover with interior and exterior
trim, such as fascias and wheel trim. Rover is a major customer, with whom PLASTIC
has built up a close design relationship over the past five years. Although it does not
have a research and development facility, PLASTIC has established mutual, international
relationships with two companies to exchange product and process developments, for
different target markets. The main type of project involves enhancements and
incremental improvements to existing products, which may include aesthetic or technical
improvements.
The main features of PLASTIC's project management approach are presented in table
8.6. The approach is based upon multi-functional teams, customer focused Sales staff
and project managers. They have two guest engineers based at Rover for two days each
week - one each for interior and exterior trim. In the case of Rover-related business, the
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Dominant characteristics
Key mechanisms
Major phases in a development project
Dominant type of project
guest engineers are the project managers. The process follows the key milestones of
each customer's process, and is characterised by clearly specified procedures, tracked by
an advanced quality planning document. This document is common to all projects and
includes an appendix describing each customer's milestone review points.
Table 8.6	 Summary of PLASTIC's approach to project management
agem.sPLASTIC.......................................
Characterisation of process
	
Customer focused multi-functional teams
Typical project duration (months)
Primary performance drivers
Formality of process
Team focus with functional support. Sales
staff and project managers are customer
focused.
Project manager.
Weekly cross-project reviews.
Senior management review at milestones.
Phases follow customer's process.
Enhancements and incremental
improvements; some aesthetic and
technical improvements.
N/A
Quality control.
Deliver reliability.
Customer response.
Clearly defined procedures: tracked by
Advanced Quality Planning document
(includes timing, costs, design information
and so forth).
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Internal integration is mainly achieved through their multi-functional approach and
weekly meetings to review all ongoing new projects. This facilitates cross-project
learning and reflects PLASTIC's current level of collective expertise. Their use of guest
engineers has greatly improved their external coordination with Rover. Similarly, there is
a full-time project coordinator who ensures any customer can immediately contact a
project manager. This ability to respond quickly to customer demands is seen as
extremely importance to PLASTIC. There are monthly review meetings with Rover,
until the Dl phase, where PLASTIC expects greater iteration of design information, as
engineering changes are demanded from Rover. Their products tend to have a high
interface with other components and it is often not until Dl that the level of engineering
fit can be established. Their experience is that most development work remains The
primary performance drivers of PLASTIC are deliveiy reliability, quality control of
design and production, and the ability to respond quickly to the customer throughout the
process.
8.7 WINDOW (Case 6)
WINDOW is a manufacturer of window regulator systems, door mechanisms (latches
and hinges), modular door systems, and seat adjuster systems. (The window regulator
and seat adjuster systems can be manual, power, or electronically controlled.) Perhaps
most significantly for WINDOW was the development of the modular door system in
1987. This product combines the regulator, motor and glass to produce an entire, self-
contained unit which can be fitted directly into the door panel. WINDOW is currently
the only UK based company to manufacture this product, and has a clear design and
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manufacturing expertise for this. WINDOW is part of a German, family owned business,
with subsidiaries in the UK, Japan, Central and North America. The UK business was
established in 1988 and is located in Coventry. In 1993, the turnover of UK operations
was over £31 million sales, and over 8.5 million units volume. The company has
experienced a steady and continual increase in both turnover and output in recent years,
particularly in the regulator and door module sectors, with the regulator sector
accounting for over 70 per cent of their turnover.
WINDOW's major customers are Rover, Ford and Volvo. WINDOWs share of Rover's
business has developed significantly since 1991, so much so that in 1994, WINDOW was
supplying nearly 50 per cent of Rover's window regulators. This increase was at the
expense of business for one of their largest competitors, a French based company
(referred here as LATCH), who competes in both window regulator and door
mechanism sectors.
8.7.1 Project management
WINDOW has a structured approach to project management, consisting of three key
elements. First, there is a corporate handbook on project management, which specifies
in detail the purpose, organisation, procedure and planning systems for effective project
management. This handbook also includes copies of most control documents and
procedures, such as timing plans, activity checklists, and project status reports. Second,
WINDOW has a 12 page project management procedure document. This is unique to
each project and lists in precise elements, the tasks within each project phase, with the
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responsible function and necessaiy documents. It is a highly controlled procedure which
acts as a checklist for each phase, and a total of 77 individual tasks to be completed. The
company specifies eight project phases: development/inquiiy; customer order; final
design/pre-production; cost evaluation and prototype; tooling and procurement; first
sample; mass production; and project evaluation. The third element is the project timing
plan, which has 50 separate elements, spread over four broad phases that roughly
correspond to customer phases: concept; design; procurement; and completion.
WINDOW uses cross-functional project teams consisting of Engineering, Pre-
production, Sales, Logistics, and Quality Control. There is a limit of three projects that a
project leader may be responsible for, at any one time, and team members are able to
work on a maximum of five projects. At the time of interviewing WINDOW in 1994,
the company was involved in product development projects with, inter alia, Rover/Land
Rover, Ford/Jaguar, Honda, Volvo/Nedcar, and Peugeot.
Rover projects begin when a customer inquiiy is received, which is discussed mainly
between the Sales executive and Engineering. If a quotation analysis form is required, a
full project team is gathered together and a detailed quotation presented. In general,
once a project has begun, monthly review meetings are held at Rover of the core team,
consisting of Rover design engineer, a Supplier Quality Assurance representative, and
the Purchasing agent, together with WINDOWs project manager and Sales executive.
WINDOW is constantly evolving and improving its delivery of the RG2000 specification.
As an approved supplier to Rover, they deem it important to maintain a close working
316
relationship. In 1994, the only part of RG2000 they had yet to conform to was BS5750,
but they were intending to reverse this situation by the end of the year. One change they
were making to their project management procedure was to optimise it in line with as
many customers are possible. WINDOW did not want to have separate project
management procedures for each customer, or to favour one customer at the expense of
another. These changes meant that they would be more closely aligned with the project
management requirements of RG2000. There was an appendix attached to the
procedure outlined above, which listed both Rover and Ford project management
milestones to enable WINDOW project managers to control against these review targets.
One issue WINDOW saw for Rover itself was that they could learn something from the
RG2000 specification. One project manager expressed a view that "Rover had to get its
own house in order, and follow its own guidelines, if inter-firm coordination problems
were to be reduced." This statement will become clearer with the review of project
GAMMA.
8.7.2 Project GAMMA
GAMMA is an example of a project that was given to a first tier supplier to project
manage. For the purposes of this thesis, GAMMA incorporates two separate projects;
however, as the discussion will reveal, consideration of these two projects together
illustrate issues of concern for outsourcing product development to rival suppliers.
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Project GAIVIMA consists of an integrated, rear door module, and the front door
window regulator and latch mechanism (GAMIMA*) for a Land Rover project. As a
door module, it is a safety critical system. The overall vehicle programme had originally
begun in the late 1980s, and had been subject to several starts and stops over a seven
year period. In 1991, Rover approached WINDOW to supply the integrated rear door
module, and a separate window regulator for the front doors of the vehicle. WINDOW's
major competitor, LATCH, was given the contract to directly supply Rover with the
latch mechanism for the front doors, and to supply the latch mechanism to WINDOW for
the rear door module - in this case, as indirect supplier to Rover (a similar situation to
Supplier B in figure 3.7).
GAMMA is an example of a rear door module, incorporating an integrated handle and
latch mechanism, which is supplied as a complete door module to the assembly track.
(This integrated system has been designed for ease of assembly.) For this project, Rover
selected the key participants and brought them together to design and develop the rear
door module. From the outset, Rover contracted WINDOW as the final tier supplier for
the rear door module, and this was formalised at the beginning of the project through a
contract giving WINDOW total responsibility for the rear door module, and the front
window regulator. Hence, it was Rover's responsibility, if they wanted to make
engineering changes, to approach WINDOW as the first tier supplier, who would then
approach the indirect suppliers to make those changes, thereby project mapaging
GAMMA. This was the first project that WINDOW (UK) had taken responsibility to
manage for a vehicle manufacturer, although the parent company had managed several
such projects.
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The GAMMA project team comprised:
• WINDOW (Rover selected) - project manager and window regulator supplier;
. LATCH (Rover selected) - latch system supplier;
HANDLE (Rover selected) - an internal handle supplier;
CABLE (Rover selected) - a cable supplier;
. a wire manufacturer; and,
a plastic moulding supplier.
Figure 8.6 outlines the key relationships within the development of the rear door module,
and the supply of the front window regulator, and front latch mechanism. In the case of
the rear door module, the relationship between the project and Rover should have been
managed through WINDOW. However, although part of the design team, an exchange
of design information developed directly between LATCH and Rover, with little transfer
to WINDOW. In the case of the front latch and window regulator, these commodities
were directly supplied separately to Rover: LATCH assembled the latch mechanism with
parts from HANDLE and CABLE, whilst WINDOW supplied the window regulator to
Rover.
GAMMA can be viewed as a black box system. LATCH was given the characteristics
and functional specifications for their black box, and were contracted to supply a
complete latch mechanism to WINDOW. Similarly, WINDOW was contracted to
provide the internal workings for a black box rear door. Instead of one line of
communication, two separate lines developed between Rover and WINDOW, and Rover
and LATCH for the GAMMA door module project. Unbeknown to WINDOW, Rover
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Figure 8.6 Design relationships in project GAMMA and GAMMA*
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frequently issued drawings and held review meetings with LATCH. In addition,
WINDOW did not receive LATCH's design information until the end of engineering
validation (Dl). This lack of upstream information sharing caused problems at the QP
phase, with delays of up to four weeks occurring for the delivery of new test equipment,
which was required in response to knowing of changes in LATCH's design.
After two years of development, Rover requested WINDOW to assume full
responsibility for the door module, not just the responsibility for project management.
However, WINDOW was unaware of LATCH's procedures and drawings, and therefore
felt they should not take full responsibility for it, particularly since the door module is a
safety critical system, and there would be legal implications for system parts they had no
control over.
The GAMMA project manager attributes a lack of discipline on the part of Rover for
some of the problems that arose. In WINDOW's view, Rover should not have
outsourced project management responsibility to them if Rover intended to constantly
change design specifications and reporting lines without WINDOWs knowledge.
One example on GAMMA highlights the knock-on effect of failing to inform the project
team. At QP phase of GAMMA, Rover changed a spring component on the internal
handle without informing WINDOW. The rear door has to withstand a gravitational
force impact test of 30G, but during quality proving, Rover found this spring had been
incorrectly specified by Rover to HANDLE; hence, the springs had to be replaced. The
failure of Rover to inform WINDOW resulted in WINDOWs test equipment being
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unable to test the revised internal release handle: the force was too great for the
equipment. WINDOW had to purchase a new pneumatic arm, and revise the parameters
of test programme software in order to test the internal release handle of the module.
Despite these types of problems, WINDOW has always met the delivery date, changing
their internal timing plans and working over time to supply the customer: "Because at the
end of the day, if you don't make the delivery date, the customer will always blame you.
So you will do whatever is required to meet it" (Quality engineer).
8.7.3 Summary of WINDOW
WINDOW is an approved supplier that is aiming to acquire preferred status in the near
future. At the time of interview, they still required BS5750 to filly satisfy the RG2000
specification, but were expecting this soon. WINDOW provides about half of Rover's
window latch requirements and all of the modular door systems. They have had a
design relationship with Rover for over four years, based on their ability to design,
develop and manufacture technical and systems solutions. They do not have any guest
engineers within Rover, but they are actively considering this option for an earlier input
to the design process. The primary performance drivers of WINDOW are delivery
reliability and engineering functionality.
The main features of WiNDOW's project management approach are presented in table
8.7. It is based on a highly formalised process consisting of eight phases and gates, with
77 individual tasks requiring separate attention. WINDOW has optimised its existing
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project management procedure to meet the requirements of all of customers by
specifying the point of convergence between their respective review milestones.
Table 8.7	 Summaiy of WINDOWs approach to project management
Project Management Elements 	 WINDOW's features
Characterisation of process 	 Phases and gates.
Dominant characteristics
Key mechanisms
Major phases in a development project
Dominant type of project
Typical project duration (months)
Primary performance drivers
Formality of process
Cross-functional teams.
Optimised project management procedure
to meet all customers' requirements.
Project manager; senior management
review at milestones.
8 phases (77 tasks):
1. development/inquiiy
2. customer order
3. final design/pre-production
4. cost evaluation and prototype
5. tooling and procurement
6. first sample
7. mass production
8. project evaluation
Evolutions, enhancement and incremental
improvements; both technical and
increasingly systems solutions.
Vanes
Delivery reliability;
Engineering firnctionality.
Highly formalised:
Corporate handbook on project
management;
Project management procedure document
(77 elements);
Project timing plan (50 elements).
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Project GAMIMA illustrates a scenario where project management responsibility was
devolved from a vehicle manufacturer to a systems supplier who, in turn, would need to
manage a competitor. GAMMA demonstrated that devolving this requires effective
inter-firm coordination to be in place, and reporting roles to be adhered to.
WiNDOW communicates design information through CAD, telephone and facsimile, but
most importantly face-to-face discussions. The monthly review meetings were a key
coordination mechanism in achieving this. However, the existence of separate
communications to LATCH was a hinderance to WINDOW being able to project
manage GAMMA. The future adoption of a guest engineer is one possibility WINDOW
sees for better securing effective coordination with Rover.
8.8	 Analysis of the cases
The six cases illustrate a diversity of approaches to design refationshIps with Rover
Group, and a variety of individual project management styles. The cases provide
examples of component suppliers involved in the upstream activities of product
development. This section compares and contrasts the cases to highlight the dynamic
nature of the inter-firm design relationship. Whilst six cases cannot generalise these
findings to a wider population, they nonetheless provide a basis from which a model for
investigating design chains can emerge.
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8.8.1 Supply relationship with Rover
Table 8.8 summarises the six cases and the main features of their relationship with the
Rover Group. Some data is missing either because the case studies declined to release
commercial information, or because no data was available. Five of the cases were
preferred suppliers, and recognised by Rover as having actively participating in close
design relationships with them. WINDOW - an approved supplier - was yet to be a
preferred supplier, but was in the process of acquiring BS5750 accreditation, which
would facilitate this. These cases are characteristic of the first tier suppliers sbe$
Chapter Three: they offer a specialist competence to the vehicle manufacturer, and are
amongst a select few who Rover are trying to deve'op c'oser partnerships witt.
Similarly, the cases demonstrate a substantial experience of design collaboration with
Rover. Three of the cases - BUMPER, DRIVE-SHAFT and ELECTRICAL - have been
participating in design activities with Rover for over 10 years, as well as supp'ying parts
for more than 20 years each. All three are sole suppliers to Rover of many products. In
the example of WINDOW, its presence in the UK has been shorter than the rest, and
their main competitor has been located in Birmingham for over half a centuly. The
introduction of modular door systems has given WINDOW a unique expertise which is
providing them with a valuable, early input to design work with Rover.
Table 8.9 compares each of the cases against attributes characteristic of supplier
involvement in design relationships. Using the typology expressed in Chapter Five, there
are two proprietary parts manufacturers (DRIVE-SHAFT and EXHAUST), two
suppliers who receive black box dimensions (ELECTRICAL and WINDOW) and two
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detail controlled body parts (BUMPER and PLASTIC). The characteristics in table 8.8
do not suggest any obvious matching of factors to component type. Indeed, this has not
been its purpose. Table 8.9 illustrates the need to examine the types of component
supplier (by design input) in more detail. An interesting distinction, for example,
concerns the division of design responsibility and authority. BUMPER is jointly
responsible for component design, but the authority to proceed, order, and manage
resides with Rover. PLASTIC is responsible for design, but depending on the volume of
parts required may not have the design authority. Distinguishing between these two
factors would provide a clearer understanding of the roles of control and expertise in
managing design chains.
Suppliers became involved in product development at times according to component
type, based on the impact of the part on the total vehicle integrity (such as the aesthetic
or number of interfacing parts). BUMPER, for example, had necessary impacts at the
concept and pre-concept stages, as did PLASTIC for components such as fascias.
ELECTRICAL's interfaces with a large number of other parts, and there is a critical time
between engineering sign-off and production, which necessitates as much early
involvement as possible to reduce engineering changes. It is useful to consider,
therefore, the relative positions of the cases along the design capability continuum and
the entry point to the product development process. Figure 8.7 positions each of the
cases on the matrix. Applying this matrix to a larger data set could provide some useful
insights into both the contribution of suppliers to product development, but also which
supplier types required greater coordination of activities. It is interesting to note that the
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relative positions of ELECTRICAL and DRWE-SI1AFT are further right than might be
expected, due to the absence of such specialist design engineers within Rover.
Figure 8.7	 The position of each case along the design capability continuum
In-house design
capability
S	 I
BUMPER
Detailcontrolled:
aesthetic parts
PLASTIC ,'
( Less
complexLJ
(ELECTRICAL':
Black box
(Standard
catalogue parts
off-the-shelf)
Pit.
con ept
Concept
Jo
Vehicle
manufacturer's
product
development
process
t
.' WINDOW '(DRWE-SHAFT'1
'Black box: critical: EXHAUST
specifications : proprietaiy parts:
I. ...........- jroria	 critical.'
Production
Location of design responsibility
Rover	 - Supplier
Notes:
1. This diagram is nominal in its representation of supplier positions.
2. The positions of supplier involvement are relative to the vehicle manufacturer's request for supplier
involvement in the product development activities.
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Two issues raised in the cases have a negative effect on design relations with Rover.
First, there were several instances when purchasing staff changed jobs and rather than a
senior purchasing manager accepting previously agreed decisions, new staff proceeded to
review these and re-instigate negotiations. This had happened to BUMPER and
ELECTRICAL. Second, several firms reported long delays over payment for tooling.
An important element of many design chains is the role of toolmaker in the process;
where letters of intent had been issued, there was concern from suppliers that these did
not in fact accumulate to very much.
8.8.2 Project management
The project management approaches of the cases were discussed in detail in the
summaries, and a composite is presented in table 8.10. Several of the companies have
changed their organisation to be more customer focused: DRIVE-SHAFT,
ELECTRICAL, and PLASTIC. All firms were using multi-functional teams. Whilst
firms may have had individual project management processes, there was consensus that
all processes should follow the customer's milestones, in this case Rover's. In hindsight,
there is a clear benefit in this helping coordinate inter-firm activities. However, some
firms had only recently decided to follow this course of action.
For many of the cases, the overlap between engineering validation (Dl) and quality
proving (QP) was a critical stage in the process. It is at this stage that the engineering fit
can be tested against the other elements of the vehicle. In ELECTRICAL's case, this
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stage is frequently followed by substantial engineering changes, not least because their
product is a high interfacing element of the vehicle.
8.8.3 Design/development information flows
In Chapter Three, figure 3.3 distinguished between four types of information flow that
were typical of assembler-supplier relationships. Examining the six cases presented in
this research, further types of relationship can be identified. Figure 8.8 illustrates five
variants of assembler-supplier information flow found in the case studies. Only DRI\TE
SHAFT and EXHAUST, both proprietary parts suppliers, follow the examples identified
by Clark and Fujimoto (1991). The characteristic of early supplier involvement in
product development activities is noticeable for black box, body parts, interior trim, and
functional parts that have been project managed by a first tier supplier. These figures are
nominal representations to illustrate the iterative nature of early information exchanges.
The information exchange between ELECTRICAL and Rover involves joint design work
from the concept phase through the placement of a guest engineer at Rover. Not only is
the guest engineer participating in current projects, but increasingly the resident expertise
is being sought for, as yet, unspecified projects. Similarly, BUMPER, in the case of
project ALPHA, clearly assisted in suggesting alternative body styling, and developing
the cost and specification information. This characteristic reflects the unique relationship
that exists between BUMPER and Rover, and the reality that the project manager had
established a close working relationship with styling from when he was employed at
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Figure 8.8	 The design/development information flows of the case studies
ELECTRICAL (black box)
	 BUMPER (body parts)
DRIVE-SHAFT / EXHAUST
(proprietary parts)
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Figure 8.8	 The design/development information flows of the case studies (continued)
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Vehicle
Specification	 J Suggested
Vehicle test _____11lijii1I
approval	 prototype parts 	
Detail design
prototype parts
Production iI
	
Production
process	 1k	 process
Complete L	 Component
vehicle	 r	 system
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Rover. Nevertheless, if vehicle manufacturers are to outsource design expertise, this
type of information flow may be found for other commodities too.
There is one key difference between the BUMPER and ELECTRICAL relationship with
Rover. ELECTRICAL participates as part of a joint design team, whereas BUMPER is
seen as part of the resident styling team. The size and nature of a harness project
necessitates bringing in a large group of people to discuss development work, whereas
the BUMPER team requires fewer members and benefits from a dominant project
manager. This observation does not ascribe benefit or disbenefit to either case, but
highlights this difference, since further research could explore the influences of this on
the relationship.
PLASTIC has a design relationship not too dissimilar to BIJMPER. There is a guest
engineer working closely within Rover engineering, so although not influencing vehicle
concept, they are collaborating on specifying costs and component requirements, which
benefits PLASTIC insofar as the guest engineer can promote PLASTIC's expertise and
processes as part of the specification.
The characteristics of WINDOW is influenced by the information exchanges differing in
practice from that intended. The original arrangement was for WINDOW to project
manage GAMMA; however, Rover did not relinquish control or authority, with the
result that WiNDOW's project responsibilities were undermined by LATCH liaising
directly with Rover. Hence, the information diagram in figure 8.7 fails to represent the
devolving of control to suppliers increasingly promoted by vehicle manufacturers.
337
8.8.4 Guest engineers
Table 8.11 summarises the number of guest engineers used by the cases. Four of the six
cases have guest engineers working within Rover, and a fifth case is considering this
option. These guest engineers have been used as a means of coordinating the product
development process from Rover, through to production in their respective companies.
The central purpose for using this mechanism is to provide an understanding of the
production requirements as early in the process as possible. ELECTRICAL is the
pioneer of the guest engineer in Rover and is widely using them with other customers.
DRIVE-SHAFT was using guest engineers in two customers: Rover and Nissan.
However, the use of these engineers was evidently different. In Rover, the guest
engineer had an engineering bias, used in much the same way as the other examples in
the cases. However, the guest engineer in Nissan was used for improving the quality of
the product in a manufacturing engineer capacity.
Table 8.11 Use of guest engineers by interviewed cases
SupplierRover!a11.dR....Honda .&ar
BUMPER X	-	 -	 -	 -	 -
DRIVE-SHAFT	 X	 -	 -	 -	 X	 -
ELECTRICAL	 X	 X	 X	 X	 -	 2
EXHAUST -	 	 -	 -	 -	 -
PLASTIC	 2	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
WINDOW*	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
* = planned
Figure 8.9 illustrates this difference. Guest engineers have been seen as an integrating
mechanism between product engineering groups, as indicated in figure 8.9. However,
two movements are acting upon their role: first, towards applications engineering in
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downstream operations; and second, increasing involvement in pre-concept specification
creation. These findings raise a number of issues for the use of guest engineers. Should
guest engineers become involved in pre-DO activities such as pre-cost pack definition,
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and assist styling or concept, before supplier selection has taken place? Whilst suppliers
continue to receive contracts, these issues remain unanswered; however, it is clear from
ELECTRICAL that the perceived change in buyer-supplier relationships is denuding the
trust that has enabled flexible participation in Rover's upstream activities.
8.9	 Summary points
A number of points can be drawn from the cases that require further consideration. First,
whilst all firms follow the traditional negotiation over contracts between purchasing and
sales, a few variants have appeared. Those suppliers with guest engineers, are using
them in this negotiation process, and in the case of DRIVE-SHAFT, Rover is involving
the staff engineer.
A second point is that suppliers are responding to the demands of Rover to meet delivery
targets in different ways. BUMPER, for example, has employed a logistics person to
ensure Rover deadlines are met. PLASTIC has a dedicated project coordinator who
maintains constant contact with project members, should the customer require
information. A key coordination mechanism, in its broadest sense, is the need to
maintain delivery reliability: this is a key element of RG2000, and the cases were aware
not to fail in delivering the development product.
Several criticisms have emerged over the operating practices of Land Rover. Both
BUIWER and WThJ)OW found that Land Rover project management skills were
lacking those of the other Rover business units. However, it should be noted that Land
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Rover has fewer projects, which tend to be of a long duration; and since the design stage
of the projects examined in this thesis, Rover has implemented the PMP, which may over
turn this observed shortcoming. One criticism of Rover is the issuing of the letter of
intent, and the typical late issuing of it. Does this suggest something wrong with the
system?
These cases represent suppliers at the forefront of actively encouraging upstream
involvement in customer's product development activities. The mechanisms used to
facilitate coordination are relatively straightforward: these reflect the need for ease of
immediate communication and resolution of uncertainty. To this end, the guest engineer
mechanism has been promoted by the suppliers to facilitate early input, largely to assist
their own production processes. This type of mechanism will be limited insofar as there
is finite space available within Rover, and suppliers will only be accepted under the guest
engineer scheme if their components are deemed crucial to warrant it..
NOTES
1. Since one set of tooling is used, the engineering, development and manufacture time is longer.
This difference in tooling arrangement may account, in part, for some of the differences found
by Clark and Fujimoto (1991) between Japanese, US and European vehicle manufacturers'
lead-times of tool dies.
2. In the UK, it is not usual for suppliers to ask for a project management fee up front. This
contrasts sharply with BUMPER's experience with Volvo Truck, who expected this
arrangement. In 1989, they initiated a three year development project of a bumper, where they
project managed German, US and UK toolmakers.
3. This relationship has changed since a guest engineer has been residing at the Canley site:
Rover staff often enquire about pre-cost pack definitions, since a resident expert is co-located
with them. This raises the question of the role of guest engineers and whether they should help
specify the cost pack which rival suppliers will also receive.
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9	 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter presents a summary of the findings of this research, and develops the
implications of these for future research.
9.1	 Summary of conclusions
The research reported in this thesis demonstrates the emergence of a new paradigm
within the total supply network, which incorporates integrated product development and
the early involvement of suppliers in design activities, and which is coordinated through a
variety of integration mechanisms. It has developed new understanding of the design and
development relationship between vehicle manufacturer and component supplier,
highlighting the key participants and procedures of this process. The typology of inter-
organisational integration mechanisms proposed in Chapter Four has found support from
the cases studies examined. At the pre-project stage, the Rover Group has put in ptace
various standards that assist in the coordination of design activities (such as effective
cost management and RG2000), but perhaps most significant is the role of the staff
engineer. This person uses his knowledge of the supply base to assist nominated
suppliers, but also to improve the links between manufacturing and engineering through
DFM and DFA. From the supplier initiative, the role of guest engineer is an important
mechanism to ensure downstream activities (supplier operations) are considered
upstream in the design process. Figure 9.1 summarises the mechanisms identified within
this study that Rover, and supplier, are using to coordinate their joint activities.
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Figure 9.1	 Inter-organisational coordination mechanisms identified in this research
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In Chapter Four, concern was raised over Bensaou's use of inter-firm coordination
mechanisms per se to examine inter-firm relationships. Examination of these six cases
illustrates the structural tasks that are implemented to effect communication of design
information between firms. Although CAD/CAM, telephone, facsimile and so forth are
used by firms, the findings contend that where firms are involved actively in early design
contributions, face-to-face exchanges are of greatest importance. There is, however, no
single mechanism that greatly facilitates coordination, rather emphasis has been placed on
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liaison, through specific liaison teams, programme managers, cross-functional teams and
the monthly review meetings. Unlike other forms of inter-firm exchange, product
development involves a large degree of uncertainty and risk. This necessarily requires
extensive information exchange until such time as the design is fixed from both provider
(supplier) and customer (vehicle manufacturer). Where this is a relatively simple part, or
customer focused, the use of EDI, CAD/CAM and other mechanisms may have a greater
influence. This thesis argues that for the core suppliers of design information - those
which will manage the chain of suppliers - inter-organisational coordination requires the
establishment of clear and effective pre-project mechanisms, from which design phase
and manufacturing phase mechanisms can develop.
The case of project ALPHA, demonstrates the limitations of Rover's PMP procedures
for so-called fast-track product development projects. These require a different
management approach, together with new understanding from purchasing. For this to
happen, the company must view this as different and instigate appropriate procedures.
It has been shown that some suppliers may undergo two stages of supply: supply based
on production and/or logistics capabilities; and supply based on design and/or project
management capabilities. As companies improve their supply logistics, attention will be
drawn further towards upstream activities. In recent years, the focus of product
development competitive advantage has been on time-to-market, overlapping problem-
solving, and multifunctional teamwork encompassed within the philosophy of
simultaneous engineering. This focus began on internal activities of the firm, but the
issue of early supplier involvement has recently received more attention. In doing so, a
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better understanding is required of the types of supplier involved and the dimensions of
their participation in inter-firm design activities. The supplier typology proposed in
Chapter Five could assist in this, thus enabling a detailed methodology such as that of
Birou and Fawcett (1994) to be applied to specific product categories, rather than at an
holistic level. The paradigm of design chain management enables these issues to be
drawn together, in relation to the other supply activities, and to place research, design
and engineering activities within the total supply network.
In summary, the main findings of the research indicate that:
Coordination:
. there is no single mechanism for coordination;
informal engineering exchanges have led to the increasing use of guest engineers as a
mechanism;
preferred suppliers are having an increasing involvement at the concept stage of
product development.
Project Management:
. there is a need for a customer's project management process to accommodate so-
calledfast track projects;
• in the cases studied, Rover Group did not undertake a post-project review;
• there was no Rover policy towards roles and responsibilities of project core team
members;
• the interface between product engineering and production (specifically engineering
validation and quality proving) is an area continuing to generate major engineering
changes.
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Negotiator Roles:
a variety of staff are being involved in the negotiation process between supplier and
vehicle manufacturer: supply agent, design engineer, and guest engineer for the
supplier; and purchasing agent, design engineer, and staff engineer for the vehicle
manufacturer;
. more responsibility is being placed on vehicle manufacturer design engineers (such as
Effective Cost Management) with a result that the role of Purchasing appears to be
changing; where changes occur to Purchasing staff, the development process is
temporarily halted by a perceived need to review contracts with suppliers.
These findings indicate a need for focus on the exchange relationship itself, through well
understood procedures, with feedback of their effectiveness. It would appear that the
vehicle manufacturer is not auditing the process or reviewing particular links. An audit is
made of suppliers to conform to RG2000, but individual projects escape any audit.
Many of the concerns of suppliers could be addressed by an internal review. Some
suppliers are taking this need upon themselves to demonstrate issues of concern. The
project management process needs to be viewed as a core competence for both vehicle
manufacturer and supplier. As more design and development is devolved, the ability to
project manage both internally and externally will determine those firms able to compete
effectively in the market place.
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9.2	 A framework for design chain management
The discussion of inter-firm product development, and the analysis of the Rover Group
and six of its suppliers, indicate various dynamics of design chain management. The
main objective of the research has been to understand better this relationship and a
framework is now developed that could be the basis for further investigation of this
emerging paradigm.
First, the Rover Group, like many other vehicle manufacturers, is ranking the supply base
through RG2000, preferred and approved supplier status and, more recently, strategic
component supplier groups. These groups would imply some stratification of design
relationships based on an ability to project manage particular operations.
Second, the analysis of the cases demonstrate that the flow of information is developing
greater iteration at concept stage in the case of ELECTRICAL, BUMPER, and
PLASTIC. This supports the typology of supplier classification presented in Chapter
Five, which characterises a preliminary sharing of ideas in the form of early supplier
involvement. This diagram provides a useful tool for examining relationships, and
further examination of inter-firm product development could find these categories
helpful.
Finally, the results of the cases suggest that Rover and its suppliers are devoting
considerable time to concept and design activities, but problems with the overall system
appear downstream with the need for engineering changes, and quality proving. Whilst
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the typology of inter-organisational coordination mechanisms indicate mechanisms for
earlier input from downstream activities, the operation of the system for managing these
appear to be a weak link in the process. Therefore, it is important to determine where in
the process these are located and their effect on the relationship.
9.3	 Further research
Since this research has been of an exploratory nature, many rich veins have been tapped
into which further research may delve. Future research could be applied in two broad
areas. First, at the level of the industry, since further work is required to characterise
design chains, which a wider study could provide. Detailed examination is required of
the widespread nature of design chains both within the automotive industry, but also
others, most notably aerospace. How does the design chain differ by sector and region?
In which industries does this paradigm play a leading role within a total supply network?
Such an examination with the aerospace industry may also determine the sitnilacitie.
and/or differences in terms of project management style: is the automotive industry
moving slowly toward the aerospace tradition of a company taking responsibility for the
central design and final assembly, after selecting partners for the other major systems?
Could beneficial lessons be learned from this sector?
Second, there are a number of issues at the strategic and operational levels that require
better understanding, and further investigation. One might postulate that the natural
growth of design chains will be the ever increasing movement towards outsourcing
design work to suppliers and design studios, as the need for technological advancement
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and for incorporating supplier manufacturing knowledge increases. However the vehicle
manufacturer will wish to retain value-added design work, marque related expertise
(such as Rolls Royce in leather seat craftsmanship, and Jaguar with wood-inlaid fascias),
and technological areas to minimise the transfer of proprietary knowledge. Hence, whilst
there may be a movement towards vehicle manufacturers as coordinators of assembly,
there will be a similar, yet specific, move towards coordination of design. This has two
implications.
At the strategic level, an understanding of design chains is pertinent to developing
corporate strategy, supplier relationship strategies, as well as manufacturing and
engineering strategies. It may clearly be, as Lamming (1993) postulates, that a group of
direct suppliers becomes established as the dominant nodes, coordinating their own
supply bases on which to draw technical expertise.
The matrix of supplier design responsibility may prove a useful instrument in
understanding these relationships. Suppliers could be indicated by project and by
customer on a design responsibility/input to process index. This could help develop an
understanding of their competencies and/or strengths and to assist explain strategic
directions. Similarly, research could investigate the implications of moving from one
position to another. A further development might be the examination of each supplier
type (black box, grey box and so forth), and to determine their operations vis-à-vis the
type of development project (incremental, radical, fast-track, and so forth).
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At the operational level, further elements of the operation require definition and
understanding, such as:
1. the flow of information through the design chain (sequential, reciprocal, or iterative);
2. the organisational forms that assist or inhibit this paradigm;
3. the adequacy of the supplier capabilities categorisation (perhaps it should be based on
the information intensity within the design relationship);
4. the measures of performance that are appropriate for assessing effective design
service;
5. the components that receive greater design outsourcing. A consideration of von
Hippel's (1990) partitioning of design tasks may reveal which activities are more
efficient when performed in-house, and those when outsourced.
There would appear to be scope for further investigation of the guest engineer form of
mechanism. In Chapter Four, this form of coordination was introduced, and analysis of
the firms studied showed it to be widely used, for a number of reasons. This research
would suggest that guest engineering is a form of collaboration between the jointly
owned partnership and informal linkages, and thus warrants further examination to
determine its position vis-â-vis existing typologies of relationship. The importance of
informal networks - and by implication the role of guest engineers - is their contribution
of tacit knowledge to product development, as opposed to the codified formal
specifications latent in traditional exchange mechanisms. Since their use in European
firms would appear to be relatively recent - based on the firms interviewed no longer
than five years - their use may be the start of a transition as this informal network of
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engineers becomes more formalised through the internship of guest engineering
activities.
There is a need to understand their dynamics and forms and to identify good practice.
Further work could define a typology of guest engineering, and examine the strategic
and operational structures that support their effective use. Further understanding is
required of the original stimulus for guest engineering, and how guest engineers influence
the key operational variables of technology alliance and inter-organisational integration
(in particular the quality, speed, dependability, flexibility and cost of the interaction).
Finally, there has been much discussion on core competencies which could benefit from
the application of the supplier typology. Further examination is required of the selection
process of strategic component families (Venkatesan, 1992). During the course of
collecting the field data, the Rover Group began identifying core areas of specialism.
This may, in future, have a strategic affect on the design capability sourcing decisions of
the company, and hence on how suppliers contribute in-house. Therefore, further
research could investigate the process by which these subsystems are identified and how
this then relates to design capability sourcing decisions. Similarly, what affect does this
have on the policy of guest engineers? What implementation is there for direct system
suppliers? Are firms identifying vehicle subsystems based on their own core
competencies, or is this reflecting the needs to manage better the development of a
vehicle? Will preferred system suppliers be identified for these areas and brought in at
the concept stage, or how will this new form evolve?
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APPENDIX A
Product classification
1.	 Engine and chassis
Advanced composite materials
Air cleaners
Air filters
Alternators
Anti-vibration sealing materials
Automotive polymers
Bearings - ceramic
Bearings - steel
Camshafts
Carburettors
castings - aluminium
Castings - malleable
Catalytic converters
Ceramics for automotive applications
Charcoal canisters and filters
Chassis frames
Compressors
Coolant thermostats
Cooling systems
Crankcase in aluminium
Crankshafts
Crankshaft vibration dampers
Cruise control - electronic
Cylinder liners/sleeves
Diaphragm and boots
Drive-by-wire
E-gas systems
Electromechanical components
Engineers
Engine blocks - aluminium
Engine control-related electronic devices
Engine covers/heads - aluminium
Engine management systems
Engine mounting/noise damping devices
Engine parts/components for emission
control
Engine rocker arm covers in composite
material
Engine valves
Engine vibration dampers
Exhaust control systems
Exhaust system silencers
Fans (and clutches)
Fans - visco
Fasteners
Fly wheels
Fuel injectors
Fuel injection - multi-point
Fuel injection - single point
Fuel injection equipment - electronically
controlled
Fuel filters
Fuel pumps
Fuel rails
Fuel throttle bodies
Gaskets
Gas shock absorbers
Heat exchangers
Manifolds
Nozzles
Oil coolers
Oil filters
Oil pumps
Oil seals
Piston pin and rings
Radiators
Radiator fans - electronic, speed-
controlled
Rubber hoses
Seals for cylinder head gaskets
Seals for exhausts
Seals for mechanical applications
Silencers (mufflers)
Sintered metal components
Sound proofing technology
Superchargers
Tappets
Turbochargers
Tyre cord fabrics
Valve lifters - hydraulic
Valve seals and guides
Valve train systems
Valves for engines
a
Vibration control technology
V-belts
Water pumps
Wheels - aluminium
Wheels - steel
2.	 Electrical
(i) Chassis
Actuators
Alternators/generators
Condensers
Direct ignition systems
Distribution
Distributorless electronic systems
Distributors
Electric cables - high tension
Electric cables - low tension
Electric heater systems
Electric modules
Electric motors - small
Electronic display systems
Electronic and transmission-related
controls
Electronic brake-related devices
Electronic devices (other)
electronic ignition devices
Fibre optics
Fuel handling
Generators
Glow plugs
Ignition coils
Ignition systems
Magnetos
Modular connection systems
Multiplexing
Opto-electromc
Power and signal distribution
Printer circuit board design
Semiconductors
Sensors for engine and electronic
devices
Solenoids
Spark plugs
Starter motors
Vehicle diagnostic devices
Voltage regulators
Wiring harnesses
Electrical
(ii) Body
Centrally-controlled lacking module
systems
Connectors
Display systems
Electric and actuator motors
Fog lamps
Head-up displays
Heated windshield systems
Horns and buzzers
Instrument panels and controls
LCD modules
Lighting
relays and relay boxes
Signal and indicator lamps
Switches and switch systems
Switch combination for steering
columns
Traffic and navigation systems
Tyre pressure monitoring
Wiper systems - front
Wiper motors and linkage parts
Wiper systems - rear
Wiper wash/cleaning systems
Wiring harnesses
3.	 Drive, transmission and steering
components
ASR drive stop control system
Automatic clutches
Automatic transmission components
Clutch assemblies
Clutch covers
Clutch cylinders
Clutch disks
Clutch facings
Clutch - lock-up
Coil and stamped spring products
CV joints
Electronic clutch systems
Electrical and electronic systems for
transmission control
Electronic control systems for 4WD
Electronically controlled automatic
transmission
Electronic suspension control systems
Flywheel
b
Front axles
Front drive steer axles
Gearbox - manual
Hydraulic clutch controls
Limited slip differential
Locking differential gears
Non-drive steer axles
Power steering systems
Pre-filled clutch actuation sealed
systems
Propeller shafts, drive shafts
Rack-and-pinion steering
Rear axles
Rear axle housings
Sintered metal components
Steering systems
Steering system - 4 wheel
Steering shafts, columns and gears
Steering wheels
Tie rod ends
Torque converters
Trailer axles
Transfer boxes for 4WD
Transfer cases
Transmission driveline systems,
transaxles
Two mass flywheel
Universl joints
Visco-drive - viscous control units
Wheels - light alloy
Wheels - steel
4.	 Suspension and brake systems
Adaptive suspension
Air compressors
Air dryers
Air suspension systems
Air-actuated cam brakes for trucks
Air-actuated wedge brakes for trucks
Air brake systems for trucks
Air disk brakes for trucks
ABS - anti-skid brake systems
ABS electronic controls
ABS braking systems controls
ABS new electronic drive for calculating
wheel speed
ASR drive slip control
Brakes - electronic control system
Brakes - power operated
Brake hoses
Brake pipes
Brake shoes
Brake vacuum boosters
Brake disk pads
Brake actuators
Brake corner modules
Brake drum assemblies
Brake disk assemblies
Brake control valves
Brake master cylinders
Brake systems
Coil springs
Damping devices
Friction materials (and linings)
Leaf springs
Shock absorbers
Suspension systems
Suspension electronic controls
Suspension system electronically
controlled by electromagnetic clutch
Suspension load sensing valves
Suspension electronic ride control
systems
Suspension - self-levelling systems
Suspension - struts/pistons
Torsion bars and stabilisers
5.	 Body components
Acoustic ceilings
Airbag systems
Anti-theft locking systems
Anti-theft locking systems - audible
warning
Bodies and structures for vehicles
Body electronic systems
Body electronics - hydraulic power used
for convertible top drives
Bumpers
Car interior components
Carpets
Cellular radios/telephones
Consoles/glove boxes
Dashboard with tubular strengthening
Dashboards and instrument panels
Dashboard-mounted tyre pressure
monitoring system
Door operating system for CVs
Door trim panels
Exterior flexible urethane body parts
Exterior mouldings and trim for metal
and plastic
Fibreglass body parts
Fuel tanks
Gas-filled lifters for seat adjusters,
engine hoods, rear doors
Gas springs
Glass for vehicle windows
Heated windscreen
Information processing communication
systems
Latches for doors, boot and bonnet -
cars and CVs
Locks - central locking systems
Lock systems - electronic, infra red
Metal body pressings
Modular door systems
Modular front ends
Panels for passenger car bodies
Panels for truck and bus chassis
Plastic body components
Plastic panels for passenger car bodies
polished wood and components for
quality interiors
Profiles/weather strips
Rubber dampers
Rubber mouldings
Safety restraints
Sealing products, adhesives, mouldings
Seat adjusters
Seatbelts
Seat cushions
Seats and seat springs
Seat systems - power adjusted
Seat fittings
Seat foam
Seat padding
Seat reclining devices
Spun bonded non-wovens
Sunroofs, sun hatches
Traffic information and guidance
systems
Upholstery, cushions and mouldings
Wheel hub caps
Window frames
Window regulators (including power
window regulators
6.	 Other
(i) Climatisation systems
Air conditioning/coolers
Condensers and evaporators for air
conditioning
Electronic heater controls
Heaters
Heating and air conditioning controls
(ii) Audio systems
Car audio
Car stereo
Car video systems
Cellular telephones
Driver information
Two-way radio
(iii) Batteries
(iv) Paint (coating)
(v) Tyres
Source:	 Sleigh (1993, Vol. 4: appendix)
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APPENDIX B
Outline of Interview Schedule
A. Context of operations
(Note: establish information for site, division and/or UK operations)
A. 1. Describe the recent history: ownership, facilities and employment
A.2. Total turnover of the manufacturing operations of the site/company
A.3. Major product lines produced by the company and this division (on site/UK):
A.4. For each of these major lines, who are the major customers (esp. Rover)?
A.5. Describe how the unit/division fits into the structure of the larger corporation
(organisation charts)
B. Product development process
B. 1. Describe the company's product development (project management) process (Are
documents/manuals available?)
B.2. Is this standard to the division, and company?
B.3. List the key stages of the process, together with the major players
(functions/activities) in each stage.
B.4. What are the milestones/deliverables of each stage? Are these reports and/or
meetings?
B.5. How do B.3 and B.4 above relate to Rover's process? (Position of D-Zero)
B.6. Who are the major customers you actively participate with in product
development? For which product lines?
B.7. How would you describe the changes in this relationship over the last two years:
increased, largely unchanged, decreased?
B.8. Over the last two years, how has the level of competition to provide product
development expertise changed for each product line: increased, largely
unchanged, decreased?
e
C. Project Team structure
C. 1. Identify the members of the project team (full-time versus part-time).
C.2. Describe the scope of project team responsibilities.
C.3. At what stage is a formal project team formed: concept?
C.4. At what stage does the team relinquish responsibility (volume production?) If so,
at what level of volume?
C.5. Where is the team located? Is it together?
C.6. How frequently does the team meet?
C.7. Do teams learn from other teams/customers?
C.8. Details of typical projects: size (man days) / frequency (projects per year) / length
of project (months)
D. Project managers/team Leaders
D. 1. What is the scope of the project manager?
D.2. Describe their responsibilities?
E.	 Inter-Organisational Links
(Note: Need to differentiate general links and specific links)
B. 1. Describe the nature of the inter-firm transaction. (What is exchanged?)
E.2. In what form is it exchanged?
E.3. How frequent is the exchange of information?
E.4. How is this exchange controlled, regulated and managed?
E.5. What is the level of trust/cooperation?
E.6. What information is exchanged at each stage?
E.7. What organisational coordination mechanisms are used?
E.8. What technological coordination mechanisms are used?
Note: Not all questions were asked at each interview. Due to time constraints and
personnel interviewed, questions were selective.
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APPENDIX C
An example of core team responsibilities (see footnote)
ACTIVITY	 BUY ENG PTS LOG MFG FIN VCE
PLANNING
1. Initial identification of core team
requirement, and allocation of roles 	 1	 1	 1
2. Ensure supplier appoints Project Manager 	 1	 1	 1
3. Determine project feasibility - engineering
	 1
4. Determine project feasibility - cost
(commence ECM)
	 1	 1	 2
5. Determine project feasibility - capacity 	 2	 1
6. Determine project feasibility - timing	 2	 1	 2
7. Ensure production of Project Plan, and
monitor regularly	 2	 1	 2	 2
8. Ensure regular internal review of plan at
supplier	 1	 1	 1
9. Communicate programme information -
keydates	 1	 1
10.Communicate programme information-
volumes	 1	 1
11.Communicate programme information -
build requirements 	 1	 1
12.Produce Budget plan for
prototypes/development funding
	 2	 1	 2
DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
1. Develop design specification, including
reliability requirement
	 1
2. Ensure D&D programme is compatible
with project plan	 1
3. Discuss and agree D&D funding	 1	 2	 2
4. Cariy-out ongoing review of D&D
resource requirements	 1
5. Identif' P' time aspiration, and design to
suit	 1	 2
6. Organise periodic formal design reviews
	 1
7. Ensure design reviews feedback into
overall plan	 1
8. Identil' requirement and scope of Design
FMECA	 1
9. Review design following initial Design
FMECA	 1
10.Review process plan following initial
Design FMECA	 1	 1	 2
11.Ensure higher assembly parts are
considered	 1	 2
12.Review function, performance and vehicle
installation	 1	 2
13.Consider complexity	 1	 1	 2
14.Identify in-service and after market
requirements	 1
15.Identify component critical parameters	 1
16.Ensure Strategic Component Supplier
Review implementation 	 2	 1
17.Product validation - identify requirements
18.Product validation - monitor progress 	 1	 2
against plan
19.Maintain thawing status	 1	 2
1
PROCESS
1. Identify location and method of prototype
manufacture	 1	 2
2. Agree inspection, test and identification of
prototypes	 1	 2
3. Agree change control system 	 2	 1	 2
4. Ensure production and verification of
process plan	 2	 1
5. Ensure completion of initial Process
FMECA, and ensure ongoing review	 1	 1
6. Determine tool, fixture and facility
requirements	 2*	 1	 1
7. Identify critical process parameters	 1
8. Ensure Control Plans are produced and
reviewed	 1
9. Agree Conformance Testing requirements 	 1	 2
10.Monitor tool procurement and
commissioning plan	 1*	 1	 2
11.Monitor facility procurement and
commissioning plan	 2	 1
12.Monitor gauge and test equipment
procurement and commissioning plan 	 1	 1
13.Perform process critique once facility is in
place	 2	 1
14.Identify supplier process capability targets,
and monitor achievement 	 1
15.Review in-house storage and handling 	 2
16.Review in-house assembly process 	 2
17.Agree 'rate of climb' delivery plan 	 2
18.Monitor sub-supplier control	 1	 2	 1
LOGISTICS
1. Define Logistics functional specification 	 1
2. Agree capacity requirements, and optimise
facility utilisation	 2	 1	 2
3. Determine box/pallet design	 2	 1	 2
4. Agree number of boxes/pallets required 	 1
5. Agree component identification and
packaging	 1	 2	 2
6. Produce Budget Plan for boxes/pallets,
including replacement provision 	 1	 2
7. Carry-out leadtime analysis	 2	 1
8. Agree delivery method and frequency 	 2	 1	 2
9. Agree pallet procurement and test plan	 1	 2
10.Review 'P' time data	 2	 2	 2	 1
11.Issue schedules to support delivery
programme	 1
12.Monitor deliveries from Dl onwards 	 1	 1
COST/COMMERCIAL
1. Develop and issue Cost Pack 	 2	 1	 2	 2
2. Set initial Cost Targets (component,
tooling, weight)	 1*	 1	 2	 2
3. Agree developed Cost Target th supplier
4. Cany-out ongoing cost analysis 	 1	 1	 2	 2
5. Maintain Cost Detail Tracking Sheets 	 1	 1	 2	 2
6. Issue orders to support delivery 	 2	 1	 2
programme
7. Discuss and agree warranty contract 	 1
8. Agree non-standard contractual terms and 1 	 2
conditions
9. Ensure original equipment related price	 1	 2
agreement in place
1
Key: 1 = primary role; 2 = support role; * = with Tooling Engineer
BUY = Buyer; ENG = Engineer; PTS = Purchasing Technical Support; LOG =
Logistics; MFG = manufacturing; FiN = Finance; VCE = Vehicle Cost Estimating
Note: This appendix is an outline of core team responsibilities as compiled by one core
team for their personal management process. No inference should be made from
this towards Rover Group policy.
